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3ABSTRACT
Barg armasin was one of the chief sources of pepper in 
South East Asia during the period 1700-1747. The need for 
this commodity attracted the English, Dutch, Chinese and 
Indonesian merchants to the area* This study, therefore, is 
not only concerned with the development of Banjarmasin as a 
commercial mart but also v/ith the activities of the traders, 
particularly the Europeans in the region, and the response 
of the local rulers to their coming. Since the commercial 
policy of the rulers was shaped to a large extent by 
political forces, special attention is paid to the role of 
the t3ugis in local politics and an attempt is made to 
examine the effect of their intervention in the Civil War 
of the 1710*s on the pepper economy. In tracing the course 
of English and Dutch activities, stress is laid on the 
strategic and political considerations which besides the 
commercial ones, led the Europeans to enter the area.
This study also presents a detailed narration of the 
mechanics of trade in the port« In this connection, 
particular reference is made to the important part played 
by the Chinese merchants, and finally, the commercial and 
political activities of the aboriginal tribes, the Biajus, 
and the repercussions of Banjarose rule over these people.
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GLOSSARY
wax obtained from the honey«*comb of a 
special genus of bees called Apidae. It 
is used for manufacturing candles.
a concretionary substance found in certain 
apes or monkeys of Borneo and certain other 
Indonesian islands. It is used to 
counteract poisons.
consultation or discussion.
a type of nest made by swiftlets which Chinese 
eat as a delicacy.
an extract from a type of shrub, or herb: 
found in Java, Borneo or Sumatra for the 
treatment of cutaneous diseases and also 
used as a purgative.
a steel-yard for weighing pepper or other 
products, (commonly used by the Chinese 
and Indonesians).
sap extracted from a herbaceous plant grown 
in Borneo and other parts of the East Indies 
for medicinal purposes.
estuary or mouth of a river.
master of a junk or other trading-ship.
rice which is not winnowed or cooked.
palisade or stockade.
light Indonesian sailing craft.
WEIGHTS M D  MEASURES
1 kati: 16 tchils or Ik lbs. (r.vcrdupois)
1 pikul: 133-134 (English) lbs. or 122-125 (Dutch) lbs.
1 bahnr: varied betxveen 360 and 600 lbs.
1 ganteng: 3 1/3 - 3k lbs. (evcrdupois)
1 keyan: 3,400 lbs. and considered the equivalent of
a last (or ton of shipping spree) or two tons 
(measurement).
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J. Landsheer and J.M. Broun
A. Broyell and J.M. Broun 
P. Snippe and P. Kamerbeek
P. Snippe and C. Braine 
C. Marre and D. Brouwer
J. Brouwer and G. Keyser
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
A - ORIGINS
Situated in the south-eastern part of Borneo,
Banjarmssin is drained by the Barito or Banjar river, which
has its source in the central range of mountains commonly
known as the- ^unong TeMng range.^ The principal tributary
of the Barito is the Negara or Bahen, while two other
important rivers flowing parallel to it into the Java sea
2
are the Kahajan and the Kapuas Murung. Between the mountains 
of the interior and the swampy coastal lowlands lies an 
irregular hilly zone covered predominantly with tropical 
rain forests. The climate is equatorial with heavy rains 
during the period of the south-west monsoon from May to
September, while a drier spell prevails between October and
a
April, the season of the north-east monsoon."
1 . J.J. de Hollander, Handle!ding bi.i do beoefening dor
Land en Volkenkunde*van Nederlandsch Post-Indies 
Vol. II,"(Breda, 1884),' p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 23. The Kahajan and the Kapuas Murung are also
known as the Great Dayak and Small Dayak rivers
respectively.
3. E.H.G, Dobby, Southeast Asia, (London, 1953), p. 244;
C.A. Fisher, Southeast Asia, (London, 1964), pp. 221-23.
4. Fisher, op. cit., p. 215; Dobby, op. cit., pp. 36-39.
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In the seventeenth century, settlement was peripheral, 
bordering the coastal regions and estuaries, with river 
navigation as the most practicable means of transport.
The early immigrants from Java and the people of Malay stock 
from other parts of the archipelago, for instance, settled 
on the lower banks of the Barito river, but when the royal 
capital was shifted to Martopura after the destruction of 
Banjarmssin in 1612 by the Dutch, the colonists also noved 
to this area. Consequently, Kayu Tinggi and Tartas (the 
river-island lying between the Barito raid Antassan-Kween 
rivers)^ were established as new towns, while smaller pockets 
of settlement were found in the neighbouring districts of- 
Rian Kiwo, Riaa Kenan, Margasari and Pulau Laut% Due to 
their good harbour facilities, Banjarmasin and Tartas 
attracted foreign traders, including Arabs, Bengalis, 
Madurese, Balinese and Chinese, a large number of whom
7
became permanent residents. By the mid-seventeenth century, 
the Bq hjarose settlements had extended to Anuntoi in Upper 
Negara, Kota Waringin and Sampit,
5. C.A.L.M. Schwaner, Borneo, Pt. I, (Amsterdam, 1853), p, 15.
6 * Ibid,, p* 43; Hollander, Handle!ding, pp. 136-37.
7* Schwaner, op. cit., pp. 55 & 70-71^ Hollander,
Handloiding, pp% 139-41. For details of port facilities 
and the volume of trade handled by Ban;] arms sin, 
especially with reference to the early twentieth century, 
see R. Brocrsma, Handel en Bedri.if in Zuicl on Oost-Borneo. 
(The Hague, 1927)'', p'p."lB-£fe.
13
The Ban;)arose, who claimed to be the result of 
intermarriage between the original Javanese inhabitants
o
and the foreign immigrants, and described as "well-shaped,
clean limbed, middle statured" with "black hair and a
complexion somewhat darker than Mulattoes"9 lived in attap
huts built on stilts or wooden logs along the river banks.
Their chief occupations were fishing, pepper-trading, boat-
making, handicraft-work, especially with wood or rattan,
TOgold and diamond mining. w Although the majority of Banjarose
were not inclihGcl to wal'd s agriculture, small plots of padi,
tapioca, and sugar cane were planted for home consumption
as in Amuntai, Plcihari and Lampcj. Pepper was cultivated
on a larger scale in Puleu Lout and Molukko for commercial
purposes. The imported articles were cotton, gambir, tobacco,
11salt, rice, copper, porcelain ware and Chinese silks.
S. Hollander, Handleiding. pp. 129-305 Broorsma, op, cit..D. 17.
9* D. Becckman, A voyage to and from the island of Borneo 
in the East Indies. (London. 1718), p. 40.
10. Holland or, Handleiding. p. 130; Anon., ."The island of .Borneo; 
its situation, extent, history and divisions, \dth
notices of its principal inhabitants, the Malays, Chinese, 
Bugis and-Dayakp", The Chinese Repository. Pt. IV, 1835/36, 
(Canton, 1836), p. 504. The ‘Chinese records mentioned 
that rhinoceros horns, peacocks, parrots and deer-hidcs 
were among the exported articles*- W.P. Grooncveldt,
"History of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1S43), Book 323", - 
Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca. (London, 1877),
p. 107.
11. Schwaner, op. cit.. p. 90.
14
While the Ban;]arose were confined to the valleys,
the more hilly intermediate zones and the middle valleys of
Ulu Pulau Petak, Mengkatip, Kapuas, Ulu Sampit and Kahnjsn
12were inhabited by Biajus or Njodjus, the aboriginal
Dayak tribes of south-east Borneo* Recognised as a
"vigilant, agile, robust race of wen having a yellowish
coloured skin," the Biajus were generally taller, fairer and
13
more bellicose than the Bnnjarese. Living in long-housos,
12. Schwaner, op. cit. * pp. 131-44; Hollander, Hand lei ding., 
pp. 48-55; S. Muller, Reizen in den Indischen Archipel. 
(Amsterdam, 1857), p. 1; M.T.K. Pcrclaer, Ethnogr a phis chc 
beschri.iving der da.yaks* (Zelt Bonmel, 1870); C. Hose 
anS" V/« Mcdougall, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*
2 Vols., (London, 19u12).
13. J.J. De Roy, Kachclijke Reys-Togt na Borneo en Atchin, 
(Leiden, 1706), - (English translation in Mackenzie 
Collection, 1822), f. 128; Schwaner, op. cit.. p. 135. 
Hose and Mcdougall made the following general 
observation about the Dayak tribes of Borneo; "These 
peoples present no very great differences of physical 
character. All are of medium height; their skin-colour 
ranges from a rich medium brown to a very pale
cafe-au-lsit, hardly deeper than the colour of cream. 
Their hair is nearly black or very dark brown, and 
generally quite lank, but in. some cases wavy or even 
almost curly. Their faces show in nearly all cases, 
though in very diverse degrees, some of the well-known 
mongoloid characters, the wide cheek bones, the 
small oblique eyes, the peculiar fold of the upper 
eyelid at its nasal end, and the scanty beard. In some 
individuals these traces are very slight and in fact 
not certainly perceptible. The nose varies greatly 
in shape, but is usually rather wide at the nostrils, 
and in very many cases the plane of the nostrils is 
tilted a little upwards and forwards." - Pagan Tribes«, 
Vol. I, p..37.
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they were a migratory people who did not stay longer than 
a few years at one site, essentially because their movements 
were largely influenced by agricultural and religious factors* 
As ladang planters of pepper and hill-padi, the Biajus had
1 A.
to move frequently in search of virgin soil for cultivation* 
Also being animists, they would leave their homes as soon 
as epidemics or other calamities occurred, believing that 
the spiritual forces rendered their dwellings unfit for 
further residence* Hence, with their strong beliefs in 
the abundance of good and bad spirits, manifested, for example, 
in the incidence of diseases or thunder and lightning, the 
Biajus would stay away from evil forces or propitiate them 
through worship or sacrifice* Besides cultivation, the 
Bio jus were also engaged in diamond and gold mining, 
collection of bezoar-stonos, beeswax, dragons-blood, fishing 
and crude wood-carving. They would often bqrter their 
products for beads, sarongs, copper utensils, salt and
14. Schwaner, op* cit*., p. 138; Hose and Mcdougall, o p . cit*. 
Vol. I, p. 41.
15. Perclaer, op. cit*. p. 4; Hose and Mcdougall, op* cit.. 
p. 41. Scharer observed that "the idea of God runs 
through the whole culture and religion like a scarlet 
thread* and that it is in fact the focus of life and 
thought.11 H. Scharer, Nga.iu Religion - The Conception 
of God among South Borneo people (translated by
R. Needham), (The Hague, 1963), p. 6 .
16
tobacco from the Indonesian or foreign merchants*
The socio-political structure of the Biajus was very
simple consisting primarily of a tribal chief who was
either the head of his family or a longhouse elder called 
17Anai. Succession to chieftainship was hereditary, 
although in certain cases, a Biaju who had distinguished 
himself in war or had accomplished other feats would also 
be elected# Each village was ruled independently by its 
Amaic unless there was a defensive or offensive alliance
no
with another village. Although the extension of Banjarc.se
political control over the Negara and Kapuas territories in
the mid-seventeenth century did not really upset the basic
structure of Biaju society, nevertheless, it introduced
certain new features into the socio-political system of the
latter. In acknowledgement of the suzerainty of Banjnrnasin,
the Biajus were obliged to pay tribute to the central
government at Martapura via the Banjarese administrators
19who were sent to these districts. ' Tribute was of two
16. De Roy, op# cit.. f. 128°, Iiollandcr, op. cit.# pp. 121-22:; 
Beeckman, op. cit.. p. 44^ Journal Borneoq (1701-02),
20 September 1701.
17. Hollander, op# cit.. p. 67.
18. Ibid# g Hose and Mcdougall, op. cit.# Vol. I, p. 41.
19. Hollander, Hand1aiding, p# 58.
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types; hasil. an annual payment in gold to the value of
five per cent for the products of the land (which thenceforth,
was treated os government land), and serah* the compulsory
levy on the natural produce, primarily pepper, which
occasionally was also exchanged for necessities such os
provisions ar.d cotton.^ The collection of tribute was more
effectively enforced in the riverine villages adjacent to
Banjarose settlements, but in the more remote interior
where the Biajus were 1 sheltered1 by dense jungle and swift
rapids, the Banjarose authorities found difficulty in levying
dues and the aborigines there were relatively more independent
21than their fellowmcn in the volleys*
In contrast to the Biajus, the Banjaresc- had a much 
more advanced and intricate socio-political structure, which 
understandably, because of the influence exerted by the 
original immigrants, was based on the Javanese feudal 
pattern* At the head of the political structure reigned 
the Pananbahan or Sultan* who was in theory, the supreme
22ruler of the land. Below him were the K.i a his or Feng crons *
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 59.
22. B. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), ff. 824-27.
The foreign names are underlined only in this introductory 
section to give emphasis to the terras but not in the 
other chapters.
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princos or chieftains ruling over territorial units normally
enfeoffed to them by the Sultan, and whose main functions
were those of tax-collection and general administration.
Although the Kiahis were usually nominated by the Panambahan,
it was nevertheless widely accepted that a son would succeed
to the office on his fatherfs deathj in such a case, the
Sultan merely had to give his verbal consent to the new
appointment. In return for his office, each K.iahi was
expected to apportion a certain percentage of the tolls he
23collected to the Pananbahan.
A great social barrier existed between the nobility
24or Orang Bangsawan and the commoners (Orang Mardika).
Although at the village or knmpong level, the K.i ahi 
assigned administrative duties to the kampong head (Pembekcl), 
and appointed boatmen, bodyguards and personal attendants 
from among his own relatives or 'hangers-on1 (Orang Patan), 
the rest of the paid labour was supplied by the ordinary 
citizens, who were essentially from the peasant class. 
Compulsory services and the most menial tasks, however, 
were carried out by the slaves (Orang Abdi), who were either 
debtors (Orang Budak) or Orang Tangkapan, offenders of the 
law (Adat), and prisoners of war, including pirates and
23. Hollander, Handleiding, p. 6 S.
24. Schwaner, Borneo, pp. 167-68.
captured Biaju rebels as well as women and children.~ 
Although endogamy was practised to prevent the upper social 
groups from marrying the lower ones, nevertheless, there 
were instances where Banjarose chieftains took Biaju women, 
noted for their beauty, as their wives. ^
Social subdivision was not only prevalent in the 
inland states of Rekonpay, Sampit, Amuntai and Mendawci but 
also extended to the harbour principalities of Kayu Tinggi 
and Tartas, where a small group of foreign patricians 
(Orang Tamoi). comprising Chinese, Gujeratis and foreign 
Indonesians, were clearly distinct from the majority of 
retail traders, artisans and slaves. Because of their wealt 
and knowledge of languages, the patricians were selected by 
the Panambahan to act as Shahbandars. with authority not 
only to transact business between foreign merchants but also 
to collect port duties.^ In recognition of their services, 
these foreign dignitaries were often given titles of honour 
such as Kjabi and Pengeran by the ruler. Early in the 17001 
Lim Kim Ko, the Chinese Cap it an, was also known as 111 a hi Pioxa
Ibid.g W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, 
(The Hague/Bandung, 1959), pi 134.
26. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 26 January 1707, SFR (7), 
no page.
27. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies«, Pt. I, 
(The liaguc/Bandung 1955) , p T 28.
28. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 26 January 1707, SFR (7).
20
Whilst a Gujerati was given the title of Pengeran Marta
Although the nobility constituted only a small class 
compared to the mass of commoners, there were however, 
various divisions according to origin and office within its 
ranks. These ranks, with titles to denote the status of 
the holder, were apparently introduced into Banjarmasin by
30the first Javanese immigrants during the Mojapahit period.
Sons of the Panambahan were known as Pengerans or Gusti if
they were minors § princesses were called Putri but were
elevated to the level of Ratu on their marriage. The
children of a princess and a commoner were addressed as
Nana rig or Andin. but the Panambahan could increase their
31status to Raden or Mas, common titles for the nobility.
K.1 ahi. Dcmang. Mantri. Patih or D.iaksa were high-ranking
titles accorded to chief administrators or Government 
32officers. Generally, it was customary for the nobility
29. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 824.
30. Hollander, Hand1elding. p. 69.
31. A. van der Ven, "Aanteokcning omtrcnt het rijk
Band jama sin s chets van het Martapoeroesche hof on 
van het landbestuur", Ti.jdschrift voor Indische 
Taal-Land en Volkcnkunde. Batavian"General 1X7 (1860), 
pp. 114-16; L.W.C. van den Berg, De Inlandsche Rangen 
en Titels op Java en Madoera. (Bata via^ "~ 1887) , p • 1-11; 
Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsche-Indie. (The Hague,
19i7' and 1521) ,'pp. 7 and 361-65.
32. Ibid.
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and top ofricir.ls to affix sub-titles, such as Adi no tl
(Door; ti) , Tenenggong q Mangku « Aria <, K^abehi, Iiiftabey 9
and Rang.g a to their main titles to enhance their prestige.00
In the first half of the eighteenth century it was estimated
that there were over' twenty Pengernns and thirty K.i ahis in 
34Banjarnasin. Some of the K.i a his were ha rang Bay a, the 
shnhbandar of Banjarmasin, Wangsa Duta, shahbandar of Kayu 
Tinggi, Bupn Buru, a pepper merchant, and JUrce Tulis Mar.di,
oc
the treasurer of the customs-house at Tertas.
With a large entourage of relatives and officials, it
was difficult for the Panu fbahan to hold paramount sway in
his territory. Although the appointment of chieftains,
distribution of fiefs, guardianship of the Treasury and
the decreeing of war and peace were royal prerogatives,
the K,jahis and Pcngerrns were virtually despots in areas
36under their jurisdiction. Apart from the district chiefs, 
several persons also exercised considerable authority in 
Banjarmasin, namely, the religious head (Mufti), and the
ges •
33. Van den Berg, De Inlandsche Rangon. p. S.
34. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. £27.
Van den Berg and Ruinbeek to the Batavian Council,
12 April 1747, KA 2591, p. 57.
35. English factors to E.I.C., S March 1740, SFR (9), ff. 17-25.
36. Congreve to E.I.C., 22. June 1746, CFR (52), f, 13$
Hollander, Randleiding. p. 69.
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The Mufti was an important member of the Banjar Council* 
All Muslim matters such as court ritual and practices, 
declaration of festival periods and interpretation of the 
lunar calendar were dealt with by him with the assistance 
of the religious teachers of lower rank* Being a religious 
people, the Banjrrese would seldom Meke any political or 
economic decision without first obtaining the advice of 
the Mufti.37
With regard to law and order, De Roy stated that there
38was "neither order nor command11 in Banj armasin* ° This 
statement is partially incorrect, for although there were 
no regular courts or written law, a certain code of
bsbehaviour was prescribed by the Adat«, or customary law.^
For example, offenders against the Ad a t were tried before
Pengeran Mangku, the judge for life and death, and Kjahi
40
Denang, the Justice of the Peace in Tartas. Minor 
offences were generally neglected but in more serious crimes 
such as those involving personal injury to the plaintiff, 
the accused could be punished by rettsn-strokes or sent to 
the agricultural regions for hard labour, while murderers
37. Van dcr Vcn, "Aantckening'1, TBg, Vol. IX, I860, p* 114*
38. De Roy, op. cit.„ f. 167.
39. Schwaner, op* cit.* pp. 165-66.
40. Swartz to 14 March 1715, LB (15), f* 823.
23
41could be executed. However, the English factors claimed
thr.t the two judges were ,la cursed crew, who had neither
honesty nor curragc / courageJ/V* but were biased or 
42
corrupted. They added that Peng cron Mr.ngku and Kj ahi
Dennng, who were also engaged in the pepper trade, would
often accept bribes and use their influential position to
extract loans from the Chinese, who ashed for persons1 
no
favours, such os the release of Chinese prisoners or the 
right to establish, retail stores in .the town.
Despite the division of control in the government, a
certain degree of cohesion, manifested in the Ban,] arc sc
Council, nevertheless existed between the Panambahan and
the nobility in -natters of state importance. The Council,
the legislative and executive orgen of the country, consisted
of the Fane riba hen Q six chief longerons q four K.i a his. four
44Orang Kay as and the Mufti. It ir\ot frequently to hold 
bicharas or conferences and to receive foreign dignitaries.* 
On many occasions, it presented a united front to the foreign 
merchants, such as the Dutch and the English. The English
41. Van dcr Von, op. cit.., pp* 115-16.
42. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 27 January 1701.
43. Ibid.
44. Ho3.1 nndcr, op. cit., p• 69.
45. English factors at Banjo, run sin to E.I.C., 3 March 1740, 
SFR (9), f. 17.
24
commented that it was impossible to negotiate secretly with
any Council member as the nev/s would inevitably leak out to
4G
the rest of the court. Beecuso of this apparent sense of 
unity among the Banjarose court officials, the English end 
Dutch found that they constantly lied to exorcise the utmost 
discretion in dealing with the Banjarose authorities; 
otherwise their commercial ventures would be jeopardised 
ar.d they would have to leave Ban3arma.sin with little or no 
pepper•
At this juncture, it would be appropriate to discuss 
the cultivation of pepper, the primary product of Banjarmasin. 
Pepper was grown along the clayish foothills of the hegara
highlands in Bekonnay, Lusong, Barambai, Komenting and
ah  a c .
Bonava Assam, a \C the more sandy river-banksxo of Auuntai,
4'
Molukko, Kayu Tinggi and Pulau Laut. Ladang or shifting 
dry cultivation in which old woods were burned to clear sites 
was commonly practised by the Biajus, the principal cultivators, 
and some Banjorese. As soon as the virgin land lost its
46. Ibid.
47. Valentijn, Pud en Blew Post Indien, Pt. Ill, (Mackenzie 
Private C 011e c t i on ( G4A)), f . 352.
A f*'‘-HO . According to Ridley, well-drained areas along river 
banks were the nost suited to pepper cultivation.
L .1 . Ridley, Spices, (London, 1912), p.25b.
4 9 . T. Rodgett to Captain Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6B),
Bo. 2 2.
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fertility, the planter would desert his old plot and move
50on in search of fresh ground to replant.
Reference to the methods of pepper cultivation in 
Banjarrnasin are lacking in the Dutch and English records.
51
Nevertheless, the accounts of Buchanan, Hunter and Marsden 
describing the systems of pepper planting in Malabar, Penang 
and West Sumatra can be assumed to apply generally to 
Banjarrnasin as well.
When the site for the pepper plants had been prepared,
poles which were kept about six to seven feet apart from each
other were stuck into the ground, after which two vines were
attached to each pole. In Borneo, the use of poles to prop
up the pepper vines differed from the practice in West
52Sumatra where chengkrings were planted. Although the pepper 
plot had to be kept weeded, care had to be taken to ensure 
that the roots of the pepper vines were not injured or the 
soil nutrients exhausted, particularly during the dry months
50. Ibid.
51. F. Buchanan, A Journey from Madras through the countries 
of Mysore. Canara and Malabar. Vol. II, (London,, 1807), 
pp. 463-675 W. Hunter, ^Remarks on the species of pepper 
which are found on Prince of Wales island", Asiatic 
Researches, Vol. IX-(London, 1809), pp. 383-9'3$'
W." Marsden, The History of Sumatra., (London, 1811),
pp. 108-18.
52, Marsden, op. cit., p. 108.
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of July and August when the ground moisture had to be retained.
In the second or third year, to ensure high productivity, the
vines were layered or fturned-downf, soon after the plant
5 3
had borne its first fruits. The layering process which
had to be carried out before the berries ripened involved
releasing the vines from the pole and bending them horizontally
into the earth. Subsequently, only two vines were allowed
to twine around the pole to avoid weakening the whole parent
54
plant through excessive foliation. For purposes of re­
cultivation, often young suckers (lada sulor). were obtained 
from nodes of old vines. Alternatively, roots which were 
direct sproutings from stems that were layered could be cut 
off and transplanted to the pole for propagation.55 This 
method of cultivation by cuttings called lada anggor had 
more fruitful results, for the plant bore fruit shortly after
fresh stems grew whilst vines grown from lada sulor took
56
five to six years to reach fruition.
The cultivator could not expect any return from pepper 
planting for two or three years unless he had a second 
garden. It is doubtful that many Biajus owned two or more
53. Ibid., p. IIO5 Buchanan, op. cit.,, p. 464.
54. Marsden, op. cit.. p. 110.
55. Ibid.. pp. 110-115 Hunter, op. cit.. p. 387.
56. Marsden, op. cit.. p. 112.
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plots of land* Apparently, between the planting and
harvesting seasons, the majority of cultivators in the
Negara regions maintained themselves by bartering products
such as gold, bezoar-stones, dragon blood and diamonds for
salt, tobacco, cotton and trinkets ’ from the lowland Banjarese,
57Indonesian or Chinese merchants.
Once the harvesting season commenced, the Biaju
cultivator was assured of a more steady and abundant supply
of pepper than his competitors in the lowlying pepper areas
of Kayu Tinggi and Molukko. Although the harvesting period
in Banjarmasin officially lasted from September to March, it
was possible to obtain small quantities of the product from
Negara during the other months of the year. On occasion,
if climatic conditions were favourable, a second crop could
59be expected in March.
The type of pepper produced in Negara differed 
from that grown in the other regions of Banjsrmasin. In fact,
00three varieties, all of which were sub-species of Piper Nigrum.
57* De Roy, Hachell.jke Reys* (Mackenzie Collection, 1822),
f* 287.
58. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 November 1704, SFR (7), 
f. 37.
59. Ibid.
60. I.E. Burkill, A Dictionary of the Economic Produce of 
the Malay Peninsula., 'fct. IlV (LondonQ 1 9 3 5 ) p. 1749.
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the black pepper originally planted on the Malabar coast,
could be distinguished by the shape of the leaf, the rate
61of growth, life-span and the siae of the grain. These
sub-types x^ ere named after, areas where they were cultivated*
The commonest and smallest grains x\rere derived from Negara
pepper which was usually dusty and light. When weighed,
Negara pepper measured about 32 lbs* in 10 gantangs* The
plant bore fruit practically the whole year round but was 
62
short-lived* Molukko or Laut pepper contained much larger,
cleaner and heavier berries. Ten gantangs of Molukko pepper
weighed between 35 and 37 pounds. Its productive rate
63
though slower, lasted longer. The intermediate variety
was Kayu Tinggi pepper xjbich had medium-sized but less dusty
grains than Negara pepper. The weight of 10 gantangs of
64
Kayu Tinggi pepper \7as between 32 to 35* pounds. Another 
species of pepper which was occasionally sold but not produced 
in Banjar.masin was long pepper, which was the unripe spadix 
or fruit spike of the Piper Longun* The red spikes were 
obtained by constant pruning of the pepper vine x/hich was
61. Ibid*
62. E* Arnold to E.I.C.,^ January 1702, JFR (GB), Mo. 23.
63. Ibid *
64. Ibid.
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65trained to a stake soon after planting. A native of the
Circar mountains in India, long pepper was cultivated in
Semarang, Macassar and several south-east Asian areas and
66
was brought to Tartas by Indonesian coastal traders.
While black pepper was sold by gantang or pikul weight, 
commercial transactions in long pepper occurred only in pikul 
weight, usually at 3 or 3k Spanish dollars per pikul.^
Besides black pepper, white pepper Ttiich was rarer in
Banjarmasin than in Palembang, was occasionally processed
for sale to the European buyers. Because of the time and
labour required in the method of processing the product, and
the little encouragement given by the chiefs to increase
production, white pepper was expensive. Although the English
East India Company expressed its intention of purchasing a
68
small amount of white pepper in 1699, none .was bought, 
probably because the Company found it financially more
worthwhile to buy the black variety. Except for occasional
69purchases, as in 1728 when 60 pikuls were procured, the 
Dutch also refrained from shipping white pepper, because the
65. T.C. Archer, Popular Economic Botany, (London, 1853), 
p. 103; Burkill, op. cit.. p. 1751.
66. Rodgett to Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 22.
67. Ibid.
6 8 . E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1699, LB (11), f. 57.
69# Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975g
f. 618.
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Banjarese would not lower the price from seven to eight reals
to six or. six and; a.half rdals per pikul which was the rate
70fixed by the Company.
The bigger grains selected for processing white pepper
were generally plucked from the vines as soon as they ripened?
(unlike black pepper where the seeds were not allowed to ripen),
although it was not easy to find all the berries maturing
71simultaneously. Thereafter, they were put into pits dug
72
out along river banks or swampy areas for about two weeks.
Leaves were laid on top of the pits to prevent the berries
from drying up. After the specified length of time, the
swollen berries were taken out of the pits and decorticated
by hand-rubbing or trampling. They were then washed and
73dried in the sun. Another method practised by the planters
was to allow the berries to rot in the pits until the husks 
74
fell. Although this process involved less work for the
cultivator, the results were less effective for many berries
became discoloured and the inner grains were damaged. From
twelve or thirteen gantangs of black pepper, only five gantangs
75of white pepper could be produced.
70. Ibid.
71. Marsden, .on-, cit. p p . 113; Buchanan.-‘op » "cit.. p. 465.
72. P. van ^am, Beschrvvinge van de Post Indische Compagnie.,
Vo I*. II, pt. I, (Stapel,'Hague, 1931), p. 305.
73. Ibid.
74. Marsden, on. cit., p. 118.
75. E. Arnold to E.I.C., 15 January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 23.
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B - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The origins of Banjarmasin as a political entity are
obscure due to the scarcity and unsatisfactory nature of
early Banjarese sources which were largely compiled from
76local mythology. Nevertheless, available evidence seems
to suggest that Javanese influence was preponderant in
Banjarmasin during the early period. For instance, in the
mid-fourteenth century, Banjarmasin was listed as a dependency
7 7of Majapahit in the Neearakertajtama. This subjection to
Majapahit was apparently the result of the marriage between
Raden Putra, a Javanese prince, and Putri Tanjaong Buihi,
the daughter of Lembong Mangkurot, the ruler of the first
78
colony of south-east Borneo. With his ascension to the 
throne, Raden Putra, now Sultan Surio Nata, became the
76. For a non-historical, i.e. mythological account of the 
origins of Banjarmasin, see J. Hageman, "Bijdrage tot 
de Geschiedenis van Borneo11, TBG VI, (1857), pp. 225-46;
Van der Ven, MAanteekeningen,f, TBG IX, (1860), p. 93;
F.S.A. de Clercq, "De Vroegste Geschiedenis van 
Bandjarmasin", TBG XXIV. (1677), pp. 238-66; J.J. Meyer, 
"Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Geschiedenis van het 
Voormalig Bandjermasinsche Rijk", De Indische Gids.
Vol. I, (1899), pp. 257-80; A.A. Cense, De Kroniek van 
Band.iarmasin. (Santpoort, 1928), pp. 2-91$ J.J. Ras,
Hika.yat Band.iar - A Study in Malay Historiography.
T^he Hague, 1968), pp. 1-4.
77. A.H, Hill, "Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai", (a revised romanised 
version of Raffles M.S. 67 with an English translation) - 
JMBRAS. Vol. XXXIII, Pt. 2, (June, 1960), pp. 107 and 166; 
Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Pt. I, pp. 30-31.
78. For more details, see Sehwaner, Borneo, pp. 43-46.
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79founder of the sultanate of Banjarmasin.
When the power of Majapahit declined between 1513 and
1528, the suzerainty which it had hitherto exercised over
Sukadana, Pasir, Kutei, Sambas, Landak, Kota Waringin and
80Banjarmasin shifted to the principality of Demak. The 
supremacy of Demak in the 1520fs was significant because 
under its auspices Islam was introduced into Banjarmasin,
81thereby transforming it from a Hindu into a Muslim state.
This transitional period from Hinduism to Islam roughly
coincided with the expansionist phase of Banjarmasin, for
under the rule of Sultan Suria Angsa, the borders of the
kingdom were extended to include Batang Tabalong, Batang
82Balangan, Alai and Amandit. During the early decades of 
the seventeenth century, practically the whole of the south­
79. Ibid., p. 46o
80. Schrieke, op. cit.. p# 31. In recent times, the account 
of the court poet, Prapanc^ on the territorial extent
of Majapahit has been challenged by authors like Hall, 
Wertheim and Cense. They state that though Majapahit 
could have exercised a measure of hegemony over the 
lesser islands of the east, it is doubtful that other 
parts of the Malayan Archipelago listed in the V...
Hegarakertagama remained within its effective control5 
rather, relationships between these states and Majapahit 
were limited to mere payment of tribute. - See D.G.E. 
Hall, A History of South East Asia, (London, 1955), 
pp. 78-81; Wertheim, op. cit.. pp. 51-52; Cense, 
op. cit.. pp. 108-09.
81. Cense, op. cit., p. 109.
82* Ihid.. pp. 111-1 2 .
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west, south-east and eastern regions of Borneo were paying 
homage to Banjarmasin. In 1636, for example, the Panambahan 
claimed Sambas, Lawei, Sukadana, Kota Waringin, Pembuang, 
Sampit, Mendawei, Upper and Lower Kahajan, Kutei, Pasir,
Pulau Laut, Satui, Asem-Asem, Kintap and Sawarangan as his
oo
vassal states.
The political "control" of the Javanese coastal 
principalities over their Borneo tributaries inevitably 
declined with the rising power of Banjarmasin, Early in the 
seventeenth century, Pajang, which succeeded Demak as the 
chief Javanese state after 1574, did not receive any tribute 
from Banjarmasin. Similarly, in 1615, the attempts of Tuban
to subjugate Banjarmasin with the co-operation of Madura and
84Surabaya were fiercely resisted. The task of restoring 
Javanese hegemony over Borneo, therefore, was left to Sultan 
Agung of Mataram (1613-1646) who emerged as the supreme 
ruler of Java after defeating his rivals from Japara and 
Grisek early in the 1610's, and Tuban, Madura and Surabaya 
in 1619, 1624 and 162-5 respectively.88
In launching his colonisation programme, which included
83. Ibid., p. 54.
84. Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
85. Ibid.. p. 36.
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not only the Javanese coastal ports but also the south, 
south-western and south-eastern states of Borneo, Sultan 
Agung managed to assert his authority over Sukadana in 1622.c 
Nine Jrears later, the Banjarese anticipated a large-scale 
attack by Mataram, which fortunately for them did not
o n
materialise. Despite the continued threat from Mataram
and the fear of the withdrawal of Javanese rice-supplies on
88
which it was largely dependent, Banjarmasin did not recognise 
Mataram's suzerainty until 1637 when peace was concluded 
between both states,89 At this stage, with the influx of a 
greater number of immigrants who were the victims of Sultan 
Agungfs aggressive policy, Javanese influence over Borneo 
became more marked than before, and thus it can be assumed 
that the seaports and towns of Borneo became diffusion centres 
of Javanese culture.
Relations between Mataram and its subject states 
deteriorated early in the 1660's when Banjarmasin and Sukadana
8 6 . H.J. de Graff, De Regering van Sultan Agung. Vorst van 
Mataram 1613-1643, 'en die zi.in voorganger Panambahan 
^eda-Ing-Krap.iak 1601-16IL3. (The Hague. 1958) q p. 279.
87. Ibid.
8 8 . Schrieke, on. cit., p. 75, Also see Chapter II, pp. 96-98 
for more examples of economic sanctions against the 
Banjarese.
89. De Grasf, op. cit,, p* 279.
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90ceased to pay tribute to their suzerain in 1659. Moreover,
to protect themselves against future threats by Mataram, the
latter ti/o states concluded a defensive and offensive pact
91with each other in 1661. A second attempt Dy Mataram to 
re-establish its hegemony over the Borneo states seven years 
later failed miserably, largely because of the decline of its 
military power, which meanwhile had been expended in curbing 
the rebellious Javanese principalities. Subsequently, in 
the 1670*s, a series of internal wars in Java which led to
Qp
the downfall of Mataram, ^ accorded Banjarmasin the opportunity 
of regaining its full autonomy.
While the lucrative trade in diamonds attracted the
93
Europeans, Portuguese, Dutch and English to Sukadana, it 
was the growth of the pepper production which raised 
Banjarmasin from a fishing village into a flourishing pepper 
mart of south-east Asia in the early decades of the seventeenth 
century. Initially, pepper production was accelerated to 
meet the demands of the Chinese junk merchants, who had 
hitherto procured their supplies from Bantam, Patani and
90. Cense, op. cit., p. 116.
91. Ibid.
92. Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
93. J. Willi, The early relations of England with Borneo 
to 1805? (Lahgenzalza, 1922), p. 2.
36
94Jambi. In the 1610*8 the Chinese were ousted from the 
pepper trade of Bantam and Jambi by the English and Dutch.
They could also not obtain any pepper from Patani, after the 
pepper estates of Johore and Kedah which exported their 
supplies to Patani had been destroyed by the Achinese, As
95a result, the Chinese turned their attention to Banjarmasin. 
They were rapidly followed by the Javanese and the Macassarese, 
and finally, by the Portuguese, Dutch, English and the Danes.
In attempting to establish trade with the Banjarese,
the Dutch Company sent G. Michielszoon to Banjarmasin in 1606,
but the undertaking proved a failure when the factor was
96
murdered in Banjarmasin the following year. No punitive
expedition was sent until 1612 when a squadron was despatched
to destroy the capital of old Banjar, thereby compelling the
97Banjarese court to establish a new base at Martapura.
For the next decadeJ the Dutch refrained from making any 
commercial contact with the Banjarese.
94. M.A.P. Mellink-Roelofsz« Asian Trade and European 
Influence, (The Hague, 1962), pp. 169, 245-47 and 258.
95. Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 54-55$ Meilink-Boelofsz, <
., p . 262.  '
96. L.C.D. Van Dijk, Neerlands vroegste betrekkingen met 
Borneo. Den Solo-Archipel. Cambodia, Siam en Cochin-China. 
(Amsterdam, 1862), p. 1$ Cense, op. cit.. p. 94.
97. Van Dijk, op. cit.. p. 2; Cense, op. cit.. p. 94.
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In 1626 however, at the request of the Panambahan,
th€) Bataviaft Council permitted pepper from Banjarmasin to
98be sold at Batavia♦ Apparently, the fear of an attack by
Mataram motivated the Panambahan to make this approach in
exchange for protection against his enemies* The establishment
of Dutch-Banjarese relations culminated in the ratification
of a treaty between both parties in September 1635, whereby
the Sultan promised to concede the pepper monopoly to the
Company on condition that the Dutch should restore his former
99
vassal states of Pasir and Kutei* The Batavian authorities,
anxious to expel their rivals, the Macassarese and the English
from the Banjarese ports, immediately ordered a fleet under
100
the command of Pool to sail to Pasir and Kutei. Pasir was
ravaged when its inhabitants refused to submit, but Kutei
pledged itself to recognise Banjarese sovereignty and the
10TDutch monopoly of the pepper trade.
98* Dogh Register* Batavia. 3.626, 22 May 1626, p. 256$
Van Dijk, op. cit*. p. 10*
99* The treaty was signed by the Banjarese ambassador, Retna 
di Ratya and the Batavian Council. In the treaty, the 
Banjarese Council promised the exclusive sale of pepper 
at 5 reals per pikul to the Dutch provided the latter 
sent a ship or frigate to Banjarmasin and advanced 
3,000 reals* See J.E* Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum 
Keer1ando-Indlcum* Vol. I, (The Hague, 1907), pp. 270-71.
100f P.A* Leupe, "Stukken betrekkelijk Borneo, 1635-1636n, 
BTLV, TOl.III, 1855, pp. 272-74.
101. J.C. Noorlander, Band.iarmasin on de Compagnic in de 
tweede helft de 18 de Eeuw. (Leiden, 1935), p* 7*
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Although the Panambahan was thinking more in terms of 
security than profit when he signed the pepper contract with 
the Dutch, the Banjarese traders felt and acted otherwise*
The Banjarese, reluctant to sacrifice the lucrative open 
trade with the Chinese, English and the Macassarese, were
102
not very keen to deliver their stocks to the Dutch factors*
Insistence on maintaining their treaty rights inevitably
brought the Dutch into conflict with the Banjarese* The
differences between both sides were enhanced by the intrigues
of the pro-Javanese faction at Court, comprising Raden Dipati
103Anom, Raja I tarn and Raja Mampawa.
In 1637 when peace was concluded between 
Mataram and Banjarmasin, Dutch-Banjarese relations deteriorated 
rapidly when the old Sultan left the bulk of the administration 
to his court s u b o r d i n a t e s . M a t t e r s  came to a head in the 
following April when the factor, Kramer, and twenty-nine
102. Ibid.
103* Raden Dipati Anom was also known as Kjahi Adipati 
Martasari, a pro-Javanese noble of Banjarmasin. - 
W.Ph. Coolhaas, Generals Missiven van Gouverneurs- 
Generaal en Raden nan Heren XVII der Verenigde 
OostinSische Compagnie, Vol.II, 163911655* (The Hague, 
1964), p. 12. Raden Dipati and the other Banjarese 
nobles, Raja Itam and Raja Mempawa had interests in the 
pepper trade* When they found that their incomes were 
affected by the Dutch policy of fixed prices, they 
decided to evict the Dutch from Banjarmasin. - Dagh 
Register. Batavia, 1637, 11 April 1637, p* 130.
104. Dagh Register. Batavia, 1637, 11 April 1637, p. 130.
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other Dutchmen were murdered and the Dutch factories at
Martapura and Kotawaringin were plundered and burned5
altogether the Company*s losses were estimated at 160,000 
10 sguilders. The Batavian authorities retaliated by blockading 
the Banjarese ports, hoping thereby to bring trade to a 
standstill. Nevertheless, the blockades were ineffective os 
the pepper merchants managed to smuggle their product to the 
foreign traders, and the Dutch fleet eventually had to withdraw 
from the area,^06
After the bitter episode of 1633, the Dutch Company
relinquished all plans to trade with Banjarmasin, In 1660,
however, a reduction in the amounts of pepper available from
Palembang and West Sumatra and an increased demand from the
European market compelled the Batavian Council to renew
107commercial relations with Banjarmasin, Dirck van Lier was 
sent to Martapura to obtain a pepper cargo and to claim 
reparation aflXBVfcing to 60,000 reals for losses sustained by 
the Dutch Company in 1638.
105 Noorlander, op, cit., p. Van Dijk, op. cit., p, 60.
106, Noorlander, op. cit., pp. 8-95 Van Dijk, op. cit., 
pp. 81 and 82.
107, Original General Missive, 16 December 1660, KA 1122, 
f. 31.
108, Ibid.
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Though recognising the existence of the old debt, the
regent, Pengeran Ratu, preferred to discharge his financial
obligations by allowing the Dutch Company to pay a reduced
rate of five per cent instead of seven per cent for poirt
duties. This clause, laid down in the new agreement of
109December 1660, was reasserted in another treaty of May 
110
1661, Also, the C o m p a n y  was guaranteed the pepper monopoly
with the price of pepper fixed at 16 reals per ISO gantangs,
apparently because Pengeran Ratu, in the face of court
intrigues by other Banjarese nobles, hoped to secure Dutch
support to maintain his position. Unfortunately for the ruler,
the Dutch refused to take sides in a factional struggle, and
consequently in 1663 Pengeran Ratu was deposed by Pengeran
Dipati Anom who established his administrative centre at 
112
Banjarmasin, Dipati Anom refused to recognise the validity 
of the contracts of 1660 and 1661, but finding that the Dutch 
were just as determined to adhere to their treaty privileges 
and fearing another war with Mataram, he agreed to ratify 
the treaty of 1661 on 7 September 1664. The new contract 
guaranteed the Dutch Company the sole right to conduct trade
109. Heeres. Corpus Diplomaticumq Vol. 11* (The Hague, 1931)q
: pp. 181-82.
110* Ibid., pp. 186-88,
111, Ibid., p. 187.
1 1 2. Original General Missive, 21 December 1663, KA 1131, 
f. 56.
in south-east Borneo; simultaneously, the Banjarese insisted 
that the Dutch should build a factory at Martapura at a 
convenient date. ^ 3
Despite the renewal of the contract, the Company did
not achieve very effective results in the pepper trade• The
Hoogcaspel, for instance, returned to Batavia with only 36
114lasts of pepper in 1664. Two reasons contributed to the
failure of the Dutch to maintain the monopoly. The first
was the reluctance of the Biajus, the chief cultivators, to
supply pepper to the Banjarese merchants. In attempts to
enlist Dutch support for his precarious regime and to
consolidate his power, Pengeran Dipati Anom was anxious to
fulfil his part of the bargain by offering all the pepper
stocks to the Company. He therefore sent his officials to
the hinterland of Negara to compel the cultivators to deliver
their produce. Consequently, many Biajus refused to harvest
116the crop and left their fields. Secondly, the refusal of 
the Dutch to make monetary advances, especially to the 
chieftains, led the local merchants, who feared financial losses
113. Dagh Register, Batavia, 1664, 7 September 1664, pp. 394-95
114, Original General Missive, 23 December 1664, KA 1136,
f, 50. One last is equal to 230 gantangs or 3,066 2/3
to 3,400 English pounds. This unit is generally used
when measuring rice.
115. Original General Missive, 21 December 1663, KA 1131, 
f. 57.
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to smuggle their pepper cargoes to the Macassarese and 
Portuguese traders instead of loading them into the Company 
vessels. Come of the pepper merchants even sailed to Batavia 
to sell their goods direct to the private traders.
These commercial hazards and the Dutch reluctance to
involve the Company in the political issues of Banjarmasin
led the Batavian authorities to abandon their pepper trade in
1667. In November 1665, the Company received a plea for
117military support from Pengeran Dipati Anom, against possible
incursions by Mataram and also against Pengeran Ratu who was
318
rumoured to be preparing a war against the Banjarese ruler.
The Batavian Council shunned all political responsibilities 
by calling off its voyages to south-east Borneo.1^
In 1678 the Dutch in Batavia decided to re-establish 
trade in Banjarmasin. They treated Banjarmasin as an alternative 
source of pepper for the Canton market because production 
had fallen in Jambi when the pepper planters turned to padi
116. Original General Missive, 3Q January 1666, KA 1142. 
f. 65.
117. Ibid.; Dagh Register. Batavia, 1665, 6 November 1665, 
p. 340.
118. Dagh Register. Batavia, 1665, 7 December 1665, p. 400.
119. Original General Missive, 25 January 1667, KA 1146. 
f. 69.
43
120cultivation for a more secure means of livelihood. The
Dutch also hoped to forestall future English voyages to the
area when they heard that two English Company vessels we re
121
despatched to Banjarmasin in 1671 and 3678. The new 
venture of the Dutch Company in 1679 did not meet with much 
success. The factors, P. der Vesten and J. van Mechelen
1 np
received only a small pepper cargo on the Helena, partly 
because of the unstable political situation in Banjarmasin 
which had dragged on into the 1670fs from the previous decade, 
and partly because of the establishment of the Portuguese in 
the area. According to the Dutch records, the power of
Dipati Anom was seriously challenged by Pengeran Ratu!s two
128 124
sons, Suria Angsa and Suria Negara early in the 16701 s.
T.h.ey enlisted Portuguese aid from Macao to overthrow
Dipati Anom. Although the two young Pengerans suffered a
120. The Dutch Company needed about 5,000 pikuls of pepper 
for the Canton market annually. - Original General 
Missive, 15 February 1678, KA 1212„ f. 585.
121. Original General Missive, 21 December 1678, KA 1 2 2 0, 
f. 2 1 .
122. Original General Missive, 13 February 1679, KA 1 2 2 0, 
f. 213.
123. Suria Angsa and Suria Negara were also known as Piaden 
Bagus and Raden Basu.
124. Dagh Register. Batavia, 1679, 14 May 1679, p. 185.
125. Letter from Pengeran Dipati Anom (or Agong) to the 
Batavian Council, 13 May 1679, KA 1256, f. 540.
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temporary setback in 1678 when they were driven back from 
Banjarmasin to the hinterland of Alii and Montrado, which
were gold-mining regions in south-west Borneo, they nevertheless
1
managed to defeat Dipati Anom in the following year."
Subsequently, Suria Angsa became the Panambahan. The
Portuguese were given favoured treatment and their ships were
loaded with pepper before those of the other foreigners,
except the Chinese who offered the highest prices on the
open market. Although other foreign traders were banned from
selling opium to the Banjarese, this condition was waived in
1 P7the case of the Portuguese.
Suria Angsa did not recognise the Dutch treaty of 1664 
which in his eyes, was signed by a pretender to the Banjarese 
throne. The Batavian authorities, however, took a more serious 
viex/ and considered the concession of commercial privileges 
to the Portuguese as a breach of the Dutch-Banjarese treaty 
of 1664. They felt that in order to make the contract 
effective, a patrol boat - should be stationed at the river 
mouth to prevent the Portuguese and other !,contrabandM traders 
from loading pepper. They dispelled this idea when they 
heard that the Macassarese, who had burnt one of the Pengeranfs
126. Dagh Register. Batavia, 1679, 14 May 1679, p. 185.
127. Original General Missive, 13 February 1679, KA 1 2 2 0. 
f. 231.
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1 O Q
houses? intended to launch an attack on Banjarmasin.
This would mean that the Dutch Company would be obliged to
give political aid to the Sultan if the Portuguese were
evicted so as to ensure peaceful conditions of trade. The
Batavian Council, therefore, decided to sever ties..-with
Banjarmasin and tried to obtain more pepper from Palembang 
129
and Bantam, With the withdrawal of the Dutch, the position
of the Portuguese in Banjarmasin was further strengthened in
1690 when they managed to secure contractual rights from
130the ruler for the exclusive purchase of pepper.
English connections with Banjarmasin originated in
1615 when a factory was established for the export of pepper
and bezoar stones. However, the venture which was regarded
as a failure, was abandoned three years later, shortly after
the outbreak of hostilities between the Dutch and the English
131in the East Indies. A demand for a larger supply of pepper 
in England and Europe in the 1630fs encouraged the English
128. Ibid.
129. Original General Missive, 24 April 1681, KA 1242, f. 92.
130. De Hoy, Hacheli.ike Reys, (Mackenzie Collection, 1822), 
f. 156.
131. The Directors referred to the Banjarmasin factory as 
"a needless factory" in 1618. - W.N* Sainsbury,
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, 
China and Japan., 1617-1621., (London. 1870) s p. 107.
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East India Company to search for alternative sources of pepper
in the East. In Bantam, little pepper could be obtained as
the population had shifted to fishing and the cultivation
1 32
of food crops after the Dutch blockades of 1620 to 1629*
Thereafter, the English attempted to trade on the west coast
of Sumatra in 1634, One year later they managed to re-establish
commercial relations with b a n j a r m a s i n ,  whereby stocks amounting
133to 10,693 reals were invested in the new factory.' 1 Dutch
competition and the policy of exclusive trade, secured by
the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of 1635, adversely affected English
commerce in Banjarmasin. In December 1636, for example,
despite an advance of 10,000 reals, the Sultan, probably out
off fear of the Dutch, prohibited J. Tuesley from taking
further supplies of pepper after 150,000 lbs. had been loaded
1 34into the Pearl. Shortly after, the English supercargoes
135left Banjarmasin for Bantam.
When Kramer and the other Dutch factors were murdered 
by the Banjarese in 1638, the English were not in Banjarmasin.
132. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, 
p. 258.
133. Bantam Council to E.I.C., 31 January 1635/36, OC (15), 
f. 1552.
134. Bantam Council to E.I.C., 20 December 1636, OC (15), 
f. 1582.
135. W. Ph. Coolhaas, Generale Mjssiven, Vol. I, 1610-1638, 
(The Hague, 1960), p. 630.
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They did not return to the area until the Dutch had lifted the 
coas tal blockade in rnid-lG39. When they arrived in 
Banjarmasin, the English took advantage of Banjarese goodwill 
to secure commercial benefits which had previously accrued to 
the Dutch.
Except for a brief period initially when its employees
managed to trade satisfactorily, the English Company did not
really achieve its objectives. Severe competition from the
Chinese and Macassarese merchants hindered the successful
loading of the English ships. In October 1640, the Coaster
returned to Eantam with only 60 pikuls and the Michael with
13636 tons of pepper. Moreover, amicable relations with the 
ruler proved difficult to maintain when he and other Banjarese
nobles borrowed vast sums of money from the English with
137
promises of repaying in pepper. The debts were not fully 
repaid, partly because the factors, instead of recovering the 
money, quarrelled among themselves nwithout consideration to
parHy
the responsibility entrusted to them,” and because the debtorsA
136. The Coasterfs unsuccessful loading was attributed 
essentially to the excessive rains in Banjarmasin which
destroyed part of the pepper crop and delayed the
harvest. - President Baker at Bantam to E.I.C., 17 
November 1640, OC (17), f. 1762, and 27 November 1641,
OC (18), f. 17817
137. "The original of the Companies £~damag(e)J7 in Banjar 
came through Samuel Husbandefs lending of the old 
kinge 20,000 r. of 8t. of wch i is not recovered," - 
Baker to E.I.C., 29 December 1645, OC (19), f. 1884.
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were reluctant to repay the loans.138 Also, Ignorance of
the Indonesian language and customs created a barrier between
the two peoples.139 In 1649, T. Penis ton, the Bantam president,
ordered 20,000 reals to be deducted from the Banjarmasin
accounts, as the factory was "in desperate debts and dead-
140
storke (stock)." When the report on Banjarmasin was sent 
to the Directors, they decided "to desert that factory and to
141only send a ship there once a year to trade as best they can."
T. Fern, the chief factor, was therefore recalled in October 
1651 after the factory had been dismantled.
With the severance of Anglo-Banjarese relations by the
closure of the factory, the Company did not show any further
interest in south-east Borneo until 1661 when it expressed
the intention of procuring as much pepper as possible by
142investing anew in Palembang and Banjarmasin. The project
138. Baker to E.I.C., 27/28 November 1641, OC (18), f. 1781.
139. In a letter to the Bantam President after T. Fenn had
left Bsnjar, the Panambahan advise:d the former to send
a factor who understood local custom and language if
the Company intended to resettle in Banjarmasin* - 
Rajah Cotteringon ^""sic_7 to the President at Bantam,
15 November 1651, OC (22), f. 2231.
140. President peniston at Bantam to E.I.C., 11 January 
1649/50, JFR (3), f. 12,
141. Minutes of the Court of Committees, 22 February 1649/50, 
CM (20), f. 491.
142. E.I.C. to Bantam Council, 20 February 1661, LB (2), 
f. 360.
49
would take the form of annual expeditions to the Banjarese 
ports without the establishment of factories. It is 
conceivable that when new and more vigorous charters were 
given to the English Company by Cromwell! and Charles II in 
1657 and 1661, the Directors should express their desire to
14°
renew trade with the Banjarese after the neglect of the 1650's. °
J. Edwards, the Bantam agent, was agitated1:that the Directors
had not recommended the resumption of trade earlier, as he
felt that the English could have prevented the signing of the
Dutch-Banjarese contract of 1661, Nevertheless, he was
enthusiastic over the news of the Company to despatch ships
to Banjarmasin, He immediately instructed his factors at
144Macassar to buy pepper at Martapura, hoping thereby to
remedy the pepper losses incurred by the English at Bantam
because of the more successful Dutch competition through the
145
payment of heavier and better 'Mexico1 reals by the Dutch.
143, This revival of interest in the East Indies was also 
probably the effect caused by the restoration of the 
monarchy in May 1660, whereby there was "a definite 
sense of the importance of national prestige expressed 
in the determination (more evident in the 1670fs) that 
the Dutch should not be permitted to control the entire 
trade of the East Indies." - D.K. Bassett, The Factory 
of the English East India Company at Bantam 1602-1682, 
(unpublished PH.D. thesis, University of London, 1955;, 
p , 256»
144, Bantam Council to E.I,C*, (date unknown), JFR (3), 3, 
f, 666,
145. Ibid*, f, 664,
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The instructions of Edwards were not acted upon until 
mid-1664 when H. Weston was sent to Banjarmasin from 
Macassar in the Bpyal Oak, The visit of Weston was short-lived. 
In negotiations with Sultan Suria Nata, Weston was informed 
that he would not be allowed to trade unless the English
146
Company was prepared to establish a factory in Banjarmasin,
Apparently, the Sultan wanted the English to be present there
to counteract the Dutch influence in the region during the
early 16601 s. Weston, aware of his employers’ injunction
that no factory should be set up, decided to leave Banjarmasin.
When A. Hurdt, the Dutch commander, arrived in Banjarmasin at
the end of July 1664, he found that the English had already
left for Japara. On the explicit orders of Maetsuycker, the
Batavian Governor-General, he despatched a squadron to the
kuala of the Barito river in order to prevent exports of
147pepper by interlopers. In November 1664 when Dutch treaty
rights were reasserted in the new contract of 1664, the Bantam
14R
Council decided to stop further voyages to Banjarmasin,
146, Original General Missive, 23 December 1664, KA 1136, 
f. 51.
147, Maetsuycker ordered A. Hurdt, the Dutch commander, to 
confiscate the pepper stocks of native or Portuguese 
vessels, but only "amicable reasoning” was to be 
exercised towards the English, - Dagh Register, 
Batavia, 1664, p. 297,
148, Bassett, op, cit,q p. 260,
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In 1671 the Bantam Council attempted to renew trade
with the Banjarese by despatching the Pink to Martapura.
The supercargoes were instructed to obtain a pepper cargo,
but if the Sultan rejected their overture, the Pink. should
149sail to Grisek to purchase pepper there. When they
arrived in Banjarmasin in March of the same year, the supercargoes
were able to negotiate for a supply of pepper from the Sultan
150in return for payment of custom dues. Aiiother expedition
to Banjarmasin was sent by the Bantam Council seven years
later but apparently, the English were unsuccessful in their
commercial venture then, because of internal instability and
interference of the pepper trade by the Portuguese and the
Dutch. Thereafter, the Bantam Council refrained from sending
151any more vessels to ^anjaraasin.
149, Bantam Council to the supercargoes of the Pink. , 25 
February 1671, JFR (6A), f. 1.
150, Consultations of the Bantam Council, 21 March 1671, 
JFR (6A), f. 15.
151, Original General Missive, 21 December 1678, KA 1220, 
f. 2 1 .
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CHAPTER II 
THE ENGLISH SETTLEMENT2 1700-1707
In September 16So the new Erst India Company, under
the name of the English Company trading to the East Incites,
wes incorporated by royrl chertor. Its elm was to replace
the ‘Old’ or London Company which had to re cell all its
factors, end dismantle cell its forts end factories in the
2
East Indies by September 1701. In their search ror lucrative
avenues of trade in the East, the Directors of the ‘.'New1 
Company selected Bonjarmasin os one of the prospective 
trading centres. After an absence of tieIf a century since 
the closure of the British factory in Martapura in 1651,
1. Private traders, especially the merchants of London, hAci 
petitioned Parliament from 1690 onwords to sanction the 
formation of a new Company end to dissolve the ‘Old1 
Company. With a desire to participate in the Eastern 
trade, the traders alleged that the London Company not 
only had a nonopoly of goods which were in great demand, 
but kept these articles for their own use. The Ling 
intended to give the ‘Old’ Com puny e\ period -of three 
years before it was dismantled. In 1694, however, the 
King renewed the ‘Old 1 Company1s charter. The increasing 
pressure from the private traders on the House oi Commons 
induced the letter to pass on Act sanctioning the 
incorporation of the New Company in 1698, after the 
private merchants had promised to raise £2 million for 
the government. Accordingly, the royql charter for the 
Few Company was received from the throne. See S.A. Khan, 
The East Indio Trrdo in the S eventeenth Century,
(Lone-on, ), -no'*1 oho1"*2 /.
2, Ibid., p. 245. The ‘Old1 Company wos never dismantled „
As a result of talks which were held between the two 
Companies, they were amalgamated in 1702 as the United 
Cow-pony trading to the East Indies.
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the •New1 Company attempted to regain a foothold in the 
south-east region of Borneo.
Banjarmr.sin was to serve as a commercial centre for
the ,7:ewf Company. By focussing attention on the China
market which held extensive possibilities for the investment
of European end Indian manufactured &oods, and purchases of
the much sought after Chinese wares such as tea, silk,
copper, zinc and porcelain, the Directors considered
Danjarmasin to be a significant intermediate port of call
3
between India and China. They were equally hopeful that
tie products of Banjarmasin, particularly pepper, and other
goods of lesser importance such as dragons-blocd, bezoar
stones, rattans, gold and diamonds, would serve as profitable
4
cormodities in the China trade. - They were optimistic that
Banjnrnasin would supply pepper not only for China, but 
also for England. In other words, the Company anticipated 
a three-fold system of trade between Brnjarmasin, China aJ*d 
England.5 j
In April 1099 the New Company appointed II. Watson and
3. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1G9S, LB (11), -• 97.
4. In 1699, the English East India Company appointed a 
China Council with A. Catcirxble os the President. The 
Council hoped to lake Chusan its main trading base 
from where commercial transactions with the Chinese 
could be conducted.
5. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1699, LB (11), f* 96.
04
a delegation of four other Council members, T, Tooly, W.
C-
Rodg^tt, T. Joyner one! T. Moseley," to soil to Bgrijarmasin 
with Contain C. Coatsworth on. the Julia. ' Although the 
objective was to establish a factory, the Council members 
uero instructed not to acquaint the Panr.nfbchan of their 
true intention on their arrival, but merely to infor i him 
that they would "briny trade thither, which would tend r.uch 
to pronoting the interest of his Pon;v:ba.han’s_/ country."
boy were also to request the cession of land in Banjar, 
Tories or Payu Tinggi for establishing a factory, r* royal 
chop granting freedom of trade with the Banjarose and other 
merchants at Banjarmasin, the purchase of pepper at the 
lowest prices possible, and this avard of extra-territorial 
rights to thc Eng 1 ish 011 jud 1 ciaj matters. In rcturn for 
these rights, th.e Council would give presents to the value 
of a dollar for every lioyan of pepper bought, out would be 
exempted from paying custom duties. If any English vessel 
did not obtain a cargo exceeding twenty-five koyans of pepper 
then the factors were not obliged to give presents or money 
to the Panambahan. The English would also not allow any 
Banjarcsc chief or Pengeron to borrow money froo then unless
G. The names of the Council nexbers were listed in order of
seniority beginning with Watson as Chief. They were
paid £1 0 0, £GG, £40 and £40 per annex respectively*
7. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1G99, LB (11), f. 51.
0* Ibid «0 f. 52.
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Q
he hi a d s o;c pledge of repay men t.
Although the English Company laid down the 
lor its factors to make a settlement in S^n jarmasin., it did 
not overlook the possibility of failure in the negotiations 
between the Panambahan and the Council. It pointed out 
the t if the factors were unsuccessful in establishing a 
settlement9 they should purchase a full cargo of pepper and 
smaller quantities of gold, bczoo.r stones, beeswax, dragons* 
blood and rattans and return to- England. However, if 
they were not permitted to trade at all in Banjar, they 
should sail to Malacca or Achch to procure a cargo of goods
v 1 - 10lor Mokhn.
With a cargo of 41,100 ite-ns of piece-goods and two 
11
tons of opium, the Julia arrived in the Bay of Banjar in 
12
A^ril 1700. The factors had to wait for nearly a month 
before they were granted an audience by the Panambahan at
9. E.I.C. to hanjar Council, 11 April 1099, CFR (0), f 
With regard to the last clause, if any Ban;: or esc vh
. 757
/ho
did not belong to royalty owed money to the Council and 
absconded, the Panatabahan had to issue a search warrant 
for the absconder who would be delivered to the English 
after he had been arrested.
10. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 11 April 1699, LB (11), f. 56. 
Mokha was a busy port on the Red Sea and the English 
made periodic visits there in the seventeenth century.
11. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 July 1700, FRi-■ (6 ), f , 45.
12. Journal Julia., (1699-1701), 24 April 1700.
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Kayu Tinggi. In the letter which S. London, who replaced
13
Wetson as Council chief, delivered to Sultan B&gus Kasunc, 
the Directors hod written that the English \iere keen to 
renew the ’’ancient friendship11 between the two peoples 
end to establish a settlement, ” ... in order to carry on a 
trade in your k i m  dor for trie benefit of your Majesty’s 
dominion and this honourable Co'ioany, so as it ray be done 
with safety and security provided your Majesty will afford 
them the necessary articles for their so doing, which we
recommend to you, otherwise they are ordered by us to apply
14
themselves elsewhere..."
Bogus Kasuoa would not per ait the English Co ayany to
settle in Banjarrasin on its own terms but stipulated that
it had lo pay port duties. Eventually, both sides agreed
that the English should give $350 per ship as port charges
in return Cor the right to build a bamboo house for conducting 
15
t r a d e . N o t h i n g  was mentioned about the pepper transactions, 
although the English factors were opti istic that they
13. The Directors had appointed S. Landon, Council Chief, 
as they considered hi - ’’the best person to advance the 
interests of the Company in Banjarmasin, being ft mqn
of ingenuity and address nnc$ knows the hunour very well 
of those peoole ^Banjarose y  ." - E.I.C. to Watson,
26 September 1699, LB (ll),”ff. 96-97.
14. Letter fro i the E.I.C. to the Sultan of JBsnjqrmasin,
13 April 1099, CER (6), ff. 761-62.
15. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 July 1700, FRJj (6), f . 45.
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would soon win the Bonjarese to their side, and persuade
* "| a?
them to offer oil their stocks to their Company. The
outcome of the negotiations showed clearly that the
Ponombohon did not wont the English to dictate conditions
to him, and the factors, instead of merely giving presents,
17hod to pay port dues as well.
The initial attempts ot creating a settlement were
encouraging. A site was selected for the factory opposite
the Barito river where the English ships were anchored. It
was "within muskett shott of ^fche EnglishJ7 ships, where
they would build a small house, and in o year or two, by
degrees doubt not but the island would be raised and made 
IS
firm." Here at Ba.njar, about twelve rales from the Jove.
Sea, the English settlers built along the river banks on
stilts several bamboo houses with thatched roofs of kojang
leaves. By the end of 1700, the factors were reported to
19
be n\j-e 11-set tied" in Banjar.
The loading of pepper into the Julia commenced in
16. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 August 1701, JFR (6B), No. 34.
17. The total cost of the presents and the port duties
came up to $950#- Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 July 1700, 
FRM (6), f. 45.
18. London to E.I.C., 11 July 1700, FRM (6), f. 46.
19. Minutes of the Hughli Council, 16 November 1700,
FRM (6), f. 31.
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November of the some year* The first consignment of one
hundred and fifty tons was the remnant of the pepper
harvest of 1699 which London managed to procure from the
Ban;)arese at thirteen gantangs per Spanish dollar. This
initial success encouraged the English to think in terms
of engrossing the whole pepper crop of Banjarnasin which
20was estimated at 2,000 tons per year. Although the
Directors had given instructions that no money should be
advanced to the Ban;)arese until the actual delivery of
pepper supplies, the factors found that it was impossible
to conduct business in this way os the Banjarese were
reluctant to send any pepper to them until they had received
advances. Nevertheless, the English hoped that the
Banjarese merchants would follow their system once Anglo-
Banjarese commercial relations were placed on a sounder 
Pibasis. x
Many of the English ships which visited Banjar, 
such as the Rising Sun., Seaford, Neptune. Sarahq and China 
Merchant, were enjoined by the Company to obtain pepper 
for sale in the various ports of China and to purchase
20. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRM (6 ), 
f. 60.
21, E.I.C. to B*njar Council, 21 August 1701, JFR (6 B),
No, 31,
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22 " ' ' ■ -
Chinese goods. Together with the’chests, of bullion,
23
namely Spanish and pillar dollars, the ships were stocked 
with many bales of Indian wares especially Coromandel 
cotton and Bengal opium. Few English articles were included 
in the invoice of the ships as the factors discovered that 
English goods were hardly saleable in Banjarmasin, Even
English bayonets and small arms, which were considered to
24be novelties, were not popular among the Banjarese. The
Banjarese insisted on Spanish dollars when making pepper
transactions with the English because pillar dollars were
unacceptable as a medium of exchange. A shortage of Spanish
dollars created difficulties for the English factors. On
many occasions, for instance, vessels which were on their
way to Banjarmasin had to stop over at Batavia to change
into Spanish dollars 25
their pillar dollars/in order to buy pepper at Banjarmasin,
The English Company therefore resorted to the sale of Indian
22. Most of the ships mentioned above came to Banjarmasin 
in 1701. The Rising Sun and Seaford were bound for 
Canton, Neptune for Amoy, Sarati and China Merchant for 
Ningpo, A general record of their arrival and departure 
is given in JFR (6B), No. 29.
23. See Appendix I, p. 329,
24. Banjar Council to E.I.C,, 9 November 1700, FRM (6), 
f, 67.
25. Krises, bayonets, sword-blades, hats and silver were 
taken to Batavia from India or Chusan to exchange for 
Spanish dollars, - Chusan Council to E.I.C,, 4 January 
1701, OC (56), 3, no page.
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products and also made use of Spanish dollars when it bought 
pepper. The Directors also displayed a great zeal in 
boosting the sale of their Coast and Bay goods, particularly
Of.
opium, which was in great demand among the Banjarese,
Despite the difficulty of procuring bulk supplies of
pepper as they had originally intended, the English factors
earned the credit of developing Banjar from a sleepy villqge
into a bustling centre. Tartas, which was about six miles
further up the Barito river than Banjar town, was the busy
commercial centre where traders of different countries, such
27
as the Portuguese, Arabs, and Indonesians from the 
neighbouring areas of' Java, Madura, Celebes, Lombok, Bali 
and Sumbewa assembled to conduct their business transactions. 
When the English Council established a settlement on Banjar, 
Pengeran Dipati, who was in charge of port duties, shifted
QQ
his customs office from Tartas to Banjar. ° Consequently,
26* Opium was sold at three Spanish dolDars per kati in 
Banjarmasin. - Rodgett to E.I.C., 23 November 1701,
FRM (6 ), f. 67. Beeckman stated that the Banjarese 
were the greatest lovers of opium imaginable. See 
Beeckman, op. cit.. p. 87.
27. Jacob de Roy, who was formerly in the service of the
Dutch East India Company, and who had fled to Banjarmasin 
in 1691 when the Dutch authorities raised certain charges 
against him, claimed that the. Portuguese of Macao showed 
the Chinese the way to Banjarmasin. Each year, four or 
five Portuguese ships came to Banjarmasin to buy pepper. 
See De Roy, Hachelijke-Reys, f. 145.
28. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 10 May 1701.
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the Chinese junks and the Indonesian perahus. which normally
resorted to Tartas, also had to come to Banjar to pay their
29
port dues to the Pengeran. Thus, the commercial 
importance of Tartas was overshadowed by the new settlement 
at Banjar.
However, there was no harmony in the English Council
for differences arose among the factors. Watson was dismissed
30by the Company in August 1701 on the grounds that he had
,rfomented differences aboard ship11 and had "made himself a
°1
laughing stock to ye Dutch,1'0 as soon as rumours of his 
mismanagement of affairs at Banjar reached Batavia. According 
to Landon, all his colleagues in the Council were guilty of 
"debts and interceptions." Apparently, Watson had planned 
with Oldham, an interpreter of the Company, to enter false 
accounts in the Council ledger, so that they could make use
32of part of the money to purchase pepper for their own profit.
29. Ibid.
30. It has been incorrectly stated by Suntharalingam that 
Landon was appointed chief of the factory only in 
August 1701 when Watson was dismissed. Landon had headed 
the Council even before the Julia arrived in Banjarmalin.
SunH\am(liyg0,y. "An Abortive Attempt at Settlement, 1700-1707",
Journal of South East Asian History. Vol. 4, No. 2, 
(1963), p. 40.
31. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 21 August 1701, LB (11), 
ff. 317-18.
32. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 13 Farch 1701.
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In another case, Rodgett bought $400 worth of cassia lignum
for his own use, but charged the sum to the Company accounts.
A further instance of "interception" occurred when a debt
of $1,250 which the Council owed to Pengeran Dipati was
inserted in the ledger as "payment already made," when in
33
fact only $250 had been paid to the Pengeran. As a result
of these illegal activities by the above-mentioned factors,
34Landon confined them to their quarters.
The high-handed conduct of Landon provoked the other 
factors to oppose him. They alleged that early in 1701,
Landon had supplied two separate stock ships with pepper.
This delivery delayed the dispatch of the Julia and the 
Panther which were hr.th Company ships. ° Rodgett explained 
that Landon had been dishonest when he loaded ten tons of 
pepper into the Panther in his own name. For every ten 
gantangs of pepper which was consigned to the Company, Rodgett 
claimed, Landon had extracted one gantang. By this means, 
Landon had managed to accumulate pepper to the amount of 
ten tons. "When Landon dies," Rodgett continued, "he would 
leave an account of irregular proceedings and trade at
33. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 13 March 1701.
34. Ibid.
35. E.I.C. to Landon, 29 August 1701, JFR (6B), Ho. 34.
36. Rodgett on the Julia off Batavia, 23 September 1701, 
FRM (6 ), f. 6 6 .
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37Banjar* 11 To lend support to Rodgett !s allegation, Tooly,
another Council member, stated that 11 the President understands
ye country and his owne interest very well, but is very high
33and exercises his authority beyond its bounds."
Row far the various,accusations and counter-accusations 
were true, cannot easily be gauged. It can, perhaps, be 
argued that Watson, who was disgruntled because he had been 
relegated to second position on the Banjar Council, had 
conspired with the other factors to trump up charges against 
Landon. It can be more definitely asserted that the whole 
Council, including Landon, to a greater or lesser extent, 
were engaged in, or attempted to participate in the separate 
stock trade.
The salaries paid by the Company to its factors in 
Borneo and China were highly inadequate. As it has already 
been noted, the chief of the Banjar factory received £100 
per annum, while a writer obtained as little as £40 per annum. 
Generally, it was recognised that his salary made up only a 
small part of the emoluments of a Company servant. Unlike 
the government official whose meagre income was supplemented 
by presents, exactions and bribes, the factor or supercargo
37. Ibid.
33, Tooly to E.I.C,, 3 January 1701, FRM (6 ), f* 72.
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had few opportunities to obtain these extra sources of income.
It would seem that the only means for him to supplement his
income was to indulge in a limited amount of private trade
which was sanctioned by the East India Company as an incentive
38
to maintain its employees1 interest and loyalty. However,
the practice of limited private trade by Company servants
was easily abused, and inevitably, it led to the gain of the
factors at the expense of the Company. For instance, when
Landon ordered Joyner and 1‘ooly to check the Company accounts
to see how much the Council owed the Banjarese for the pepper
purchases, they showed him a debit account totalling $16,000.
Later on, Landon discovered that these two men had added
40
$500 to the account. The factors were guilty not because 
they had engaged in private trade, but because they had made 
use of the money or the investments of the Company to pursue 
their own interests. A more serious charge against the 
Council members was that they had joined the separate stock 
traders to carry on private trade against the explicit orders 
of the Directors who had instructed them not to "...directly 
or indirectly load or help in loading goods in India on any 
separate stock ship for Europe, nor load any goods from 
port to port, nor trade with ships, nor advance them any
39. K.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company 
trading to ChTna, 1635-1834. Vol. "!. (Oxford, 1926), 
pp. 70-71.
40, Journal Julia«. (1699-1701), 13 March 1701.
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i.41money#11
Although the Royal Charter of 1698 granted the right
of trading to the East Indies to the 'New1 East India Company,
it did not fully exclude separate stock merchants. Out of
the £2,000,000 which the Company had promised to raise for
Parliament, £23,000 worth of the stock had been subscribed
42
by the private traders. By making this subscription, the
private traders could stake a claim to the Eastern trade.
The Directors admitted that rialthough private traders were
not in the Joint-stock, yet they had the liberty to trade to
India by virtue of the subscription to the amount of what
43
little subscription they had.11
In Banjarmasin, the separate stock ships competed with 
the Company vessels for pepper purchases. As the Directors 
were powerless in preventing the movements of the private 
traders, they could only instruct their employees in Banjar 
to get an exclusive pepper contract from the Panambahan for
41. E,I,C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LB (12), f. 575.
42. Out of the £2,000,000, the London or 'Old' Company made
a subscription of £315,000 while the ’New* Company held
the largest number of shares totalling £1,662,000.
See W. Hilburn, Oriental Commerce. Vol. I, (London, 1813), 
p# xi.
43. E.I.C. to Benjar Council, 26 September 1699, LB (11),
f. 98.
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44the East India Company, and so deter the separate stock
merchants from making further voyages to Banjarmasin, Their
hopes for the whole pepper supply, however, quickly faded
away. In addition to the large amounts of pepper which were
taken away by the Chinese junk owners, considerable quantities
were also despatched by the private ships. It has already
been indicated that the Banjar factors were partly responsible
for contributing towards the successful despatch of the
separate stock ships. Furthermore, by competing with the
Company for pepper, the private traders not only reduced
substantially the quantities of pepper sold to the English
Council, but created additional difficulties for the Company,
On a few occasions, the Council members had complained that
in spite of their numerous attempts to persuade the Banjarese
to accept pillar dollars and other currency, they could not 
45succeed. This was because the various separate stock ships,
such as the Panther, and later on the Marlborough. Trumball.
46and. the Black Bo.v which came to Banjarmasin, always had a 
ready supply of Spanish dollars with which to trade,
Anglo-Banjarese relations were not very cordial by
44. E.I.C, to Landon, 29 August 1701, LB (11), f. 328.
45. E.I.C, to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LB (12), f. 575.
46. The Marlborough. Trumball and Black Boy visited
Banjarmasin in 1703. - W. Lambert to E.I.C,, 12
December 1703, OC (59), f. 8187,
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mid-1701, Although the Pengerans and Gustis paid frequent
visits to the English in their huts or ships, and were warmly
received, and on occasions obtained presents such as small 
47
firearms, they still harboured animosity against the 
English. One of the chief enemies of the English was Pengeran 
Aria, the eldest son of the Panambahan and ua person of great
/ Q
position and much feared by the country people.1' Pengeran
Aria's hatred of the English probably stemmed from the time
when he was threatened by Captain Coatsworth who compelled
him to deliver seventeen koyans of pepper for which payment
had already been made. Coatsworth had made it cle?ir that if
Pengeran Aria failed to make the delivery, he would have to
repay $100 for every koyan of pepper below the quantity he
49
had contracted to deliver. Besides Aria, Sultan Bagus Kasuma also
resented the English because he objected to the recruitment
50
of Bugis soldiers by the English Council.
There were few Bugis when the English factory was opened 
in 1700. Mien Landon appeared to take a strong liking to the 
Bugis, Wadjoe Loeboe, who was one of the first recruits from 
Chinrana in the Celebes, persuaded many of his discontented
47. Journal Julia. (1699-1701), 22 November 1700.
48. Ibid.
49. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 27 December 1700.
50. Journal Borneo., (1701-1702), 22 June 1701.
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kinsmen to leave their homos and come to Banjar to serve the
English Company. These Bugis mercenaries, who were paid
five to seven dollars per month by the Banjar Council, were
51
commanded by a famous warrior from. Bony, called Bambang.
At a meeting with the Panambahan on 17 June 1701, Landon
tried to account for the large number of Bugis present in
the factory. Ke explained that due to the short supply of
European troops at Banjar, he was obliged to employ Bugis to
guard the factory. However, he had already requested the
Directors to send more English soldiers to Banjar5 once
they arrived, the number of Bugis would be considerably
reduced. This was just an empty remark which Landon made in
order to calm the nerves of the Banjarese ruler. One strongly
feels that if the Company had sent a reinforcement of European
soldiers, London would not have dismissed his Bugis mercenaries
but would have retained them in the service of the Banjar
Council. Landon also assured the Panambahan that the Bugis
were under strict orders and if they committed the slightest
^2crime, they would be severely punished.^
The Sultan, like Pengeran Aria, was also bitter that 
the English had behaved in a domineering manner towards the
51. Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
IS August 1701, KA 1539. f. 57.
52. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 22 June 1701.
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Banjarese* The Directors, while instructing their employees
to exercise caution, nevertheless insisted that courtesy
should be shown towards the Banjarese when they advised that
the English factors should strive to win over the Banjarese
"by all manner of affable carryage, and courteous behaviour
53and above all by doing no wrong or injury to them.”
Despite this advice, some of the Council members did not
abide by it. In compelling Pengeran Aria to deliver pepper
to the Company, Coatsworth boasted that if the Pengeran did
not act as he was told, he could have him shot merely on a
54
verbal order from Landon. On another occasion when an
attempt was made to kill Landon, the unsuccessful Banjarese
assassin was captured by the English and imprisoned. When
Bagus Kasuma sent men to release his subject, Barre, who was
in charge of the prisoner, not only refused to surrender him,
55but shot at several other Banjarese in their perahus.
The English had also infuriated the Biajus when they seized 
some of their perahus which were wrecked in the Bay of Banjar.0 
Hence, when Pengeran Mangku, another Banjarese noble, informed 
the English Council that Pengeran Aria and the Sultan intended
53. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1699, LB (11),
f. 96.
54. Rodgett on the Julia off Batavia to E.I.C., 23 September 
1701, IBM (6 ), f. 6 8 .
55 • Ibid. Barre was the supercargo of the Borneo.
56. Ibid.
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to oust the English from Banjar, the factors were not the 
least surprised if hostilities ivere to break out. As early 
as 4 January 1701, the Banjar Council anticipated an early 
war and so had requested the Directors to send "men, grenades,
rn
shells, drummers and provisions for half a year,1’0
The need to keep constant guard on the factory had been
impressed on the English factors even before they had set
s°foot on Banjar, To ensure that the factory had some measure 
of protection, the Company decided that one ship should be 
constantly stationed at Banjar so that "the native or Chinese 
will not use you ill, or be guilty of any unfair practice 
towards you whilst there is a ship in the road capable to
59protect you against any injuryes that shall be offered you,"
To the English, one of the first signs of impending 
warfare occurred in June 1701 when Sultan Bagus Kasuma, 
accompanied by an entourage of a thousand followers in thirty
57. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 27 June 1701, FRM (6 ), f. 70.
58. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 27 June 1700, LB (11), f. 2000.
The Directors warned that the Banjarese were "a false
and treacherous people, and you must accordingly deal 
with greater caution and wariness and not trust your 
money without pepper being actually delivered to you, 
nor trust your person or people beyond command of your 
ships which you must keep always in a posture of defence 
and not let too many natives come aboard at any one time 
and those without creuses (krises) or other arms,"
59. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 26 September 1700, LB (11),
f. 96.
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perahus, shifted his residence from ICayu Tinggi to Tartas.
According to the Capitan China, Lira Kira Ko, the Panambahan
intended to make only a brief stay in Tartas. Sensing that
Tartas was a step nearer to Banjar than Kayu Tinggi, the
60English made preparations for defence. For about one and
a half months, the situation in Banjar was tense, but there
was no outbreak of violence. However, on 28 August 1701,on
old Macassarese officer informed. Landon that there were current
rumours that the Banjarese inhabitants in the vicinity of
Banjar were making prenarotions to evacuate their families
and possessions in order to clear the way for a surprise
61attack on the English factory. VJhen Landon and K. Barre, 
the supercargo of the Borneo, went to investigate, they saw 
that all the perahus and junks along the Barito river were 
covered with awnings and that the inhabitants had loaded their 
goods into their boats. The Banjarese informed Landon that 
they had been warned by their chieftains to evacuate the town 
before they were killed by the English. When the English 
insisted on learning the truth about the mass evacuation from 
the Sultan, the Capitan China reported that Bagus Kasuma had 
expressed great astonishment at the withdrawal of his subjects
60. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 5 June 1701. Although
t h e  Council had requested ammunition from the Company, 
it did not receive any. However, the English had to go 
ahead with their plans to defend the factory.
61. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 28 August 1701.
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from Banjar and wanted them to return to their homes. Lim 
Kim Ko assured the English that the Panambahan meant no harm 
as he liras still a close friend of the English.
On 30 August the factors found that the Chinese
residents of Banjar were also planning to leave their homes
with their families. The few remaining Chinese felt that
63
they were risking their lives. Meanwhile, the English
traders, together with their families and some Macassarese
civilians, left their huts and went aboard the Mary to
safeguard themselves. Landon, however, stayed on the platform
and with the aid of his Bugis soldiers, mounted a few big
guns. A palisade of wooden boards was placed around the Mary
64-to serve as a line of defence.
Hostilities commenced on 31 August 1701 at the upper 
end of Banjar town when fighting broke out between the Bugis 
soldiers of the Company and some Banjarese who had shot at 
them from their perahus. The scuffle turned into open conflict 
when Banjar town on both sides of the river was set on fire 
by the Banjarese. When the English suspected that the
62. Ibid.. 29 August 1701.
63. Journal Borneo. (1701-1702), 30 August 1701.
Ibid. The factory was deserted. The English intended 
to resist the Banjarese assault from the Mary.
65. Journal Borneo. (1701-1702), 30 August 1701.
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Sultan and Pengeran Aria had initiated hostilities, they
took the offensive by storming Tartas with a party of thirty-
66six Europeans and seventy Bugis on 10 September 1701*
By this time, the Panambahan and his followers had already
gone to Kayu Tinggi. Undaunted, the Company troops pursued
the Banjarese to Kayu Tinggi, after they had set Tartas in
67flames for a stretch of over one mile. This was probably 
done by the English as a retaliatory measure against the 
Banjarese who had burned Banjar. The Panambahan, who was 
not really prepared for a full-scale war with the English, 
bravely defended his stronghold at Kayu Tinggi. However, 
the ill manned Banjarese soldiers were unable to put up 
very effective resistance against the better-prepared Bugis 
and European troops. In the event, the English managed to
surround Kayu Tinggi so that neither provisions nor
reinforcement of soldiers could be sent to the beleaguerd 
Banjarese. The war dragged on for about a month. When the 
Sultan found that he was at the losing end of the struggle, 
he decided to-.call off the war and sign a truce with the
g o
English in mid-October 1701. According to the contract,
•________________   ** f ' i i
i  , -
6 6 . Landon to E.I.C. (undated), OC (57), f. 7726.
67. In his description of the war, Logan said that the
English overran several towns such as Banjarmasin,
Tartas, Kayu Tinggi and Martapura. See J.R. Logan,
"Early English Intercourse in Borneo", Journal of the
Indian Archipelago. Vol. II, (1848), p. 509.
6 8 . Journal Borneo. (1701-1702), 14 October 1701.
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( as recorded by the English since no copy of the actual 
Anglo-Banjarese treaty is available ), the Sultan,promised 
to repay the English $3,000 for debts which Pengeran Mangku 
and Pengeran Dipati owed the Company, and another $300 as 
war expenses incurred by the Council. There was no clause 
stipulating that Banjar would be ceded to the English Company, 
although it was stated that the English could settle and 
trade in Banjar as long as they continued to pay port duties
4 - 0 - 1  i 6 9to the Panambahan.
It is difficult to trace the causes of the JLnglo-Banjarese
war of 1701. Apparently, the Banjarese started the war when
they burned Banjar town. The English factors contended that
open warfare was the culmination of the Sultan and Pengeran
Aria's hatred of the English because of their impolitic actions
such as the recruitment of Bugis and the display of arbitrary
conduct. Rodgett, the Council member, pointed out that
Landon had, hurt native sentiments when he showed total disregard
for Banjarese authority by declaring himself as !,Kingfl and
70
his Bugis mistress as T,QueenM of Banjar. Thereupon, the 
Banjarese revolted in an attempt to evict the English from 
Banjar.
69. Ibid., 22 June 1701.
70. Rodgett on the Julia off Batavia to E.I.C., 23 September 
1701, FRM (6 ), f. 6 8 .
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The English also alleged that the Banjarose could have
launched the attack because they wanted to liquidate their
debts. They indicated that Pengeran Aria, Pengeran Mangku
and a few other nobles became indebted to the Company when
they did not supply the full amount of pepper on which cash
71advances had been made by the factors. Thus the Banjarese 
nobles tried to cancel their outstanding debts to the Company 
by creating hostilities. If this allegation had any grounds, 
the Banjarese obviously did not realise that if they lost 
the war, reparation costs to the Company would be financially 
heavier than their outstanding debts.
The argument would be too one-sided if one were to assume 
that Banjarese provocation definitely caused the war of 1701. 
The English could have misconstrued the Sultanfs journey from 
Kayu Tinggi to Tartas in June 1701 as a design by the ruler 
to gather his forces in preparation for war. It was usual 
for the Sultan to travel regularly between Kayu Tinggi and 
Tartas, as the former was his hill resort and the latter his 
administrative centre. The Sultan might have resented the 
actions of the English council members, but so long as they 
did not attempt to override his authority, he tolerated their 
presence in Banjar.
Very likely, there was really no deep-seated cause for
71. Piodgett to E.I.C., 23 September 1701, FRM (6 ), f. 6 8 .
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the war. It probably started as a scuffle between the Bugis 
and the Banjarese. Moreover, the English were perhaps 
misinformed by their Bugis employees that the Banjarese 
intended to rout them. Consequently, Tartas came under 
heavy English attack and was overrun. The Sultan was either 
unaware of the situation because he had already left for 
Kayu Tinggi, or he did not want to be embroiled in the conflict 
and therefore had hurriedly left Tartas. He was inadvertently 
brought into the war when the English pursued the Banjarese 
to Kayu Tinggi. The sudden nature of the attack caught the 
Sultan by surprise and probably explains why the Banjarese 
were unable to defend themselves effectively against a small 
Anglo-Bugis force.
.After the war, the English Council took precautionary 
measures to defend the settlement on Banjar by mounting two 
bastions and twenty guns. In March 1702 Landcn, who was 
probably apprehensive of a fresh outbreak of Anglo-Banjarese
72
hostilities, indicated his intention of abandoning the factory. 
It is conceivable that he realised that the Banjarese were 
aggrieved over the English onslaught on Tartas and Kayu Tinggi 
and felt that they might retaliate by attacking the English 
settlement. Landon!s advice to withdraw from Banjar was not 
heeded by the other Council members, partly because they
72. Landon to E.I.C., 20 April 1702, FHM (6 ), f. 119.
Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 July 1702, JFR (6B), No. 56.
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objected to his leadership, and partly because no instructions 
for withdrawal had been issued by the Directors,
In April 1702 the Banjarese, who had recruited five 
hundred Biaju warriors to boost their numbers, launched an
73
attack on the Mary which was anchored in the Bay of Banjar.
On this occasion, when the English saw that they were heavily
outnumbered, they decided to abandon Banjar and sail to
Batavia, The break-up of the factory occurred on 6 April 
74
1702.
The assault on the Mary, and the subsequent withdrawal
75
of the English from their factory, came at a time when 
the affairs of the Council were at a very low ebb. After the
76
war of 1701, the Banjarese factory was in a "bare condition."
Owing to the high mortality rate among the Council employees
at Banjar and to the lack of replacements, there was insufficient
77personnel to run the factory. A more serious mishap was 
the shortage of funds in the Council. Landon claimed that
73. Landon to E.I.C., 29 April 1702, CFR (6 ), f. 932.
74. Joyner at Batavia to E.I.C., 29 June. 1702, 6&M ( O , -P. .12 » .
75. Landon stated that since he did not wish to offend the
junk traders, he had told them that the Council would 
return to Banjar to reopen trade as soon as possible.
- Landon to E.I.C., 29 April 1702, CFR (6 ), f, 391.
76. Journal Borneo,.(1701-1702), 31 March 1702.
77. Landon to E.I.C., 20 April 1702, FRM(6 ), f. 933.
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since the date when he assumed office as chief of the factory,
he had not received more than $14,000 from the Company for .
Council expenses. In fact, after the Anglo-Banjarese war,
he had to borrow $6,000 to $7,000 from Barre in order to
maintain the factory, but nonetheless, felt that it was
pointless to stay on in Banjar after the bitter episode of 
78
the Mary.
In April 1702 the Macclesfield. which was on its way 
to Banjar, arrived at Batavia from London. The Chusan Council,
7q
then temporarily stationed m  Batavia, could not verify the 
events at Banjar. Nonetheless, it was resolved that the 
Macclesfield should continue its voyage as instructed by the
OQ
Directors, in order to obtain a cargo of pepper. H. Rouse
and R. Master of the Chusan Council were selected to accompany
Captain Stacy of the Macclesfield to Banjar so as to re-establish
trade,and to reopen the factory if the settlement under
__ _ 81
Landon !s presidency had already been ftbroak/e]y upr? •
78. Chusan Council to E.I.C., 15 June 1702, CFR (6 ), f. 933.
79. Originally known as the' China Council when it was founded 
by the Company in 169S, the name was changed to Chusan 
Council when a settlement was made on Chusan. The 
Council withdrew to Batavia late in 17CQ. after encountering 
certain setbacks on Chusan. - LB (11), f. 117; OC (56),
f. 7408. Also s e e p p . -87.
80. The Directors had instructed that the Chusan Council and 
the Banjar Council should work closely together in order 
to advance the Companyfs interest. - E.I.C. to Banjar 
Council, 21 August 1701, CFR (6 ), f. 924.
81. Chusan Council to E.I.C., 25 April 1702, JFR (6 B), No. 6 .
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On the voyage to Banjarraasin in May 1702, the
Macclesfield met the Borneo., which was transporting Landon
and his party to Batavia, off Rembang. Landon, who had
Watson and Tooly aboard as his prisoners, could not be
82persuaded to return to Banjar. ' Instead, he tried to dissuade 
Rouse and Master from continuing their journey probably 
because he wqs anxious for their safety and felt that it would 
be better if they could stay away from Banjar for a while 
until the situation there had become normal again. Rouse and 
Master did not heed Landonfs advice but proceeded towards 
their destination.
Early in June 1702, the Macclesfield reached Banjarmasin.
Initially, the factors were given a cod reception by the
Banjarese. After a preliminary meeting with the Shahbandar
84where they pointed out that they had come to trade. Rouse 
and Master managed to gain access to Bagus Kasuma. In the 
ensuing negotiations, the Panambahan would only permit the 
renewal of trade if the English gave him $1,000 as port 
charges and a large supply of arms, in lieu of what Landon 
had seized from his people in the first Anglo-Banjarese war
82. Rouse and Master to Chusan Council, 21 July 1702, 
JFR (6 B), No. 56,
83. Ibid.
84. Rouse and Master to Chusan Council, 10 June 1702, 
JFR (6B), No. 42.
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OO
of 1701. When Rouse and Master protested and insisted on 
the former agreement of October 1701, the ruler was adamant 
as he considered that the contract had been invalidated when 
the English left Banjar in April 1702. Eventually, the 
supercargoes of the Macclesfield had to agree on the sum of 
$500 as port duty on every vessel which traded in Banjar.
In return, the Sultan allowed Rouse and Master to build
86temporary sheds in Banjar for storing water and provisions.
Meanwhile, the Directors had received reports of the
abandonment of the Banjar factory and also various complaints
against Landon from the other Council members. When informed
that Landon had no intention to return to Banjar, but had
proceeded to Bengal, the Directors dismissed him from the
87service of the Company in August 1702. Tooly, who had 
been brought back in chains to Batavia, was absolved from all
blame as the Directors were given the impression that "his
88character and behaviour had been unblameable in Europe.11 
Thereafter, they appointed him as the new chief of the Banjar 
Council. Rodgett, Joyner and Beauchamp became his assistants.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. E.I.C. to the commanders of the Borneo. Macclesfield 
and other ships. - August 1702, MRM (19), no page.
88. Ibid.
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When Tooly arrived in Banjarmasin in August 1702,
House and Master refused to acknowledge him as chief because 
they felt that the initiative to reopen the factory had been 
given to them by the Chusan Council, They told Tooly that 
it was they who had revived the commerce of Banjar, as- the 
Banjarese could not even tolerate the names of the previous 
Council members being mentioned in their presence. Since 
"the trade we are now driving is of our owne planting,"
House and Master continued, "tis but reason we should reap
p q
the credit or discredit of it." Because of their refusal 
to co-operate with him, Tooly w&s compelled to administer the 
factory jointly with Rouse and Master and he promised not
QO
"to insist on any superiority."
In the course of their joint administration of the
Banjar factory, conflict occurred botween the two .English
groups when they competed with each other for the supply of
pepper. Rouse and Master, who had signed the commercial
contract with the Fanambahan, expected to load the Macclesfield
0*1
before other English ships." Instead of complying with this
89. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 1 September 1702, JFR (6B), 
Ho. 86.
90. Tooly to Rouse and Master, 2 September 1702, JFR (6B), 
No. 87.
91. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 21 October 1702, JFR (6B), 
No. 138.
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request, Tooly advanced $500 to the Banjarese to deliver
92pepper to the Panther, a private vessel. Mien Rouse and
Master admonished him for intercepting the pepper trade
because they felt that the principal way to lose the friendship
93of the Banjarese was to make cash advances, Tooly blamed
Rouse and Master for the slow despatch of the Macclesfield*
He stated that if they had not deferred payment to the
Banjarese but had handed out cash promptly, the Macclesfield
would have completed its loading by then. In fact, the
pepper merchants and the Chinese Shahbandar had voiced their
dissatisfaction with the deferred payments. Since Rouse and
Master hnd already wasted so much time, Tooly continued, it
was not in the interest of the Company to wait for the loading
of a single vessel and thus he had decided to obtain pepper
94for several ships at once.
The presence of another private ship, the Frederick„
92. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 22 October 1702, JFR (6ij), 
No. 140.
93. Ibid.
94. Tooly also denied that he had disclosed confidential 
matters to Captain Robinson of the Panthbr. He charged 
that Rouse and Master tried "to lessen him on all 
occasions and make mountains of molehills by telling 
halfe storeys as suits best with them." - Tooly to 
Rouse and Master, 22 October 1702, JFR (6B), No. 140,
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in Banjar in 1702 complicated matters, and led to further 
friction among the English, In their determination to procure 
a complete cargo for the Macclesfield, Rouse and Master 
refused to permit Captain Peacock of the Frederick buy any 
pepper. When Captain Peacock ignored their instructions
and started to load pepper, Rouse and Master sent their men
95to seize his supplies. Peacock thereupon complained to
Tooly that his co-administrators had no right whatever to
obstruct the free commerce of Banjar* As he had already
paid port duties and made ample cash advances to the Banjarese
merchants, he had equal right to participate in.the pepper
trade. As a matter of fact, one of the Pengerans at Tartas
had announced that all English merchants could trade in
96Banjar so long as they made cash advances. Rouse and Master 
disagreed and stated that since the Frederick was not a 
Company vessel. Peacock should have asked permission from the 
Banjar Council to purchase pepper.9^ Despite their threats 
designed to prohibit other English merchants from obtaining 
pepper, Rouse and Master failed to persuade the Banjarese to 
give them a full cargo of pepper for the Macclesfield. When 
they asked Tooly to part with ten tons of pepper and he
95. Rouse and Master to Chusan Council, 18 November 1702,
JFR (6B), No. 17S.
96. Peacock to Tooly, 18 November 1702, JFR (6B), No. 177.
97. Rouse and Master to Peacock, 18 November 1702, JFR (6B), 
No. 179.
refused. Rouse and Master decided to leave Banjar for 
Palembang where one of the Pengerans had promised them three 
hundred pikuls of pepper. ^
Meanwhile, the Directors were thinking of ways to cake
the Banjar venture a success. As the factory at Chusan was
already closed, Banjar was considered as an alternative station
fr..om v/here the English Company could attempt to reopen
trade with eastern Indonesia and also China. In order to
consolidate its position and advance its interests in Banjar,
the Company resolved to erect a fort around the factory.
From time to time, the Banjar Council, in writing to the
Directors, had advocated the fortification of the settlement.
Rodgett, who succeeded Tooly as chief of the factory when
99
the latter died early in 1703, indicated that a fort would 
not only defend the English against further attacks of the 
Banjarese, but would also fulfil a major economic objective 
of the Company, namely, the encouragement of the Chinese 
junks to return to Banjar. After the Anglo-Banjarese war of 
1701, many nakhodas transferred their commercial transactions 
from Banjar to Tortas. When the English factory was 
re-established in 1702, the Chinese could not be persuaded
98. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 17 December 1702, JFR (6B), 
No. 209.
99. Tooly died on board the Edward and Dudley on 11 May
1703. - Ship log, Edward and Dudley, (1702-1705).
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to trade with the English at Banjar.10^ Rodgett informed
the Directors that the nakhodas had declared that they would
bring their junks to Banjar again only if they were assured
of protection by the English Company, since they did not
wish the events which they had experienced under Landon to
recur. The nakhodas had complained that during Landon1s
presidency, they were compelled to pay double port duties
to Landon and the Banjarese Shahbandar at Banjar. Hence
the English had to ensure that sufficient protection was given
to the junk merchants against future toll-exactions by the
unauthorised
Banjarese and/English Council members. Rodgett thereby
indicated that the only means to deter the aggressive Shahbandar
from receiving duties at Banjar was for the Company to
10P
construct a fort.
Rodgettfs conviction that the Company should fortify 
Banjar stemmed from his confidence that the English had the 
right to carry out such a project because Banjar, so he claimed, 
had been ceded to the Company by the Sultan in 1701. It is 
difficult to determine whether there was any cession of 
territory at all because of the absence of such a treaty.
It can be recalled that the English sources merely mentioned
100. Rodgett and Griffith to E.I.C., 23 March 1704, SFR (7), 
f. 1.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
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that the Sultan had promised to allow the English to settle 
in Banjar so long as they paid port dues. This clause implies 
that the ruler did not consider Banjar to be ceded territory, 
but rather, as land which was still under his suzerainty.
There is a possibility that Rodgett and some of the other 
Council members interpreted the contract differently, namely, 
that Banjar was ceded territory; as such, only the-Company had 
the prerogative to collect duties and to construct a fort.
Undeniably, the English were very keen to trade with
the junks at Banjar, The hopes of the Directors to establish
profitable trading settlements in China where the Company
servants could purchase silk, tea, and porcelain, at cheap
prices had not been fulfilled. The withdrawal of the Council
from Chusan in January 1702 was a manifestation of the East
India Company’s inability to conduct successful trade with
the Chinese. Catchpoole, the President of the Chusan Council,
and his subordinates, had faced numerous administrative and
commercial difficulties in Chusan, They found that payment
of a duty of two per cent to the Chumpein or governor of
Chusan was not sufficient to enable them to participate in
103
the commerce of Ningpo. They also had to satisfy the 
demands of the Hoppo or Commissioner of Customs at Ningpo,
103. E.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company, 
Vol. I, p. lTTH ~
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who resented the idea that the Ghumpein should grant 
commercial privileges to the English without first consulting 
him.
With regard to the commercial difficulties, the Chusan
factors could not persuade the Chinese merchants to accept
their form of payment, viz. two-thirds in silver and one-third
in European or Indian goods for the purchases they made,
because the Chinese insisted on being paid in the proportion
of three-quarters and one-quarter in money and goods 
104respectively. The Chusan Council stated that it met with
"dilatory proceedings, specious and false pretences and base
usage in treating for goods by having one price given us
105
today and another tomorrow." Subsequently, the English
106
Council was expelled from Chusan by the Mandarin of Justice.
In December 1703, the Directors sanctioned the 
fortification plans at Ban.jar and appointed H. Barre to 
direct the building operations, shortly after the English
104. Ibid., p. 114.
105. Chusan Council to E.I.C., 31 January 1701, OC (56), 4, 
f. 7408.
103. The Chusan members alleged that two private merchants, 
H. Gough and J. Roberts, instigated the Mandarin of 
Justice to expel them by claiming that the Council, 
especially Catchpoole, the President, behaved in a 
domineering way towards the separate stock traders.
In their great hurry to sail off, the Chusan Council 
left behind 51,3Q0 taels of unliquidated advances and 
some unsold stock in the factory. - Morse, op. cit.« 
pp. 114-16.
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107Council had managed to obtain the approval of the Panambahan.
It is clear that though Rodgett considered Banjar to be.the
territory of the Company, the Directors recognised that even
if it were only a formality, the Sultan had to be consulted
in order not to incur any Banjarese hostility. Extensive
preliminary ground-work had to be undertaken before actual
construction work commenced, for after the factory was burnt
108in 1702, the area was "mostly in ruins". When the place 
wqs resettled, only temporary sheds for storing water and 
provisions were put up, while the Company servants and 
merchants were housed in the ships anchored in the Bay of 
B a n j a r . .
In its search for a site to build a fortified 
factory, the Banjar Council suggested Tomborneo, a small 
island ofi Banjar Bay, abounding in fish, cattle and timber. 
Since Tomborneo v/as sparsely populated because of its 
reputation as a favourite haunt for Indonesian pirates, it 
was considered to be an ideal choice. However, the island, 
consisting of very low land, and liable to periodical flooding
107. Banjar Council to E.I.C,, 21 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1*
108. W. Lambert to E.I.C*, 12 September 1703, OC (5), f. 814.
109. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 December 1703, OC (59), 
f. 8218.
during the rainy season, had to be drained. After some
deliberation, the English Council resolved to construct
the fort on Banjar and not Tomborneo. The Council found
that it was not feasible to drain Tomborneo because of the
limited number of workers available on Banjar, for the task
of drainage required many "hands, tools, naval stores and
n  istationary wares." Although Rodgett had proposed to recruit 
Javanese carpenters and blacksmiths to work on the settlement 
because he felt they were cheaper to obtain than Europeans, 
the Directors decided against it. Moreover, since Banjar 
was already an established settlement, the Directors felt 
that it would be easier to fortify the place where labourers, 
building materials, and provisions were within easy reach
■jip
of the Council members.
Working plans on Banjar commenced early in 1704. By 
September of the same yeai} the settlement was reported to
113
be "thriving"."” After the ditch had been cleared, a large 
timber warehouse was built. In order to construct a wharf.
110. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 23 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.
111. Rodgett to E.I.C., 24 February 1704, SFR (7), f. 5.
112. Ibid.
113. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7), 
f. 13. In fact, Rodgett claimed that the factory was 
resettled through his efforts. He stated that prior 
to his arrival, "not much as a board dared to be sent 
ashore or a tree cut downe. Therefore, the credit of 
resettling Banjar cannot be taken from me." - Rodgett 
to E.I.C., 21 December 1703, OC (59), f. 8218.
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wooden piles were drilled into the ground to serve as the 
114foundation. Despite the initial progress, work on the
building project was stopped in mid-1705. The reason for
this cessation of activity was attributed to the sparse
number of builders available in Banjar. At the time of Barre!s
arrival in September 1705, there were about forty Europeans
in the settlement, but most of them had fallen sick because
they could not bear the strain of working in a hot climate.
Moreover, some of the Indonesian slaves who provided the
115English Council with taQnual labour, had run away.
Barre, who had assumed charge of the factory from Joyner,
soon after his arrival in 1705, felt strongly that the building
of the fort should be resumed as quickly as possible. With
the reinforcements which he brought along, he estimated
that there were sufficient men to undertake the project which
had lain dormant for several months. From his previous
experience bf the Banjarese, and from Joyner's earlier
impression that these people were seriously contemplating
another assault on the factory, Barre was convinced that
116
’'force prevailed more than arguments” in Banjarmasin. He 
argued that the Banjarese ’’dreaded the Dutch and feared the
114. Banjar Council to E,I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7),f. 13.
115. Joyner and Griffith to E.I.C., 28 May 1705, OC (61),
f. 8361. —
116. Barre to .E.I.C., 25 March 1706, SFR (7), f. 28.
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Macassarese" because both races had demonstrated the use of 
117force before. This aggressive policy of Barre differed
from the concept of Griffith, one of the Council members.
The latter held the opinion that the "natives could only be
managed by prudence and not force," otherwise war would be
118the inevitable result. Subsequent course of events were 
to prove that Griffith was the better judge of the Banjarese 
than Barre.
Under the direction of Barre, the building plans were
put into operation in January 1706. After the ground had
been provided with a stable foundation of wooden piles, Barre
wanted to fortify the factory with stone, and not brick and
119timber, as he felt that a stone wall would be stronger.
The whole project, which included a wharf as we11 as a defence
wall, was designed to be completed in twenty months at a
cost of $9,000 and $12,000 respectively* Altogether, $48,000
were needed for the whole scheme which included the cost of
120
i,he xactory buildings. By the end of November 1706, the 
builders had put the finishing touches to s spacious two-
117. Ibid. The Dutch and Macassarese were both renowned 
for their military and naval skill.
118. Griffith to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f. 23.
119. Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, JFR (9), f. 42.
120. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 23 November 1706, SFR (7), 
f. 34.
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121storeyed barracks and a brick warehouse. The latter,
which was designed to stock six hundred tons of pepper at a
time, replaced did timber building which had been built
under the supervision of Rodgett, A lime-kiln was established
in Tomborneo to manufacture bricks which were needed for
122the various factory buildings. Since Barre did not trust
the Bugis and Macassarese soldiers as he considered them
treacherous, he asked the Directors to recruit only European
personnel to serve as resident guards at the factory once
123the fortifications were completed.
Despite Barrels enthusiasm over the swift completion 
of the project, unforseen obstacles tended to hinder the 
remaining part of the building programme. The high mortality 
rate in Banjarmasin frequently robbed the English Company of
12/i
valuable workmen. x It has already been observed that it 
was difficult for the Banjar Council to replace carpenters, 
bricklayers or blacksmiths. This problem of replacement 
became greater when the English were expelled from their 
settlement on Pulau Condore as the occasional supply of -
121. The length and width of the barracks and warehouse 
were 106 ft. by 26 ft. and 90 ft. by 40 ft. respectively. 
- Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, SFR (7), f. 42.
122. Barre to E.I.C., 30 January 1707, SFR (7), f. 42.
123. Ibid. ,
124. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 23 March 1706, SFR (7), f. 23.
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125workers from there to Banjarmasin was terminated. The
unskilled labourers, made up of imported African or local
Indonesian slaves, had the habit of escaping from their
English masters. The torrential rains in Banjarmasin were
another difficulty encountered by the workmens there were
126long periods in which operations were at a standstill,
A greater problem which beset the English more than
the above-mentioned ones was the lack of timber and rice
supplies. Although the Banjar Council managed to obtain a,
small quantity of timber for its buildings from Tomborneo,
the bulk of it had to come from Java, However, it was
difficult for the English to ship raw materials and rice from
Java as the bustling activity in the Banjar factory apparently
unsettled the Dutch authorities at Batavia, Various English
captains of ships observed that the Dutch were distressed to
witness the large number of English vessels arriving at
Banjarmasin "and seemed resolved to persecute ye trade thither
127with gter, vigour than ever," As early as December 1700 
Willem van Outhoorn, the Governor-General of Batavia, expressed 
concern over the fact that in addition to the English ships
125, Ibid,
126, Barre to E.I*C,, 30 January 1707, SFR (7), f# 42,
127, Observation of H,Gough on the Mary at the Cape of 
Good Hope, - 21 February 1701, FRM (6 ), f. 46,
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which were going to China and hampering Dutch commerce with 
the Chinese junks, an increasing number of them were also 
stopping at Banjarmasin to trade. He remarked that the Dutch 
Company had ignored the problem of British intrusion into 
areas where it had exclusive contracts with the indigeneous
rulers, such as Banjarmasin for some time, but henceforth,
128it could not do so any more. Here, the Dutch**Ban jarese
contract which Van Outhoorn referred to was that signed in
1664 whereby the Banjarese^promised to send all their pepper
129
to the Dutch Company to the exclusion of all other peoples.
When the attempt of Joannes van Mechelen and Pieter
der Vesten to purchase a full pepper cargo at Banjarmasin in
1678 failed, the Batavian Council decided to stop sending
any more Company ships to Banjarmasin, but sanctioned private
vessels of the Burghers and the Chinese inhabitants of Java
to sail to Banjarmasin to procure pepper for the Company.
Steady but moderate quantities of pepper were received from
the Banjarese by the private merchants of Java who sold them
130to the Dutch authorities on their return to Batavia. When
128. Original General Missive, 1 December 1700, KA 1520q 
f. 414.
129. Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticumq Pt. II, in BTLV, (1S31), 
Vol. 87, pp. 285-87.
130. Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1715. 
f. 367-68. In this missive, the Governor-General and 
Council of Batavia referred to incidents concerning 
Banjarmasin in the 1660fs and 16701 s.
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he talked of English intrusion into Banjarmasin, Van Outhoorn
inplied that the Banjarese-Dutch contract of 1664 was still
valid although Dutch Company ships had not visited Banjar
for a long time. He added that measures would be taken
against the English to prevent them from establishing a
strong settlement at Banjar. He had thought of forbidding
English ships proceeding to Banjar to land at Batavia to get
provisions and water, but had decided against it as such a
move would appear to be a breach of promise to the English
131to allow them to use Batavia as a landing site.
Although Van Outhoorn had considered the question of 
taking measures to check the English at Banjar in 17009 the 
subject was not brought up again in the Council until 1703.
In that year, the Governor-General stated that he had ' 
received information that Captain Barre was expected to come 
to Banjar in August 1703 to take charge of the English 
settlement t h e r e . I n  view of his impending retirement 
as Governor-General5 Van Quthoorn m ^ e d  his Council colleagues 
not to abandon their attempts to find effective means to 
impede the English activities on Banjar. He was especially 
concerned about the smuggling trade in opium by the English
131. Original General Missive, 1 December 1700, KA 1520q 
f. 415.
132. Original General Missive, 25 February 1703* KA 1545. 
f. 113. “
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interlopers from Batavia to Banjar which was threatening
133the commerce of the Dutch Company.' Because of the great
popularity of opium among the Banjarese, and the high profits
which could be derived from the sale of the product, the
Dutch alleged that the English who came to Batavia and
Semarang to obtain provisions, usually managed to smuggle
substantial quantities of opium into their vessels along with
134the other necessities. Although an order was given to the 
Resident of Semarang in April 1702 to restrict the supply of 
opium to the private traders of the town so as to prevent 
smuggling by the English, the Dutch authorities found that
the contraband trade in opium still existed to a considerable
, , 135
extent.
In March 1703, the Banjar Council reported that the
Dutch Company tried to starve the inhabitants of Banjar by
restricting rice supplies from Java to that quarter. The
limited quantities which were available on the Banjar market
cost 16 gantangs per Spanish dollar whereas formerly, 60
136gantangs could be obtained for a dollar. It did not 
mention anything about the earlier Dutch attempt to hinder
133. Ibid.
134. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 25 April 1702,
135. Ibid.
136. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.
97
the English from bringing opium from Java to Banjarmasin,
Although the restriction on rice imports into Banjarmasin
was a deliberate measure of the Batavian Council to check
Anglo-Banjarese trade* it was nevertheless carried out
because of the urgency to conserve the rice supplies in Java.
As early as 25 April 1702, the Batavian Council had instructed
the Resident of Japara to send all the rice supplies of his
area to Batavia so that the needs of the Dutch Company
personnel could be satisfied first. If extra quantities of
rice remained thereafter, Javanese private merchants tould
127obtain passes to export the rice.
In July 1703 the situation with regard to the rice 
shortage in Java had worsened. A certain Burgher called 
Roelof Willems, was only permitted to take salt and some 
other provisions, but not rice to Malacca and Acheh. The 
Dutch authorities announced that in view of the small stocks 
of rice available in Java, these would be strictly kept, for
the consumption of the Company servants in Batavia and.
138 ' • ' ' ; 1
Ceylon. Because of the restriction, it is possible that
only very small quantities of rice were smuggled by the
private traders of Batavia to Banjarmasin and other areas; -
137. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 25 April 1702, 
KA-617, f. 140.
138. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 17 July 1703, 
KA 618f f. 332.
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hence, this accounted for the exorbitant price of the product 
in Banjar, Nevertheless, the Banjarese inhabitants under 
the English control were alarmed when they were deprived of 
extensive rice imports from one of their chief granaries, 
Rodgett attempted to solve this problem by despatching English
I Q C
vessels from Banjar to Batavia to purchase direct supplies.
However, the mission was unsuccessful, and the outcome was
that the Banjarese labouring force was compelled by the
English to remedy the shortage by planting its own rice and
140
also some sugar cane.
The regulation imposed by Van Outhoorn in 1703
prohibiting the export of rice from Java was still enforced
in 1706. In fact, early in 170C the hew hovernor-General
of Batavia, Johan van Hoorn, intensified measures against
the English in Banjarmasin* When he found that the Resident
of Tagal was not vigilant enough in checking the smuggling trade
in rice, he transferred him to Sernarang and sent Cornelis
141Jongbloet to replace him. A more serious case concerned 
eleven Chinese merchants of Dernak who were banished to Ceylon 
and the Cape of Good Hope by Johan van Hoorn for furnishing
139* Banjar Council to E.I.C*, 21 March 1704, SFR (7), f. 1.
140. Banjar Council to E.I.C*, 30 September 1704, SFR (7),
f. 13. ~
141. Resolutions of the Batavian Council, 4 March 1706,
KA 622. f. 177.
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k 142stocks of timber and rice to the English an Banjarmasin.
The Governor-General declared that he had taken such a stern
measure in order to show an example to other private traders
143
who still continued to help the English. Because of all
these obstacles? a disappointed Barre had to announce at
the end of 1706 that the whole building project would require
144two years instead of twenty months to complete.
As the Dutch obstructive measures occurred simultaneously 
with the attempts of some Macassarese coastal traders to 
obtain pepper in Banjar, the Banjar Council suspected that 
they had been deliberately sent to the area by the Governor
145of Macassar to displace the English from the pepper market. 
Instead of purchasing pepper at the port as the English and 
the Chinese merchants did, the Council claimed that the 
Macassarese went directly into the hinterland of Negara to
*] A S?
procure pepper from the Biajus. " Du e to a gifowing fear 
that this intrusion by the neighbouring Indonesians in the 
pepper trade v/ould leave them with hardly any pepper in the
142. Ibid.« f. 178.
143. Ibid.
144. Barre to E.I.C., 3 November 1706, SFR (7), f. 34.
145. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LB (12), 
f. 570.
146. Rodgett to E.I.C., 21 December 1703, OC (59), 
f. 8218.
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end, the English held hasty consultation sessions or
147bicharas with the Panambahon. They tried to persuade him
to prohibit the Macassarese from going inland to make pepper
purchases, and to grant an exclusive pepper contract to the
148English. Sultan Bagus Kasuma gave his verbal consent."
In effect, the Banjar Council received only an empty promise, 
for the ruler certainly had no intention of stopping the 
lucrative Indonesian trade, and thereby diminish the toll- 
duties derived from this source.
Because of intensive competition from the Indonesian
coastal traders and the junk nakhodas, English vessels which
arrived in Banjar in 1705 and thereafter were not very
successful in procuring full pepper cargoes. Ships such as
the Seaford which had to depart from ^anjar in May 1704
without a single grain of pepper did so merely because the
factors had no Spanish reals to buy the product."**4^ But in
the case of the Mar.y . Feather stone., Caesar«, Catherine.
150
Blenheim and Jane which visited Banjarmasin in 1705, full
147. Ibid.
148. Hodgett to E.I.C., 20 December 1703, OC (59), f. 8217.
149. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 16 May 1704, SFR (7), f. 2.
150. The Featherstone actually came to Banjar on 10 
November 1704. The Caesar and Catherine arrived in 
May and August 17053respectively, while the Blenheim 
and Jane reached Banjar on 6 SeDtember 1705. -
SFR 7777 ff• 14> 15 and 24*
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cargoes were not procurable chiefly because, so the
Banjarese claimed, the bulk of the crop had been damaged by
151excessive rains. Although he had promised the Banjar
Council that he would help the English to fill their ships
with pepper, Sultan Bagus Kasuma was alleged to have acted
152in a 'dilatory1 manner towards the English in 1705.
Moreover, Pengeran Aria, who was accused by the English as
one of the principal instigators of the Anglo-Banjarese war
of 1701, tried to hinder pepper supplies to the English when
153he fined a Chinese nakhoda for selling pepper to them.
Several of the English Council members, who disliked
Joyner as chief of the Council, attributed the hostile
attitude of Pengeran Aria and some of his subordinates to
had
Joyner's arbitrary behaviour and the way he bungled relationsA
with the Banjarese authorities. It was true that Joyner's 
past record as chief of the Banjar Council had not been very 
favourable. He had first assumed office as chief after 
Rodgett had died aboard the Seaford late in-1704 while - -
on hi s way to Pulau Condore to acquire, tools and workers
151. W. Salladine at Batavia to E.I.C., 11 July 1705, 
SFR (7), f. 13.
152. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 8 October 1705, SFR (7), 
f. 1 2 .
153. Joyner to Griffith, 10 August 1705, SFR (6 ), 
no page.
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154for the construction project on Bgnjar. At the beginning
of his term of office, Joyner was reported to have a ,Tgood
155
understanding with the natives." However, when he was 
officially appointed chief by the Directors in February 1705, 
the other factors alleged that Joyner became arrogant, and 
Anglo-Banjarese relations rapidly deteriorated. Because of 
his ill-conduct, Joyner earned the disrespect of his 
colleagues in the Council, and when reports of his behaviour 
reached the Directors, so: the other members claimed, they 
"caused a scandal in India.
According to the English factors, Joynerfs association
with his Macassarese soldiers incurred the displeasure of the
Banjarese nobles. Like Landon, Joyner was on very friendly
terms with his men and he made no attempts to impose
discipline, or to check the Macassarese when they broke
"barrack" regulations. On many occasions, the Macassarese
were alleged to have shown negligence in guarding the factory
by staying away from duty, had fallen asleep while on patrol,
or had robbed the Banjarese inhabitants or abused some of the 
157
factors. Instead of taking action against the Macassarese,
154. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f.29.
155. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 2 February 1705, SFR (7), f.15.
156. Barre to E.I.C., 4 February 1706, SFR (7), f. 26.
157. Griffith to Joyner, 4 August 1705, SFR (6 ), no page.
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Joyner had rebuked his subordinates for causing "dissension 
and separateness" in the Council.
Griffith, a Council member, warned Joyner not to put
implicit trust in his soldiers because he suspected the
159
loyalty of the Macassarese to the English, The recent 
appearance of Pengeran Purabaya in Banjar enhanced his 
suspicion, Purabaya, of Macassarese and Banjarese blood, 
was regarded as a prospective claimant to the Sultanate of 
Banjarmasin, When his father who held the regency during 
Bagus-Kasumafs minority had died, Purabaya tried the wrest 
the throne from the heir-apparent. He was unsuccessful in
n 0Q
his attempt and was subsequently deported to Pulau Laut. 
Nevertheless, Purabaya was hopeful of claiming the throne
from Bagus Kasuma and therefore had started to recruit
161Macassarese troops from Pulau Laut and Banjar. His attempts 
at persuading the Macassarese to join his army made a few 
English factors, including Griffith, suspect that Purabaya 
intended to stir up a rebellion against the English at 
Banjar; an event similar to that which had occurred at Pulau
158, Joyner to the rest of the Banjar Council, 6 August 1705,
SFR (6 ).
159, Griffith to E.I.C., 30 August 1705, SFR (7), f. 23.
160, De Roy, Hacheli.ike Re^s, f, 136,
161, See pp, 123-24 for a more detailed account on Purabaya,
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Condore.
Griffith was afraid that if the uprising at Banjar
occurred, there was every possibility that the Macassarese
soldiers of the English Company and Purabaya would inflict
harm on the English, ”by having so many of them among us,
and you /~Joyner_7 ssy yourselfe there are greater rewards
offered them by the other party,so weighing the whole matter,
our English people here are not without some grounds uneasy
11 163
at your confiding so much in ye Macassars. Thus, Griffltn
felt that certain precautions were necessary in order to 
ensure the safety of the English in case violence should 
break out. One of these measures should be the redistribution 
of the Macassarese soldiers in Banjar so that some of them 
could be sent to Tomborneo to guard the Companyfs effects 
there while the rest could remain in the factory at Banjar.
By restricting thes*e men in such a way that the Indonesian 
soldiers would hot exceed the number of Europeans in either 
place at any one time, there was less likelihood for the 
Macassarese to inflict harm on the English. For defensive
162. The Macassarese soldiers on Pulau Condore had revolted 
against the English factors on 3 March 1705. The 
Council on Pulau Condore suspected that the Cochin 
Chinese had instigated the Macassarese to take action 
against the English in order to drive them away from 
the island. See Milburn, Oriental Commerce  ^ Vol. II, 
p. 44o.
163. Griffith to Joyner, 4 August 1705, OC (61), f. 8370.
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purposes, the English factors should construct a drawbridge
so that their ship would be a place of safe retreat in case
164of any Macassarese attack.
Griffith also considered the danger from the Macassarese
who were not in the service of the English Company, He
suggested that these people should be asked to remove their
lantings to the other side of the Barito river away from the
Company^ ship, so that if the factors fired their guns
during an attack, the Macassarese would not be in the way to
mask their guns. Finally, the English soldiers should be on
the alert all the time by refraining from excessive drinking
16 ^and they should also abandon their native mistresses#
Joyner denied all these charges and considered the 
threat of a "Macassarese-inspired1* rebellion in Banjar as
166
"ridiculous" because Purabaya was leaving Banjar shortly.
Contrary to what Griffith had said, Joyner admitted that
Purabaya had in fact approached him for help to subject the
167upland Biajus, but he had refused. He argued that
164. Griffith to Joyner, 4 August 1705, OC (61), f. 8370.
165. Ibid. The Banjar Council alleged that Joyner cpenly 
encouraged debauchery by keeping a harem of female 
slaves. - Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 August 1705,
SFR (7), f. 23.
166.. Joyner to Griffith, 6 August 1705, SFR (6 ), no page,
167. Ibid.
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Griffith's fears of a revolt by Purabaya against the English
were unfounded. Purabaya had no reason to stage an uprising
as he did not have any grudge- against the English.
He wanted some of the Macassarese soldiers of the English
because
Company to join his army /it is likely that he iffcerkim to use 
them to suppress the Biajus .in order to gain a footholc! in 
the upper province of Negara.. Once the Biajus were subjected, 
Purabaya could launch the attack on Banjar from Upper Negara 
with less difficulty than from Pulau Laut. By approaching 
the chief of the English factory for military aid, it was 
obvious that Purabaya was determined to oust the Sultan and 
become the ruler himself.
Joyner was also resentful that Griffith had cast doubt.v
on the loyalty of his Macassarese soldiers who wore a well-
disciplined force. He was positive that as long as the
English Company needed their services and they were not ill-
treated, the Macassarese would remain faithful to the Banjar 
16°Council. ° With regard to the construction of a drawbridge, 
ho informed his subordinates that he had already made plans 
to build it. However, he thought thet it was an insufficient 
means of defence, for if the Macassarese really intended 
to launch an attack on the factory, they had other ways to 
carry out their plans. On the subject of Macassarese
168. Joyner to Griffith, 6 August 1705, SFR (6 ).
mistresses, Joyner admitted that he had permitted a few of 
his subordinates to keep female slaves for the "odd several 
necessary occasions.
Despite Joynerfs protestations, the factors continued
to send incriminating reports on him to the Company. Friction
between Joyner and his subordinates increased after Barre*s
170 fc/Acn
death in March 1707 and Joyner succeeded as chief for the
second time. This was clearly seen in one instance when the
English prohibited a few junks from loading supplies until
171
the Jane had been stocked with 45,000 gantangs of pepper.
The factors managed to do this by stationing a guard vessel 
at the kuala of the Barito river. Shortly afterwards, Joyner 
told the junk traders that he would remove the guard vessel 
and allow them to receive pepper if they gave him §2,500.
To show that he would keep his word, Joyner ordered the 
guard ship to sail out of the river. The nakhodas then 
bribed him and started to load pepper into their junks. When 
the rest of the Council members heard about this incident, 
they rebuked Joyner who was thereafter obliged to reimpose 
control over the junks by commanding the guard vessel to go
169. Ibid.
170. Barre had complained of pain in his head and neck 
before he died. - Banjar Council to E.I.C., 22 March 
1707, SFR (7), f. 43. In 1713, when Captain Beeckman 
visitecf "Banjarmasin, the Banjarese boasted that they 
had poisoned Barre. - See Beeckman, op. cit.„ p. 87.
171. J. Casby and Griffith to E.I.C., 2 June 1707, SFR (7),
f. 46.
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172to the kuala again. Under the threat of force, the
Chinese were compelled to return oil their pepper supplies to 
173the Jane. _ After this incident, the Council members accused
Joyner of encouraging his Macassarese soldiers to loot
Banjarese perahus which were wrecked in the Bay of Banjar.
They claimed that when Joyner wanted to share the loot with
them, they refused because they did not want to participate
174
in his illicit activities.
When the Directors received the reports on Joyner from 
the other factors, they discharged him from his post early 
in June 1707 on the grounds that he was no longer fit to
exercise his duties because of his irresponsible and impolitic
17 5 176actions. J. Cunningham, the President of the factory
at Pulau Condore before the English were expelled by the
native inhabitants, was sent to Banjar in the same month to
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid.
174. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, SFR (7), 
f. 51.
175. Minutes of the Court of Managers, 20 June 1707, CM*(42)» 
f. 604.
176. Hamilton described Cunningham as followss "He was bred 
a surgeon, and had turned virtuoso; would spend whole 
days in comtemplating on nature, shape and qualities 
of a butterfly or a shell fish and left the management 
of the Companyfs business to others as little capable 
as himself, so everyone but he was master." - See
A. Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies * Vol. II, 
(London, 1930), p. 7 7 . ' '
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act as the new chief of the English Council. Alas, it was 
too late for Cunningham to attempt to restore the goodwill 
of the Banjarese. The wounds which the English chiefs, 
namely, Joyner and Barre, had inflicted on the Banjarese 
authorities were too deep to heal.
On 21 June 1707 Bagus Kasuma, various Banjarese princes
177
and nobles held a secret meeting at Tortas. Soon after
the conference, the Panambahan addressed a very friendly
letter to the English Council. He offered to grant the
whole pepper contract to the English which they, without
hesitation, accepted.^^ Meanwhile, Cunningham had received
o report that a large number of Banjarese were busy constructing
warrior perahus in the upper region of Negara. When he went
to verify the truth from the Pongerans, they assured him
that he had nothing to fear as the few Banjarese nobles were
17 Qmerely building hunting vessels.
The hunting expedition of the Pengerans turned out 
to be an onslaught on the English settlement of Banjar. On 
the morning of 27 June 1707, about one hundred and fifty 
perahus swooped down on the Blenheim9 Charlton, and some
177. John Wolff to Johan van Hoorn, Governor-General of 
Batavia, 31 July 1707, KA 1626. f. 371.
178. Ibid.
179. Ibid.
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1 on
small English boats which were anchored in Banjar harbour. v 
The Blenheim could not offer much resistance because the 
gunpowder on board was wet. The Charlton emerged from the 
assault with little damage, and managed to go to the aid. of 
the Ble nhc±m in time to rescue the crew and other Englishmen
■ II.. ■ 1| l«| I. ,,,|« +  W
181who were aboard. ° However, the rescuers did not find the
182captain of the Blenheim and a certain Jacob Hoogkoner,
who had fled into the interior of Banjarmasin while the
fighting was on. In the scuffle, the Chinese residents of
the town and some foreigners who stayed in the vicinity of
Banjar, either escaped or were massacred by the fierce 
183Banjarese. Although the smaller English ships w ;re badly
damaged and their crews were injured or killed, the Blenheim 
and the Charlton did not suffer such heavy losses. On their 
side, the casualty rate of the Banjarese was estimated to 
be a high one with about one thousand and five hundred men
180. John Wolff to Johan van Hoorn, Governor-General of 
Batavia, 31 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 371.
181. Ibid.
182. Jacob Koogkamer was an official in the Eutch Company 
at Batavia who was compelled to flee in 1706 when he 
became involved in some political difficulties with 
the Batavian Council, He came to Banjarmasin to join 
the English but in the skirmish with the Banjarese in 
1707, he fled into the hinterland where he died of 
fever. See F. Valentijn, Pud en hieuyOost Indien« 
Vol. Ill, (Mackenzie Coliection (Private)J, (64V)19 
ff. 399-401.
183. John Wolff to John van Hoorn, 31 July 1707, KA 1626., 
f. 372.
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dead. Before the Banjarese could launch a fresh attack,
the English decided to leave the factory and sail to
Batavia. The factors managed to retrieve sixteen chests of
treasure, but the losses in cash and goods were valued at
1 nc
$22,000 and $28,000 respectively.
Several reasons can be suggested for the Banjarese
assault on the English factory. According to Griffith, the
ill-conduct of Joyner and his treatment of the Banjarese,
186
alienated the Banjarese from the English. ° It would seem 
that the charges which the Council members brought against 
Joyner earlier on made him fully responsible for incurring 
the hostility of the Banjarese, It is improbable, however, 
that Joyner alone could infuriate the Banjarese to such an 
extent where they wanted to kill or expel the English. A 
more likely explanation would be that the attitude of the 
Sultan and his subordinates had not changed since 1702^ 
they continued to detest the English after the attack on the 
Mary. But when the English insisted on resettling and trading 
at Banjar in that same year, the Banjarese authorities consented 
on condition that the English Company would only conduct
184. Hamilton, op. cit.o p. 78.
185. Banjar Council at Batavia to E.I.C., 24 July 1707,
SFR (7), f. 32.
186. Griffith at Batavia to E.I.C., 25 February 1708,
SFR (7), f. 51.
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commercial transactions in the area.
Peaceful relations between the two peoples we re
partially restored by Barre when he arrived in September 1705
and tried to reassure the Banjarese that the i^iglish wanted
merely to trade. These amicable ties between the English
and Banjarese disappeared when the Banjarese authorities
saw the mounting fortifications. When the construction works
were in progress, Barre asserted that it was useless for the
Banjarese to object to their fortifications, because the
Council members had a military force at hand to resist any
187attempt that was made against them. ° Barre could have also 
incurred the displeasure of the Panambahan when he shot at 
Gusti Ganton, a Banjarese chieftain, who had murdered a 
Chinese captain, and narrowly missed the Banjarese queen who
TOO
was in the perahu with the Gusti. ° It was a sign of great 
disrespect when Barre fired on the Gusti, but it was a 
personal insult to the Panambahan that Barre should have 
acted in such a violent manner when his wife was aboard the 
perahu.
The Banjarese onslaught was also attributed to the 
intrigues of the junk traders. According to Cunningham,
187. Barre to E.I.C., 4 February 1706, SFR (7), f. 26.
188. Banjar Council at Batavia to E.T.C., 24 July 1707, 
SFR (7), f. 32.
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the junk masters became embittered and jealous of the
factors after they had been/deprived of pepper cargoes
when threatened by an English military force and the
appearance of the guard vessel* They also felt that once
the fort was completed, the English would claim a monopoly
189of the whole pepper trade. Hence, Cunningham felt that 
the Chinese instigated the Banjarese to take action against 
the English factory* As soon as the English were evicted, 
he stated, the Chinese could resume their profitable commerce 
and move freely in the area, as their movements had been 
considerably restricted by the guard vessel which was 
stationed at the kuala of the Bari to river.
Cunningham!s contention that the Chinese were involved 
in the Banjarese plot to expel the English had no grounds.
One would have thought that if the Chinese had made 
instigations against the English, they would not have been 
massacred by the Banjarese. Unfortunately, many Chinese 
inhabitants of Banjar were killed in the attack. Evidently, 
the junk traders and Chinese residents were unaware of the 
plot to evict the English. 'They might have disliked the 
English for imposing arbitrary measures to prevent their 
trade in pepper, but it is highly improbable that they
189. Cunningham to E.I,C,,,26 July 1707, SFR (7), f. 47.
190. Ibid.
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played a part in the preparations for war. It can be more 
definitely concluded that the Banjarese authorities planned 
the attack on their own. As already indicated, the 
Panambahan and his subordinates had harboured resentment 
towards the English for a long time since the Anglo-Banjarese 
war of 1701. The second war was,in a sense, the culmination 
of Banjarese ill-feelings towards the Council members for 
constructing a fort against the Sultan!s orders.
Finally, it can be said that the outbreak of Banjarese 
hostilities in 1707 was a result of the fear of the 
Banjarese that the English would dominate the whole of 
Banjarmasin if their - actions went unchecked. In allowing 
the English to trade in Banjar, Bagus Kasuma made it clear 
that he did not want the factors to set up any armaments in 
his territory. The latter, however, openly flouted his 
ruling by importing soldiers and building a fort. To the 
Banjarese, the fortifications signalled the end of their 
freedom and the beginning of British control in their land. 
Joyner and Barre, who displayed the might of the nPax 
Brittanica" whenever they had the opportunity, enhanced: the 
gnawing fears and antagonism of the Banjarese. Thus, before 
the fbrtifications were completed, the Banjarese, who knew 
that the English force was depleted by the flight of sixteen
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men to Java, seized the chance to attack the English
settlement, and were rewarded by the withdrawal of the
Banjar Council to Batavia, Griffith had been proven right
192
when he declared that force would beget warI
When they reached Batavia, the Banjar factors stayed
193there for some time to repair their damaged ships. In
March 1708 the remaining members of the Council, consisting
of Cunningham, Edwards and Griffith, resolved to return to
Banjar to recoup some of the losses which were incurred in
194
the onslaught of 1707, The factors were hopeful that if 
the Company sent them a force of two hundred soldiers and 
builders from Madras, they could suppress the treacherous 
Banjarese for "you /"the Directors_7 will not pass by such 
indignity and loss sustained by such perfidious people." °
In April 17C8 the factors, without waiting for the 
reply of their Company, sailed with J. Legg, another Council 
member, on the Anna to Banjarmasin. When they arrived on
191. R. Edwards alleged that Joyner had been impudent enough 
to allow the Banjarese to know the number of men who 
were in the force of the Company. - Edward's account
of the war of 1707, 7 March 1708, SFR (7), f. 53.
192. Refer to p.^ TI.
193. Wolff to Van Hoorn, 31 July 1707, KA 1626, f. 371.
194. Banjar Council at Batavia to E.I.C., 5 March 1708,
JFR (9), f. 3.
195. Ibid.
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1 May of the same year, the Banjarese authorities avoided
them, A month elapsed before the English were invited for
talks with the messengers of Sultan Bagus Kasuma in Kayu 
196
Tinggi. After weeks of negotiation over the resumption
of the pepper trade by the English, the ruler sent a letter
to the factors. The important contents of the letter were
"... that the English might trade honestly but must stop
no vessels going or coming from Kayutonge / Kayu Tinggi_/
197and when landed, must depart," Here, the Sultan imnlied 
that the English could neither build a factory nor a fort, 
but were to conduct ship-based trading, i.e, they could go 
ashore for the trading season only. This condition was 
probably inserted in order to prevent a recurrence of troubles 
in case the English should decide to stay on in Banjar. The 
port duty was fixed at §1,000 per ship while the cost of 
pepper was ten gantangs per Spanish dollar. However, before 
the English could undertake any commercial venture, they had 
to pay the Fanambahan §3,000 as a peace gesture. ‘ This 
sum was insisted upon because Landon took the same amount 
from the Banjarese when he defeated them in the Anglo-Banjarese 
war of 1701.
196. J. Legg to E.I.C., S February 1709 - Abstract letters 
from Coast and Bay, f. 193.
197. Ibid.
193. Ibid.
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When the factors refused to pay-the $3,000, Bagus
Kssuma was adamant. He warned that the English should comply
199
with this condition or leave Banjarmasin immediately.
The English chose the latter course, and departed for Bengal 
on 1 October 1708,200 After a four-months1 stay in 
Banjarmasin, the factors found that their design to renew 
commerce with the Banjarese and to resettle the factory had 
ended in failure. Since the two experiments by their 
employees to settle in Banjar in 1701 and 1707 had proven 
futile, it took the Birectors six years before another attempt 
was made to establish a factory in Banjarmasin.
199, J, Legg to E.I.C,, 8 February 1709, - Abstract letters
from Coast and Bay, f, 194, Edwards felt that the
Panambahan would not give in to the English on their
terms because Cunningham was included in the party to 
Banjarmasin. He said that "Cunningham had been 
fairly beat out of their /"BanjareseJ  country for the 
English crimes in general," - Letter to the Council
at Bengal, 6 January 1709, Bengal Letters received, 
no page.
2 0 0. Letter from Fort St, George General, 1 October 1708,
" Abstract Letters from Coast and Bay„ f. 158,
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL DISTURBANCES
After he had regained his independence from Hatar am
in the 1670fs, it has already been noticed that the
Panambahan of banjarmasin managed to exercise suzerainty
over the neighbouring areas of Sukadana, Sambas, Landak,
1
Kota Waringin, Pasir and Kutei. His authority over these
south-western and south-eastern states of Borneo was greatly
weakened by the end of the seventeenth century when his
control over his own subjects of Banjarmasin declined because
2
of internal conflict. Henceforth, with the Panambahan1s 
attention focusses] on his own territory, practically every 
vassal state was able to throw off the yoke of its former 
master and to re-establish its independence.
Within the sultanate of Banjarmasin, the Panambahan, 
Bagus Kasuma, who reigned at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, was, as his title denoted, the supreme ruler. His 
political control existed only in theory, for in practice, 
it was confined to the lower regions of the Barito and Bahan 
rivers including the towns of Tartas, Banjarmasin, Kayu Tinggi
1. Refer to Chapter 1, p. 32.
2* C* Nagtegaal, De Voormalige Besturende e n .Gouvernements
- La.ndschappen"in Zuid-Obst Borneo, (Utrecht, 1939), p. 4 0
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and the capital of Martapura* The government in the
remaining parts of the kingdom rested with three persons,
Pengeran Anom, Gusti Temenggong and Pengeran Purba or Marta
Ningrat. The first chief, who was the brother of Bagus
Kasuma, and known officially as the Sultan of Negara, controlled
the pepper-producing provinces of Gekompay, Borangbaha,
Marampiade and Negara, and levied duties on the popper exports
which were sent down the bUngei Negara, from which a certain
3
percentage was delivered to the Panambahan. Gusti Temenggong,
with his seat of power at Bonawa Assam, governed the gold-
mining districts of the hinterland, such as Alii, Nahara,
m 4Nantsja, Komanting and Bonawa Tengah. A shrewd and cunning 
politician, he derived a very lucrative income from the 
revenue received from the mines and from the compulsory 
annual tributes made by the Banjarese to the Panambahan.
Instead of sending the full tributary sum to the ruler, it 
was said that Gusti Temenggong only made an account of his 
transactions to his master as he thought T,proper and agreeable 
with his own interest." .Although-Bagus Kasuma was fully 
aware of the dishonesty of the Gusti, he could not make any 
move to check him because he felt that "a person of such
3, De Roy, Hacheli.ike (Mackenzie Collection, 1822),
f. 165.
4* Ibid., f. 135.
5. Ibid.
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high rank and authority cannot so easily be controlled, since
no person whatever may come within his district and mines
without having previously obtained his leave to it, still
less dare they enter into any commercial speculation with
the natives of his jurisdiction.” The third chieftain was
Pengeran Purba who resided in the outskirts of Martapura.
Being a military figure who controlled the Banjarese forces,
he was heavily relied upon by the Panambahan and Pengeran
Anom for the defence of their territory as they thought that
7
he was "invincible,”
Sultan Bagus Kasuma had little cause to fear that any 
of these three chieftains would challenge his authority so 
long as he did not try to encroach on their right to collect 
dues or interfere with regional politics in their respective 
territories. The chiefs, on the other hand, though envious 
of the Sultan1s powers, were even more intolerant and jealous 
of each other "on account of suspecting one another of 
intrigues in favour of the king, so that what the one proposes, 
the other disapproves, endeavouring thereby to master the 
other, wherefore the king as well as the other three chiefs 
are loath to attempt anything for fear of the other so that
o
all is now in a complete confusion here."0
6 . Ibid.. f. 136.
7. Beeckman, A voyage to Borneo, p. 94. 
8 * De Roy, op, cit., f. 165.
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It has been indicated that the people who had to boar
the brunt of taxation levied by the local rulers were not
so much the Banjarese as the Biajus, the Dayak tribes of
inland Negara and Kapuas, who were forced to pay gold or
pepper to the Panambahan* Since Bagus Kasuma had discreetly
steered clear of local politics in order to ensure his own
safety on the throne, the regional chiefs would generally
exact more than the fixed dues from their Biaju subjects to
fill their o\m treasury. The Panambahan, because of his own
political weakness in a land torn by local loyalties and
support, had to turn a blind eye to such unfair practices,
which invariably, gave rise to discontent among the Biajus*
On the whole, Bagus Kasuma was able to keep his Biaju fiefs
under control by stationing large numbers of Banjarese
soldiers in regions where there were predominant Biaju 
9populations* However, the relationship bwtveen the two 
parties became gradually more strained until it culminated 
in the Biaju uprising of 1711*
When Suria Alam succeeded Bagus Kasuma as 
Panambahan in 1708, the Banjarese nobles decided to raise
9* There were roughly 1,800 soldiers in Kayu Tinggi and 
its villages, 700 in Tartas and Banjarmasin, and 500 
in Negara. In the first three places, the soldiers 
were used to defend the ports and the administrative 
centre, while a comparatively large number of them 
were deployed in Negara to keep guard on the Biajus* 
See Be Roy, 9 291,
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the tribute levied on the Biajus from forty to sixty tahils
of gold^ This act raised a huge outcry from the Biaju
leaders who complained that they were grossly maltreated
and demanded a reduction in the duties, but the Banjarese
rulers simply turned a deaf ear to their pleas. In addition
to this malpractice, the Biajus claimed that further Injustice
was meted out to them. With the influx of large numbers of
Chinese junk traders into Banjarmasin after the expulsion
of the English factors from Banjar, the Biajus, despite the
fact that they were the principal pepper cultivators of
Negara, Marampiade and Bekompay, were forbidden by the
Banjarese rulers to sell pepper direct to the Chinese or
other foreign merchants. Instead, they were compelled to
deliver all their stocks at a very low price to the Banjarese,
who would in turn, sell the pepper to the junks at an
11
extremely high profit at Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. These 
two causes, higher taxation and lower income, presumably 
incited the upland people to cast aside all fears of 
suppression by the better-armed Banjarese and to rebel in 
1711.
The Biaju revolt was easily quelled by the Banjarese
10, Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693, 
f. 1174.
11, Ibid.
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troops who not only had a capable leader in Pengeran Purba,
but they were also supplied with an extra twenty muskets by
the Dutch factors, Bosch and Indus, when they came to trade
12
in Banjarmasin in September of*the same year. Suria Alam
acted rashly by pardoning his Biaju prisoners because he
felt that they would not create trouble again if he showed
13mercy to them. The Panambahan had misjudged his subjects 
because soon after they were set free, the Biaju leaders 
solicited the support of Pengeran Purabaya of Pulau Laut. 
PuTabaya still harboured a strong grudge against the 
Banjarese royal family for expelling him from Banjarmasin 
in the days of Bagus Kasuma.
It has already been indicated that for some time,
Purabaya had considered himself the legitimate heir to the
throne, basing his claim on the fact that although his
mother was a Macassarese princess, his father, who was the
uncle of Bagus Kasuma, had been the regent when the latter 
14was a minor. When Bagus Kasuma came of age, a succession
dispute ensued between him and his uncle after the latter
15
had contrived to make Purabaya his heir. After an
12. Bosch and Indus to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
31 September 1711, KA 1683, f. 1415.
13. Ibid., f. 1417.
14. Refer to p. 103.
15. De Roy, on. cit.« f. 136.
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unsuccessful application for help from the Dutch, Sultan
Bagus Kasuma turned to some Portuguese from Macao for
support. The Portuguese managed to regain the throne for
him in 1680, In return for their military favours, the
Portuguese we re granted an exclusive contract to purchase
pepper at twelve gantangs per dollar,u while Pulau Laut
was ceded to Purabaya as a conciliatory measure. Purabaya
was not satisfied. Hence when he arrived in Pulau Laut,
Purabaya started to enlist men, consisting chiefly of
17Macassarese for his army, in preparation for the day when 
he could launch an attack on Banjarmasin, As already observed, 
he went as far as Banjar to recruit Macassarese soldiers who 
were employed by the English East India Company and was
1 o
partially successful in his attempt,
When he as approached by the Biaju leaders to act as 
commander late in 1711, Purabaya decided that it was the
o 19
appropriate time to attack Banjarmasin and depose Duria Alam*
16. The pepper contract; granted to the Portuguese was 
maintained until 1691* In 1691 when the Portuguese tried 
to get the whole pepper supply and prevented a Spanish 
galleon from loading pepper, the Banjarese revolted and 
drove them out. De Roy, op. cit,, ff. 158-59,
17. Captain Reid on the Arabella, 4 May 1715, JFR (9).
18. Refer to pp, 105-06.
19. Bosch and Indus to the Governor-General of Batavia,
31 September 1711, KA 1683. f. 1416,
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In addition to the coalition of the Biajus, who looked upon
the continued struggle against the Banjarese as one of
liberation against their greedy masters, Purabaya could
recruit the help of Daing Mamantuli, the notorious Bugis
prince who had been expelled from Macassar for his misdeeds,
and who had gone to Kutei in the meantime as the guest of
Krain Bonteramboe in order to support her claims to the region 
20
of Pasir. The appearance of the Bugis in south-east Borneo
at this time was not a strange phenomenon. A maritime and 
warfaring race from the Celebes, the Bugis, through their 
piratical activities, had penetrated into many parts of the 
Malay Archipelago. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
there were sizeable colonies of Bugis immigrants along the 
KLang and Selangor rivers.2-*- In 1701 a small number of Bugis 
mercenaries were introduced into Banjarmasin by Landon, the 
English Council chief, to guard the East India Company’s
20. Ka?ain Bonteramboe was the daughter of Krain Kronrong of
Goo and a princess of Pasir. Soon after her marriage
to the ruler of Kutei, relations between Pasir and Kutei 
were strained because of Bonteramboe1s ambitions to 
exercise sovereignty over Pasir. To lend support to 
her territorial claims, Bonteramboe sought the help of 
Daing Mamantuli. For more details, sec C. Bock, Reis 
in Post en Zuid Borneo van Koetai naar Banjarmassin 
ondernomen op last der Indische ReReering in 1879 en 
l'8'feO.' (The Hague., 1837). DP. XIV-XLX.
21. B.O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya," JMBBAS. Vol. XIII,
Pt. I, (1935), p. 151.
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2 2factory at Banjar.
With the entry of Purabaya and Daing Mamantuli, the 
revolt, which had originally been a minor conflict between 
the Banjarese and the Biajus, escalated into a full-scale 
war involving external forces. Hostilities which had ceased 
temporarily late in 1711, commenced again in August the 
following year when the first batch of Purabayafs soldiers 
arrived off Tomborneo to join the Biajus. In the face of 
overwhelming odds, Suria Alam despatched two ambassadors,
Baden Aria and Tanu Kati, to Batavia for military assistance. 
The Dutch authorities, not wishing to entangle themselves 
in an internal war in Banjarmasin, gave a negative reply to 
the Panambahan.
Meanv/hile, Daing Mamantuli and his two hundred followers
had reached Pulau Laut from Kutei, where they were met by
Purabaya and his son, Gusti Busu. With a fleet of seventeen
perahus, the combined Macassarese and Bugis troops sailed to 
24Banjermasin. To send reinforcements to the Biajus, they
22, Secret report on the English factory at Banjarmasin by 
the Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of 
Batavia, 19 August 1701,. KA 1539, f. 57. Also refer 
to pp. 67-68,
23, Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 3.706q 
f, 8 6 .
24, Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708, 
f. 1266.
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went up the Barito river into the upper region of Negara, 
which was the chief trouble spot. Heavy fighting occurred 
but confronted with a more formidable foe, especially the 
Bugis, and heavily outnumbered, the Banjarese army of Pengeran 
Purba and Pengeran Nata Dilaga was badly defeated. Consequently, 
the Bugis were able to occupy extensive stretches of popper 
land while the more remote areas in the interior were burnt.
Ihe scene in Upper Negara and Bekompay was one of pillage, 
devastation and desolation. Many pepper plantations were 
neglected or ruined, and large numbers of Banjarese fled to 
the towns or ports of the lowlands for refuge.
The victorious Macassarese and Bugis managed to advance
down the Barito river until they reached the outskirts of
the city. Here, Purabaya and Gusti Busu compelled the
Banjarese merchants to hand over their pepper stocks to them,
so that only the most intrepid traders managed to smuggle
meagre quantities of pepper to Kayu Tinggi or Tartas which
26were then sold to the Chinese junks at exorbitant prices.
On one of his reconnoitring trips along the Barito river,
Purabaya confronted Von Lanschot, skipper of the Dutch boat, 
Bo£aa£d, who was attempting to go inland to obtain pepper.
He informed Lanschot that the Dutch Company had been deceived
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
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by Suria Alam who had promised to load all the Dutch ships
with full cargoes of pepper. In fact, most of the pepper
lands were now in the hands of the Bugis, while the little
pepper that remained in the warehouses could not be exported
27because of blockades imposed by the enemy. Purabaya added
that if the Dutch factors were keen to purchase pepper, they
would have to ask his permission and declare their support
for him. Lanschot, who had strict orders from the Batavian
Council not to take sides, told Purabaya that he and his
28colleagues would remain neutral.
It was evident that the unstable situation in
Banjarmasin was beyond the control of Suria Alam and his
court. Lacking reinforcements of arms or men from the
Dutch Company, the Banjarese suffered heavy casualities at
the hands of Daing Mamantuli and Purabaya. Furthermore, a
serious blow was dealt the economy of the country by the
dislocation of the pepper trade. Since Banjarmasin could
29not meet their demands for pepper supplies, the number of 
foreign ships which called at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi decreased
27. Ibid.. f. 1267.
28. Ibid.. f. 1268.
29. The Dutch Council reported that even the Chinese
Lieutenant of Batavia, Que Hoenko, could not obtain any
pepper although he offered the Banjarese a high price
in advance.- Original General Missive, 28 November 
1715, KA 1751. f. 369.
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considerably, and this led to the reduction of part.dues. Moreover,
the government had to increase imports, especially of
provisions, to feed both the soldiers and the civilian
population, after the ricefields had been abandoned by the
agricultural population who had fled to the lowland ports
30
and towns for refuge. Suria Alam realised that unless he
could obtain reinforcements of soldiers or arms from the
0*1
Europeans, his kingdom would be ruined.OJ~ Since he had been 
rebuffed by the Dutch, he therefore turned to the English 
in a desperate attempt to gain military support.
The appearance of the Borneo and the Eagle Galley 
(vessels sent by the English East India Company to revive 
trade with the Banjarese) in Barito waters at the height of 
the upland revolts in 1713 probably served to boost the 
morale of the lowland Banjarese who had despaired of victory 
over their foes. Although the English were there only to 
buy pepper, it is possible that Suria Alam hoped that he 
could manoeuvre in such a way that he could at least recruit 
some military aid from the English for his internal war by 
promising to load the two boats swiftly. If his plan backfired, 
he still had another trump-card up his sleeve. Evidently,
30. Ibid.
31. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 822.
32. Ibid.
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33by sending embassies to Batavia? Suria Alam was bent on
Dutch assistance against his enemies es:oecially after
Purabaya hod joined forces with Daing Mamantuli. Yet he was
conscious that the Dutch authorities at Batavia were reluctant
to commit themselves even to send more ammunition to
Banjarmasin. The arrival of the English at this juncture
could possibly reverse the odds in his favour. The Psnambohan
felt that since the Dutch at Batavia were keen to obtain
pepper from the region of Fegnra, they would definitely
34resent any competition from the English. Therefore, by 
playing on the Dutch fears of intense English competition 
in the pepper trade, he hoped that he could make the Batavian 
government send more arms and some troops to Banjarmasin to 
augment his greatly depleted numbers. In short, Suria Alam 
wanted to play off both European sides, and in the event, 
attempt to get the best bargain out of both, or at least, 
from one party.
In the negotiations with the English, Pengeran Purba, 
as the spokesman of Buria Alam, informed the factors that 
if they wanted to trade in Banjarmasin, it was necessary for 
the Eaalc Galley and the Borneo to sail into Tartas harbour,
33. Original General Massive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706, 
f. 8 6 , and 11 January 1714, KA 1724, f, 1191.
34. Original General Missive, 30 January 1714, ICA 1739«, 
f. 1695.
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instead of anchoring off the Bay of Banjar, so that the
Banjarese could keep an eye on them to prevent any outbreak 
35
of violence* This was just a pretext on the Panambahan's
part for his real intention was to get the ships to act as
a bulwark against further incursions by Purabaya and the
Biajus. The opposing forces had invaded Negara town once
but had been repulsed. There was no guarantee that they
would not attack again. If Purabaya launched another assault
at this stage, Suria Alam felt that it would be easier to
recruit British help if the Eagle Galley and the Borneo
were stationed at Tartas. However, the English, sensing that
the ruler wished to embroil them in his war, and that they
would be risking their own lives if they did, courteously
36
refused the Sultan's invitation. Undeterred by the
English reply, Suria Alam,at a subsequent meeting, offered
cheap pepper to the English in exchange for some men and
ammunition to enable him to intensify his war efforts against
his enemies. Thus, in July 1714 B. Swartz, captain of the
Eagle Galleyq spared two of his crew members to assist the
Banjarese forces in routing some Biaju rebels whose hideout
37
was about three hundred miles from ^ayu Tinggi.
35. Beeckman, op. cit.q p. 63.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., f. 80.
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It has been noted that the Panambahan's plan to sain 
British support for the war did not meet with much success* 
About two years had elapsed since the start of the internal 
conflict, and Suria Alam had witnessed his territories one 
by one falling into the grasp of Purabaya and Daing Mamantuli, 
If these two leaders were able to continue their victorious 
attacks, it would not be long before they would overrun the 
lowland ports and towns and oust him from his throne in the 
process. Such fears eventually led the ruler to appeal to
qo
the Indonesian and Malay merchants to defend tis kingdom.'0
At all times of the year, large numbers of Indonesian 
and Malays called at Banjarmasin and its ports to trade with 
the Chinese, English, and Dutch, as well as the Banjarese.
These small-scale inland traders from Java, Madura, Sumbawa, 
Bali and Johore bartered rice, salt, rattans, birds'-nests 
and sappan wood for pepper and bezoar-stones, but particularly 
for Chinese luxury articles including silk, tea and porcelain. 
Eor many of them, the coastal trade, with Banjarmasin as 
the commercial centre, gave them their sole livelihood.
When internal war broke out in Negara and the neighbouring 
regions, the Indonesians and Malays found that their mercantile 
activities were adversely affected. As fewer foreign vessels
33. Banjarese embassy to the Governor of Macassar, 17 
September 1716, KA 1782, f. 1452.
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visited Banjarmasin with the disruption of the pepper economy, 
many of the coastal traders were left with unsold goods, 
and moreover5 they could not obtain the required products 
to bring back to their homeland.^9
These short-term effects listed above were, however, 
not as harmful as the long-term ones, which were piracy and 
looting, evils dreaded by the merchants. The Indonesians 
and Malays wanted a quick stop to the war because of a gnawing 
fear of the Bugis who had become infamous as robbers, pirates 
and mercenaries. If Suria Alan lost the war, then Daing 
Mamantuli and his henchmen would become the masters of 
Banjarmasin, Instead of a thriving port, fartas or Kayu 
Tinggi would become a pirates' den. Since they had a stake 
in the region and wanted to see that peaceful conditions 
existed so that normal trade could be resumed once more, the 
Indonesian and Malay traders therefore pledged their loyal 
support to the Sultan, and supplied him with arms, warriors 
and one hundred perahus.^9
With the large reinforcements of artillery and men,
Suria Alam regained his confidence. During the last few 
months of 1714, the Banjarese, with the assistance of their 
Indonesian allies, launched a counter-offensive against
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
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Purabaya and the Bugis. In the struggle, the Bugis suffered
the most severe losses since the war began, including Gusti
41Busu, who was killed in action by the Banjarese soldiers.
When the Biajus saw that many of their leaders were slaughtered,
they retreated to the mountains, leaving the Bugis behind to
continue the fight. Whthin a few months, the Banjarese
were able to reverse the scales while Purabaya found difficulty
42in halting his advancing foes.
Although the revolts had subsided considerably, Suria 
Alam was ill at ease. Ee was unsure whether the calmer 
situation which had returned to Banjarmasin could prevail 
for long, as he was apprehensive that Purabaya would enlist 
more aid from the Bugis in the Malay Archipelago to avenge 
the death of his son. The Sultan did not wish to see a 
temporary halt to the war but a complete end to it. To 
achieve his objective, Suria Alam felt thet he had to make 
another appeal to the Dutch for arms such as muskets, which 
could be provided by his Indonesian neighbours. Lim Kim Ko, 
the Capitan China, who was sent as ambassador to Batavia, 
told the Governor-General that the Panambahan was willing to 
grant the pepper monopoly of Banjarmasin to the Dutch 
Company if troops and muskets were despatched to his kingdom
41. Lim Kim Ko to the Governor-General of Batavia, 5 
November 1716, KA 1779. f. 57.
42. Ibid.
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43to help him defeat Purabaya. When Lim saw that the
Governor-General, Christoffel van Zwoll, was unimpressed
with this offer, he tried to play on the Dutch fears of
English intrusion in south-east Borneo by declaring that if
the Company was reluctant to extend a helping hand to the
Banjarese, the generous offer would be thrown open to the
English Company, which would henceforth become the master
of that region. Once again, the Dutch athorities did not
relent but adhered to their original resolution of abstaining
4 4
from the internal disorders of Banjarmasin.
Although the odds were in favour of the Banjarese in
1714, the Panambahan, even then, was unduly alarmed by the
disturbances in his land. After the Banjarese counter-attack
of that year, the Bugis and Macassarese never regained their
former military strength. No doubt,there were occasional
affrays between the two factions, but these were generally
minor clashes which the Banjarese were able to deal with
without incurring great losses. Purabaya knew he was fighting
a losing battle, but still he did not surrender but struggled
45on until he was also killed by his enemies late in 1717..
43. Ibid., f. 58.
44. Ibid.
45. Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 24
November 1717, KA 1782, f. 1452.
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Kis handful of followers (compared to the large army which
he commanded during the initial stages of the war), fled
back to Pulau Laut, Daing Mamantuli felt that it was
worthless to continue the conflict, and thus, with his
46depleted forces, sailed off to Kutei. With the .Biajus in 
subjection in the uplands of Negara, peace had been restored 
to Banjarmasin.
Kasuma Dilaga, who succeeded to the throne in 1718
after the death of Buria Alam, was faced with the difficult
task of putting the country, ravaged by the civil war, on
its feet again. There was the need to attract foreign ships
into the harbour of Banjar, to resettle the refugees and
encourage them to replant the land, and above all, to import
rice and other provisions so as to remedy the shortage of
food created by the war. The first two needs did not pose
much of a problem. With the removal of the enemy blockades
along the rivers, and easy accessibility to the pepper
plantations which had not been ruined, the English, Chinese
and Indonesian traders returned to Tartas or Kayu Tinggi to
resume their commercial activities, while the pepper planters,
47
assured of a. large market, resumed work on their fields.
46. Ibid.
47. Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 24 
October 1717, KA 1782, f. 1453.
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However, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient amounts of 
rice gave the Banjarese court a headache. As Java provided 
one of the chief granaries for Borneo, the Panambahan was 
especially interested in renewing mercantile connections 
with the Dutch Company so that he could obtain large supplies
of rice in exchange for the pepper monopoly of Banjarmasin.
48However, when they were approached in 1720, . the Batavian
authorities did not accede to Kasuma Dilaga's request because 
they felt that it was senseless to go to Banjarmasin which 
was still a potential trouble spot despite the cessation of 
the Bugis-Banjarese war, when the Company already had adequate 
stocks of pepper from Bantam and Palembang which had signed 
new contracts with the Dutch Company.
While the Banjarese were busy with their redevelopment 
schemes, the peace which the country had enjoyed for a few 
years was suddenly shattered by the return of the Bugis.
The first signs of renewed Bugis activity, according to the 
Dutch records, occurred late in 1725 when Arun Sinkang, a 
famous pirate, with his small retinue of men overran Sanpit, 
a village of Pasir, and kidnapped about one hundred and
48. Original General Missive, 31 December 1720, KA 1826., 
ff.« 1564-65. In fact, two Banjarese missions were 
despatched, one to Macassar and the other to Batavia 
on 30 April and 14 December 1720 respectively.
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49fifty men. This action provoked the Raja of Pasir to go
to Macassar to ask for Dutch aid to drive out the intruder,
Kasuma Dilaga heard that Arun Sinkang was sailing towards his
land? and fearing that the latter would plunder passing vessels
and impede traffic in Banjarmasin waters, he despatched two
representatives to Batavia in October 1726 in a further
attempt to lure the Dutch to Banjarmasin, in the hope that
they would provide him with the necessary support in the
SIevent of a Banjarese-Bugis conflict.
On this occasion, the Batavian Council responded to
the ruler*s invitation by sending Landsheer and Broun on a
62
trade mission to Banjarmasin in 1727. This was a deviation 
in the policy of the Dutch Company which was to abstain 
from trading with the Banjarese. The change was brought 
about not because the Batavian Council felt that, it had'a 
moral obligation to help the Banjarese to defend themselves 
against external foes, but because of an urgent need to buy 
pepper from Banjarmasin so as to replenish the depleted
49. Original General Missive, 5 December 1726, KA 1929q 
f. 847.
50. Ibid.
51. Letter from Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of
Batavia, 1 November 1726, KA 1931, f. 1839.
52. Original General Missive, 6 December 1726, KA 1929,
f. 848.
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53supplies from Bantam and Palembang.
As soon as the Dutch ships, the Arend and the Volk 
reached the Bay of Banjar in January 1727, the Banjarese 
nobles made numerous complaints to the Dutch about the piratical 
acts committed by the Bugis. For instance, the Temenggong’s 
son mentioned that he encountered seven Bugis vessels from 
Tidor while he was sailing home from Mandhara. The Bugis
raided his boat and he was only saved by a small passing
54vessel which was smuggling goods to Selangor. Pengeran
Dipati cited an incident when he met two Bugis vessels off
Sukadana which tried to obstruct his path* When he opened
55fire, the boats sank and the Bugis swam away. Other nobles
also stated that Bugis perahus were sighted daily in Banjarmasin
waters. Since the factors were already in the area, they
should help the Banjarese to remove the Bugis threat in
return for a steady supply of pepper. Landsheer and Broun
assured their hosts that these were minor piracies and that
they were confident that the Bugis would not dare to
infiltrate Banjarmasin in large numbers as long as the Dutch
56
were there to trade.
53. Ibid.
54. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia,
3 June 1727, KA 1949. f. 374.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.. f. 375.
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The appearance of the Bugis did not cause much
consternation among the common people until May 1729 when
Toassa, the Captain or second-in-command of Arun Sinkang,
sailed up the Barito river and plundered Banjarese boats
57which were carrying pepper cargoes. Like his predecessor, 
Daing Mamantuli, Toassa used force to compel the pepper 
planters to deliver their stocks (which were consigned to
j r o
the lowland merchants) to him when he reached Upper Negara.00 
The Dutch factors, Broyell and Broun, refused to give a 
positive answer when Kasuma Dilaga told them that their 
Company must erect a factory and stockade in Banjarmasin to
protect Banjarese interests if Dutch-Banjarese commercial
59relations were to-be maintained.
The expedition of Toassa into Negara was only a 
preliminary step to enable him to survey the inland regions 
of Banjar, In the following months, Arun Sinkang, who had
gained supremacy in Pasir by then, ordered Toassa to launch
60an attack against the Banjarese. Toassa , encouraged
57. Landsheer to the Governor-General of Batavia, 14 
November 1728, KA 1992. f. 176.
58. Ibid.
59. Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia,
27 June 1729, KA 2025, f. 316.
60. Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia,
28 February 1730, KA 2055., f. 46.
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possibly by the thought of large spoils in the event of
victory, swiftly gathered his six. hundred followers, and in
thirty six war perahus, the Bugis sailed down the east cosst
61of Borneo to Tomborneo. When the Panambahan realised that
war was impending, he insisted that the Dutch Company should
start building the factory and that in the meantime, more
62Dutch assistance should be forthcoming. Instead of lending
a helping hand to the Banjarese, Broyell and Broun had to
sail home in the Volk because of the large number of sick
63men aboard ship. In spite of strong resistance from the
Banjarese, the Bugis were able to capture many of the villages
in the interior, and they took away men, women, and children
in addition to spoils. During the fierce skirmishes, about
twenty merchant vessels which were heading for the Banjarese
ports, abruptly turned back for Kayelin, Mandhara, Sumanap 
64and Surabaya.
In March 1730 Kasuma Dilaga passed away after a short 
illness and his nephew, Hamid Dulla, became the Panambahan.
61. Governor of Macassar to the Governor-General of Batavia,
2 March 1730, KA 2055, f. 47.
62. Letter from Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of
of Batavia, 15 November 1728, KA_1992, f. 182.
63. Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia,
2 September 1729, KA 2025, f. 279.
64. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Governor-General of 
Batavia, 8 April 1730, KA 2055. f. 2,
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The latter, who was anxious for the safety of his kingdom, 
promised the new Dutch factors, Snippe and Kamerbeek, that 
he would personally see to the safe delivery of pepper for 
their ships oven when supplies were interrupted upriver, if
6 Sthey would pledge to oust the Bugis invaders from Banjarmasin.
Although not initially impressed by this offer, Snippe and
Kamerbeek realised, after a short stay in Tartas, that unless
they came to a compromise with the Sultan, they would be
unable to stop the Banjarese from selling their pepper to
the Chinese at exorbitant rates, and thus the Dutch would
Bo
be deprived of available stock. In the next three years, 
the Dutch found that their supplies of pepper were diminishing 
rapidly. This was because the pepper merchants became more 
reluctant to consign their stocks to them, especially when 
the amounts of pepper were restricted by the intrusion of 
the Bugis, and the presence of the Chinese junks.
When Marre and Brouwer led the Dutch expedition to 
Banjarmasin in 1733, they decided to put an end to the 
contraband practices of tho Banjarese, and boost pepper 
deliveries to the Company by signing a treaty with Sultan
65. Ibid.
66. Snippe and -Kamerbeek to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
8 May 1730, KA 2055o f. 87.
67. -'Original General Missive, 25 October 1732, KA 2097,
’ f. 58.
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Hamid Dulla and Pengeran Suria Dilaga. While commercial
interests motivated the Dutch, political considerations,
namely, the necessity for European aid to defend the borders
of Banjarmasin, spurred the Banjarese authorities to seal
68
the contract on 26 September 1733.
The treaty contained nineteen articles. Article II
to VI laid town the regulations under which the junks could
trade in Banjarmasin. Henceforth, although Chinese junks
could still enter the Banjarese ports, only one junk per
year would be permitted to ship pepper outside the Bay of
Banjar under the supervision of the Dutch officer, go as to
ensure that the vessel would not take more than the fixed
69quantity of 4,000 pikuls annually. If any extra pepper 
was found aboard the junk, it should be treated as contraband, 
and therefore, subject to confiscation under Article VII, 
and the proceeds were to be divided equally between the 
Dutch factors and the Banjarese Shahbandar. In return for 
the right to purchase clean and pure pepper at the price of 
4£ reals per pikul (126 lbs.) which was laid down in Article 
IX to XII, the Dutch Bompany promised to protect the
68. Dutch-Banjarese contract, 26 September 1733, Stapel,
Corpus Diplomaticuau Vd. V, (The Hague, 1938), pp. 165-70.
69. The amount of 4,000 pikuls appeared only in the 
ratified treaty. Resolution of the Batavian Council,
26 February 1734, KA 653. f. 506.
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Panambahan against external invasion in Article XIII either 
by means of a factory or pagar as soon as it was constructed, 
or when vessels were stationed at the kuala of the Barito 
river, without having to bear the costs of such ventures.
The right of extra-territoriality for the Company servants 
was guaranteed in Articles XIV and XV whilst Article XVI 
stated that any trespassers on the Dutch factory were to be 
prosecuted or shot* The monopoly of the pepper trade was 
ensured to the Company in Article XVII* It specified that 
all Europeans, whether English, French or Portuguese x^ould be 
prohibited from' trading in Banjarmasin* In exchange for these 
trading privileges. Articles XVIII and.XEX stipulated that 
the Company could, if it wished, build a factory or pagar 
either at the site which the Dutch factors had occupied since
1727, or near old Banjar which was in the lower part of the
70 ^Barito river. Here, the Company could continue to send
its ships for trade without the obligation to build a fort
or pagar* unless the Governor-General and Council wished to 
71do so. The decision of the Batavian Council to render 
assistance to the Sultan, even though it was occasional and 
not continuous, namely, only when ships were stationed at the 
river-mouth, marked a major change in the Dutch Company*s
70. Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum* p. 168.
71. Article XIX, Stapel, op* cit.. p. 168.
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policy towards Banjarmasin.
When the draft treaty was presented to the Batavian 
Council for ratification, the Governor-General, while 
recognizing that military aid to Banjarmasin was essential 
for obtaining a pepper monopoly, did not like the idea of
79
involving the Dutch Company too fully in Banjarese politics.
As far as possible, the Company did not wish to take sides 
in any conflict of Banjarmasin but the treaty committed it 
to support the Banjarese. As no date was fixed for the 
erection of the factory, the Governor-General decided that 
it could be indefinitely postponed since Banjarmasin did 
not deserve such great attention as to warrant the existence
of a factory. However, an armed vessel could be stationed
«  7 3
off Banjar to repel future Bugis attacks.
The treaty between the Dutch and the Banjarese for the 
joint defence of Banjarmasin did not have much effect in 
halting further Bugis incursions into south-east Borneo.
One of the most renowned figures was Topass Aisy who had made 
Linggi his den after his expulsion from Bony twelve years 
p r e v i o u s l y O n  one of his occasional raids in the Straits
72.. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, 
KA 653* ff. 509-10.
73. Ibid.* f. 510.
74. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia,
10 June 1735, KA 2237* f. 46.
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of’ Malacca, TopassAray met Arun Palla, another pirate, and
both of them set off for Linggi to pursue their illicit
activities in the Straits of Bangka. The former went as far
as east Java where he managed to force the Javanese to
deliver their rice supplies to him.^5 When the Banjarese
authorities heard that Topass Aray intended to make Banjarmasin
his next target, they requested the Dutch factors, Marre
and Brouwer, to send one or two ships to keep patrol along
76the coast in accordance with the treaty terms. Although
Sultan Kasuma A-lam, who had ascended the throne as regent
for his nephew Mohamed after the sudden death of Hamid Dulla,
the latterfs father^early in 1734, was not very eager to
maintain friendly relations with the Dutch, he was nevertheless
anxious to see that the Chinese junks, which were loaded with
valuable products, should be escorted safely into Tartas
77or Kayu Tinggi. The factors claimed that the pro-Chinese
attitude of the Sultan had been largely moulded by Pengeran
Kasuma Ningrat, the chief minister of state, and a close
78
friend of the Capitan China.
75. Ibid., f. 47.
76. Ibid., f. 48.
77. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Datavia,
17 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 16.
78. Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia,
9 July 1734, KA 2206, f. 13.
147
The sight of the Dutch vessels, the Snip and the &otte 
off the Bay of Banjar prevented Topass Aray from inflicting 
harm on the Banjarese and other foreign merchants when he 
arrived in Tomborneo. Instead, as soon as he heard that 
Arun Sinkang and Toassa were making preparations for another 
war on the Banjarese, Topass Aray offered his services to
n q
Kasuma Alam, It was evident that the first two Bugis chiefs,
OA
with an army comprising 500 men and 40 perahus«° intended
to crush Banjarmasin once and for all. While they were on
their way to the Banjarese coast in April 1735, Arun Sinkang
and Toassa encountered Topass Aray, and both factions fought.
After his thirty perahus were sunk or burnt, and most of his 
were
men/killed, Topass Aray fled into the interior of Negara
81
late in April 1735,
With Topass Aray beaten, the Panambahan had to depend
on the Dutch to win the war for him. Under the command of
J, Graffe, the gunboats, Snip and &otte as well as the other
Dutch vessels, Tan.iong Pura. Onbeschaamhei,jt and Quartel.
were all stationed at the mouth of the Barito river to stop
32-Sinkang’s party from sailing inland.0 ' When the Bugis
79, Marre and Brouwer to the Governor-General of Batavia,
10 June 1735, KA 2237, f. 29.
80, Ibid.
81, Ibid.
82. Ibid.. f. 30
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appeared, the Dutch opened fire. By their active participation
in the war in May 1735, Marre and Brouwer realised that they
had gone against the instructions of the Company regarding
83non-involvement in Banjarese politics. However, they felt 
that it was impossible to stay aloof when at least one gunboat 
had to be posted at the river's mouth in order to comply 
with the regulations stipulated in the treaty of 1733.
Although plans for the erection of the factory and stockade 
could be left aside, other forms of military aid hod to be 
given^ otherwise, the Dutch Company could not expect any 
pepper deliveries from the Banjarese,
When Arun Sinkang and Toassa could not gain access into
the Barito river in May 1735, they started to encircle the
Dutch vessels with their perahus<, hoping thereby to force
84
their enemies to give up this way. But before all the 
perahus could encircle them, the Dutch fired on the Bugis 
boats. Heavy fighting resulted but the Bugis could not 
contend with the modern artillery of the Dutch. After ten 
days of periodic skirmishes in which Arun Sinkang found that 
every move on his part was repelled by the joint Dutch-
85
Banjarese forces, he and Toassa decided to return to Pasir.
83. Ibid., f. 31.
84. Ibid.q f. 32.
85. Ibid.« f. 33.
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When the Bugis withdrew, Topass ^ray left his hideout
in Negara and went to Tomborneo. To ensure that he had no
opportunity to create mischief, Kasuma Alam despatched a
battalion of Banjarese troops under the leadership of Pengeran
R6Marta and Gusti Johore to the island to keep guard.
Meanwhile, in May 1735 Topass Aray sailed to Martapure to 
request a loan of some weapons and a few war-boats from the 
ruler, apparently with the intention of launching a counter­
attack on Arun Sinkang and Toassa in order to retrieve his 
87losses. Kasuma Alam hesitated but consented when assured,
that Topass Aray meant no harm. After he had obtained the 
military goods, Topass Aray also bought three chests of 
opium from the Dutch factors, Marre and Brouwer became 
suspicious and doubtful of the true intentions of the Bugis 
chief, when they saw that he could still afford luxury 
articles after declaring that he had incurred great losses
+.v. 88m  the war.
As soon as he returned to Tomborneo, Topass Aray sent 
his second-in-command, Karee Patas, to Pasir to invite Arun 
Sinkang and Toassa to join him in a combined onslaught on
8 6 . Ibid.. f. 36
87. Ibid., f . 39
CO00 Ibid., f . 37
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Banjarmasin. The reply was favourable and in mid-June
1735, Arun Sinkang*s forces and thirty perahus reached 
90Tomborneo. However, as on the previous occasion, they
were unable to storm the Banjarese towns for the Dutch vessels
were once more stationed along the coast. The affray ended
91up with the Bugis retreat. This time, the Dutch and the
Banjarese did not allow their foes to gather strength for a
renewal of fighting, and therefore, they made a surprise
move by storming Tomborneo at night. The Bugis, who were
caught totally unawares, were badly defeated. In addition
to the capture of many soldiers, about eighty members of
92.Topass Arayfs family became prisoners of the Banjorese.
Of the three Bugis chiefs, only Toassa managed to escape,
93whilst the other two vie re exiled to Ceylon.
In spite of the help rendered the Banjarese, the Dutch 
factors were very dissatisfied with the post-war situation 
after 1735. Instead of obtaining large supplies of pepper 
which had been promised in return for military assistance,
89. Letter from Kasuma Alam and Kasuma Ningrat to the 
Batavian Council, 11 June 1735, KA 2237„ f. 2 2 .
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., f. 23.
92. Original General Missive, 16 December 1735, KA 2220„ 
f. 1489.
93. Ibid.
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the Company witnessed only the reverse, and in 1737, it 
withdrew its ships from Banjarmasin once more.^ Moreover, 
the removal of Topass Aray and Arun Sinkang from the scene 
did not mean that the Bugis menace was over, for small 
numbers of pirates still roamed the Banjarese shores in 
search of prey while others were engaged in smuggling
Q5
activities," As far as the Panambahan was concerned, he 
was for the moment, not unduly worried by the minor contraband 
practices and the withdrawal of the Dutch, so long as peace 
had been restored to his kingdom internally, and he was 
assured of profitable trade from the Chinese and other 
foreign merchants.
94. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2245, 
f. 1289.
95. Ibid.
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CHAPTER IV 
D13TCH ACTIVITIES; 1711-1737
VJhen J. van Mechelen ancl P. dor Vostcn failed to
obtain a pepper cargo for Batavia in 16785 the Dutch
Company stopped despatching ships to Banjarmasin for commercial
purposes.-*- In 1708, Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China of
Banjarmasin, came to Batavia as the ambassador of Sultan
Suria Alarn, He informed the Batavian Council that the Sultan
intended to renew commercial relations with the Dutch Company
and would be sending an embassy to Batavia shortly for 
2
negotiations. It can be recalled that in the same year, 
the ruler was feced with a political crisis when the Bis3us 
threatened to revolt because of unfair taxes and extortion 
by the B^njarose nobles. By extending an invitation to the 
Dutch Company to return to Bgnjarmasin, Sultan Suria Alam 
hoped that the Batavian Council would respond and give him 
military aid in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with 
the Biajus. W3\en the Batavian authorities received the news 
from Lim Kim Ko, they decided to encourage free trade between 
the Banjarese and the inhabitants of Batavia. Thus,they
1. Original General Missive, 13 February 1679, ICA 1220q 
f. 231.
2 . Resolution of the Batavian Council, 30 October 1708,
KA 624. f. 758.
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permitted the Banjarese to sell their pepper at Batavia, and 
also issued ft’ee passes to the Batavian fchinesc, thereby 
allowing them to buy pepper at Banjarmasin for the Dutch 
Company at five Spanish reals per pikul. If the price of 
pepper exceeded this fixed amount, a premium of half a real
q
would be given for every pikul. Instead of relying on its
own employees, the Batavian Council preferred to send the
4private Chinese traders to bring pepper supplies to it.
In February 1711 however, the Governor-General, Abraham 
van Riebeeck, reversed the established policy of the Council 
not to send ships to Banjarmasin by declaring that a Company 
vessel, the Peter and Paulo would be despatched to Banjarmasin
5
to buy pepper, gold and ambergris. Several reasons can be 
advanced for the major change of policy. First, the method 
of obtaining pepper from the Batavian Chinese had not worked 
satisfactorily for the Company. In 1709, 850,000 lbs. of 
poppet! had .been supplied by the Chinese traders but the quantity 
had dwindled considerably in the subsequent years. Moreover, 
the price of pepper was not five reals but seven to eight
3. Ibid., f. 759.
4. Figures on the exact amount of pepper imported into Batavia 
by the private Chinese traders ore unavailable for this 
period. According to the Governor-General, the amount 
seldom exceeded a few hundred thousand pounds annually.
- Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 February 1711,
KA 627, f. 103.
5. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 February 173-1, 
KA 627« f. 103.
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6reals per pikul. Secondly, in contrast to the small stock
of pepper which the Company could purchase, a fleet of
thirteen junks from China had gone to Banjarmasin in August
7
1710 for a large consignment of pepper.
Van Rieheeck, who realised that the Panambahan was 
eager to renew DutchrBanjarese relationships, felt that this 
was the moment for the Company to break into the pepper 
market of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi and prevent the Chinese 
junk owners from taking away the whole crop. During this 
period, 1700-1^25, the Directors in Holland increased their 
demand for pepper from the East, Each year, between 5,16 - 
6,45 million pounds of pepper were required by the European 
market, but generally the Batavian Government sent amounts 
of pepper which were below the quantities stipulated because
Q
of insufficient tonnage. In order to satisfy the demand of 
the home market, the Batavian authorities were prepared to 
revive the trade with the Banjcarese,
The Batavian Council was also alarmed by rumours that 
the English intended to re-enter south-east Borneo to trade.
6 . Ibid.
7. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 9 August 1710,
KA 626. f. 527,
8 . Original General Missive, (no date), KA 2195, f. 490.
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The recollection of the former English settlement and the 
fortification on Banjar made Van Riebeeck decide that he 
could not ignore the region. If the English were to re-establish 
themselves on Banjar, their commercial and political actions 
could prove detrimental to the Dutch interests in Java and 
the surrounding regions, as they had previously done between 
the years 1700-1707. Even in June 1708, when the Dutch 
officials heard that Cunningham and his party planned to 
resettle in Banjarmasin, they issued orders to all the 
governors of the east coast of Java to prohibit private ships 
from transporting timber, limestone,or rice to Banjarmasin,
9in order to prevent the English from receiving these supplies.
Despite the initial enthusiasm shown by the Governor-
General over the renewal of trade with Banjarmasin in 1711,
the project was hastily withdrawn two years later after the
Batavian Council had decided that it was no longer financially
worthwhile to continue to ship pepper from the region.'1’0 It
pointed out that while the first voyage of the Peter and
Paul had brought back 826 2/3 pikuls of pepper, the amount
11
had decreased to 586-g- pikuls in 1712. Although N.V.D. Bosch
9. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 22 June 1708,
KA 624. f. 490.
10. Original General Missive, 11 January 1714, KA 1724. 
f. 1191.
11. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693. 
f. 1176 and 17 January 1713, KA 1708. f. 1265.
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and I. Indus9 the first and second factors of the Peter and
Paul, found that most of the crop of the season had been
consigned to the junks when they arrived in Tartas in
September 1711, they managed to persuade the new Panambahan,
Suria Alam, to grant them a full cargo of pepper at four
Spanish reals per pikul* * This was because the factors,
who responded to the call of the Banjarese authorities to
help them curb the Biaju revolt which had broken out in
13Negara in 1711, gave twenty muskets to the Sultan who was
14in desperate need for arms. In less than one month, the
15Peter and Paul was able to return home with a full cargo.
Unfortunately, the second Dutch expedition to Banjarmasin
in August 1712 did not come up to the expectations of the
Batavian Council. With the prospect of a larger supply of
pepper according to the promises of the two Banjarese
ambassadors, Raden Aria and Tanu Kati, who came to Batavia
16at the beginning of 1712, the Batavian Council furnished
12 January 1712,
1 2 . Bosch and Indus to the Batavian Council,/KA 1693, f. 1415.
13. Original General Missive, 21 July 1711, KA 1691. f. 96.
14* Bosch and Indus to the Batavian Council, 12 January
1712, KA 1693, f. 1415.
15. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693. 
f. 1176.
16. Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706,
f. 8 6 .
157
10,000 reals to the factors, Bosch and A. Poulle, who
replaced Indus, and sent the Lni.itpool and the Jambi to
18
accompany the Peter and Paul in collecting the stocks.
However, on arrival, the factors were unable to make immediate
purchases as the Banjarese merchants had given most of their
supplies to the junks at the rate of six to seven Spanish
1$
reals per pikul. Moreover, the nakhodas, in order to 
ensure that Suria Alam would not repeat his action in 
consigning their stocks to the Dutch, had paid the Chinese 
middlemen to obtain the pepper direct from the uplands, even 
though there was a civil war in the land. Consequently, 
when the Dutch ships left the Bay of Banjar in October 1712, 
only the Peter and Paul was loaded, with 73312-g- lbs. or 
586-J- pikuls of pepper.^
The Dutch authorities were frustrated with the poor 
results of the pepper trade. They had despatched ships to 
Banjarmasin with the expectation that pepper supplies from
17. Ibid. The amount was 6.000 reals more than the previous
sub: .
18. The Batavian authorities were informed by Bosch that 
ships such as the Peter and Paul which were over 100 ft. 
long, could not sail up the Banjar river because of
the great sandbank at its mouth, particularly during 
the Westerly monsoon. Resolution of the Batavian 
Council, 29 December 1711, ICA 627. f. 962.
19. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708. 
f. 1264.
20. Ibid.. f. 1265.
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that quarter would help to meet the demand of the Directors
in Holland for bigger amounts of pepper annually from south- 
2 1east Asia. ^ It was, therefore, suprising that these 
voyages to Banjarmasin should be abruptly stopped in 1713. 
Evidently, the Batavian Council was disgruntled that the 
Banjarese merchants had given most of their pepper supplies 
to the nakhodas. It should be realised that during this
period when the Banjarese and Biajus were embroiled in the
22
civil war, pepper production was at a very low level.
The reduced annual yield could not meet the demands of both 
the Chinese and Dutch simultaneously. Since the Chinese paid 
higher prices for pepper, the Banjarese gave them their 
pepper before the Dutch.
When faced with this difficulty, the Governor-General 
and Council had to decide whether to continue the expeditions 
to Banjarmasin or not. They resolved not to send any more 
vessels there, partly because they were disappointed that 
the Companyfs goods, viz. Indian cloth and opium, could not 
be sold in Banjarmasin, and also because they did not wish 
to become politically involved in the internal disturbances 
of that region. With regard to the sale of cloth and opium.
2 1 . Original General Missive, 1733 (no specific date),
KA 2195. f. 5153.
2 2 . Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751. 
f. 363.
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the Council had hoped that the losses incurred .by the reduced
sale of these goods to the Chinese at Batavia would he
partially remedied at Banjar if the Banjarese purchased
23Indian cloth and opium in large quantities. To the Governor-
General1s consternation, these articles were not popular with
the Banjarese. The Council was also not interested in the
export of arms or military stores to the Banjarese despite
the Sultan’s pleas for such aid. Hence, ±£ decided
that it would try to obtain more pepper from the other
areas of Bantam,' Palembang and Malabar where the annual
production was less likely to fluctuate, and where their
24-
political conditions were relatively more stable.
The arrival of a Banjarese embassy consisting of Pengeran
Kasuma Negara, Kjahi Mata Juda, Kjahi Angsa Dips, and Lim
25Kira Ko in Batavia in February 1713, failed to make any 
impact on the Batavian Council to reverse its decision not 
to despatch any vessels to Banjarmasin. Sultan Suria Alam 
had ordered his messengers to inform the Governor-General,
23. The Dutch stated that they lost the trade in Indian cloth 
and opium to the English who went to Canton to sell these 
articles to the Chinese. - Original General Missive,
15 November 1712, KA 1706. f. 8 6 .
24* Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751 
f. 370.
25. Original General Missive, 11 January 1714, KA 1924« 
f. 1196.
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C. van Zwoll, that he would give the monopoly of the pepper
trade to the Dutch Company if it would assist him in
26restoring order in Banjarmasin* The ruler was very concerned 
over the war at this stage, for by 1713, Purabaya and the 
Bugis had captured the major pepper-producing regions of 
Negara and Bekompay from the Banjarese and were then 
advancing towards Tartas. Unless the enemy could be stopped 
soon5 the Sultan was afraid that, he would lose the war once 
Banjarmasin or Tartas was overrun by the Bugis. Van Zwoll, 
who was convinced that the Sultan was making an empty 
promise, refused to amend the resolution of the Council to 
abandon Banjarmasin.2^
A decline in the pepper production of Bantam and 
Palembang, and the failure of the Batavian Council to meet 
the demands of the Directors in sending bigger stocks to 
Holland in the late 1720?s, compelled the Governor-General to 
re-establish trade with the Banjarese. In Bantam, for 
example, the berries were smaller and had more imperfections. 
Moreover, the annual yield which was between 3.8 million to
o p
5.4 million lbs. from 1718 to 1723, dropped to 2,162,083 lbs.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 8 8 .
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in 1726. In Jambi, the new pepper plantations had not
produced really worth-while results. Meanwhile, the
Directors in the Netherlands who had requested Batavia to
transport between 5i million and Gj million lbs. of black
pepper from 1700 to 1725, increased the demand thereafter
30to 6.45 - 8.60 million lbs. per year. Early in
October 1726 *8 ul t a n Kasuma Dilaga invited the Dutch'
Company to reopen commercial relations with Banjarmasin in
order to enlist Dutch support to durb the Bugis pirates who
had renewed their activities off the Banjarese coast. The
Batavian authorities seized the opportunity by dispatching
the Arend and the Volk to Tartas in November of the same 
31year.
The first Dutch fleet returned to Batavia in mid-1727
32from Banjarmasin with 3,962 pikuls or 495,250 lbs. of pepper. 
Compared to the amounts of pepper secured in 1712-1713, it 
can be seen that the factors, Landsheer and Broun, had made 
a good start in making purchases especially when 8,000 pikuls
29. Original General Missive, 21 October 1726, KA 1928. 
f. 27.
30. Original General Missive, 1733, (no specific date), 
KA 2195. f* 5153.
31. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 5 November 1726, 
KA 642. f. 723.
32. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 
1727, KA 1949c f. 371.
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of pepper had been contracted to the junks and a small 
quantity had been given to the English merchants in the
QQ
preceding year. In 1728 all the six Dutch ships, namely,
the Zui.lderbeek, Wolpha r s di.jk, Volk, Raadhuis, Oli .if tak and
Doornik were fully loaded with a total of 19,785 pikuls of 
84-pepper* In addition, another 363,943 lbs* were shipped to
Batavia by the private merchants of Banjarmasin. Altogether,
22,692a* pikuls of pepper were bought by the Dutch Company.
It was able to make such a record purchase not only because
production was at its peak during that season, but also
because Kasuma Dilaga had decreed that the Banjarese traders
36were to supply the whole crop to it* Hox/ever, the Dutch 
vessels which were sent to Banjarmasin thereafter never 
managed to obtain a similar quantity of pepper5 in fact, as
33. Ibid.
34* KA 1992, f. 170. The breakdown of the shipment of 
pepper per vessel in 1728 is as follows:
Name of ship Quantity in pikuls Payment in Spanish 
____________     reals_______
Olijftak 750 3,195^
Zuijderbeek 5,000 21,290
Kaadhuis 4,000 17,220
Wolpharsdijk 4,000 17,048
Doornik 5,000 21,292
De Volk 1.035 9,907j:
Total 19,789 84,452#
35. Original 3eneral Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, 
f. 618.
36. Ibid.
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the table below indicates, the amounts decreased annually 
until the Batavian authorities tried to rectify the situation 
by signing the contract of 1733 with the Banjarese court.
Quantity of black pepper obtained b.v 
the Dutch Company from Ban.iarmasin
Year Quantity
(Dutch lbs,)
1727 495,250
1728 2,453,340
1729 1,071,250
1730 784,125
1731/32 276,834
1733 264,347
Sources: 1 . KA 1949, f. 371s
2 , KA 1992, f. 170;
KA 2195, f, 5164 for all other years.
One of the causes for the marked fall in the pepper 
purchases of the Company was the widespread resentment and 
disappointment among the cultivators and merchants because 
of the imposition of a fixed price on the sale of pepper.
Hoping that the Dutch Company would build a factory and 
stockade in his territory in exchange for commercial 
concessions, Sultan Kasuma Dilaga had granted the whole
pepper supply to the Dutch in 1727 at the rate of 4-g* Spanish
reals per pikul by announcing that pepper should be loaded
164
37
only into the Dutch boats. By taking away the large crop
in 1728 at this low price, Landsheer and Broun deprived the
Banjarese merchants of large profits which they could have
obtained if the pepper stocks had been sold to the junks
instead. Broyell and Broun claimed that in an attempt to
drive away the Dutch and to dissuade the cultivators from
making deliveries to the factors, certain Chinese merchants,
led by Lau Kim Kong, spread rumours that two Banjarese
coolies had been killed by the Dutch because they had. refused
38to load pepper into the vessel, Zuijderbeek. Consequently,
fewer Banjarese traders offered their pepper to the Dutch
factors for fear that they would receive similar treatment.
Even after the Panambahan had publicly declared that these
39rumours were unfounded, the situation did not improve and 
much smaller cargoes of pepper were shipped back to Batavia. 
Besides, when many cultivators found that they had received 
few returns for their efforts and that it was not worthwhile 
to continue planting, they abandoned their pepper plots and 
migrated, to the towns or simply switched to some other sort
37. Original General Missive, 31 January 1728, KA 1953, 
f. 2236.
38. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 1 August 
1729, KA 2025. f. 325.
39. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 10 August 
1729, KA 2025, f. 326.
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of work, such as woodcraft or fishing. Moreover, they 
resented the compulsive methods which were used by the 
Banjarese court officials to secure the pepper from them, 
for the officials would not have been able to enforce the 
orders of the Sultan if they had left the pepper sales to 
the free will of the cultivators and the traders*
Despite the assurances of the Panambahan that all the
pepper of his land would go only to the Dutch, the latter
observed that the ruler did not have full control over the
pepper trade* In fact, greater influence was exerted by
Pengeran Mangku, the state administrator, and Gusti
42
Temenggong, the governor of the upland provinces. Except
for a brief period between 1727 and 172S when they carried
out the orders of the Panambahan by despatching pepper
cargoes to the Dutch factors, these Banjarese officials
generally conducted commercial transactions independent of
43the ruler or without his knowledge. They realised that 
the Dutch monopoly of the pepper trade had led to decreased
40. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005* 
f. 2673.
41. Ibid., f. 2679.
42. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 15 August 
1729, KA 2025, f. 265; P. Snippe and C. Braine to 
the Batavian Council, 15 May 1732, KA 2130* f. 7.
43. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 15 August 
1729, KA 2025, f. 265.
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revenue for them, since much of their income, paTticularly
that of Pengeran Mangku, came from the bribes and loans
they obtained from the rich Chinese of Tartas and Kayu
Tinggi. The Chinese had complained that large-scale purchases
by the Butch had adversely affected their trade with the
junks. Thus,both the disgruntled Banjarese officials and
the Chinese merchants of Tartas conspired to prevent further
supplies of pepper from reaching the Butch ships. The
Chinese merchants indicated that unless Pengeran Mangku acted
swiftly so that the Dutch could not obtain further quantities
44
of pepper, the Banjarese could not expect any more loans.
Accordingly, on several occasions when Kasuma BHaga was away
in Kayu Tinggi, Pengeran Mangku, who was left in sole charge
of commercial matters in Tartas, sent men to intercept the
perahus which were transporting pepper stocks downriver for
45the Dutch factors. Thereafter, these pepper cargoes were
delivered to the nakhodas of the junks who returned to
Tartas in 1729, notwithstanding the Sultan1s injunction and
46
the protests of the Butch factors.
In addition to their interest in purchases of pepper, 
the Batavian authorities were also keen to boost the sale
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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of their cotton piece-goods and opium to the Banjarese late
in the 1720*s. They surmised that if they could persuade
the Banjarese to accept these commodities, it was possible
that a time would come when their products would be exchanged
for pepper in the same way as the Chinese bartered their
goods, and thus the lucrative sale of the piece-goods would
47
prevent the drain of Spanish currency from Batavia. It 
has been noted that as early as 1711, the Batavian Council 
decided to put the scheme into practice by despatching ten
4 0
bales of cloth in the Peter and Paul. No price was fixed
for the sale of the article as this was left to the discretion
of the factors, Bosch and Indus, who were also instructed to
study the possibilities of an extensive trade in retail
49wares on the Banjarese market. However, when the Peter 
and Paul returned to Batavia in 1712 with the whole cargo 
of goods which had originally been consigned to it, the 
Council gave up the idea of trying to sell piece-goods in 
Banjarmasin.^0
47. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 February 1711, 
KA 627. f. 103.
48. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 6 July 1711,
KA 627. f. 487.
49. Ibid.
50. Original General Missive, 15 November 1712, KA 1706« 
f. 8 6 .
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With the renewal of trade between the Dutch Company 
and the Banjarese in 1726, the Batavian Council revived its
Cl
interest in the sale of cloth and opium. Although Landsheer
and Broun managed to sell four pieces of Bengal baftas and
two chests of opium (which was a very small turnover of
goods) in 1728, they received only 738.4.12 florins from
52
the Banjarese instead of 1,909.10 florins. The factors
complained that they had to advance the goods to the Banjarese
before payment as the latter would not otherwise buy the
products, however, it was difficult to make the Banjarese
pay upi consequently, when the Dutch^departed, the Banjarese
53still owed them 73% of the debt. Landsheer and Broun 
pointed out that neither the Banjarese officials nor the 
merchants would repay their debts in pepper. The trade in 
piece-goods and opium proved to be of less importance in 
subsequent years when even smaller amounts were sold but the 
Dutch Company still incurred a loss in some cases. In 1729, 
for instance, three bales of cotton which cost the Dutch
260.19.4 florins, we re sold at 191.15.12 florins since the
51. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 8 July 1727,
KA 643. f. 509.
52. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 
1727, KA 1949. f. 370.
53. Ibid.
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Banjarese would not pay more than 45 reals per bale. The
two chests of opium and the remaxning three bales of cotton
which were unsold, were shipped back to Batavia. Moreover,
Broyell and Broun could not persuade the Banjarese to repay
55what they owed the Dutch in the former years.
The Dutch factors ascribed their failure in the retail
trade to the competition of the junk owners of Canton and 
56
Amoy. After their voyage to Batavia or Semarang, the
Chinese nakhodas, who stopped at Tartas on their way home
to load pepper and to dispose of their Chinese wares, would
also resell some of tlie piece-goods and opium which they had
purchased in Java. The Dutch estimated that every year,
roughly twelve to fifteen bales of cotton, and five to six
chests of opium were distributed among the Banjarese by the 
57nakhodas.
TAhen the Batavian Council realised that its Indian
piece-goods were not in demand in Banjarmasin, it instructed
58its factors to promote the sale of neurenberger articles,
54. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 5 October
1729, KA 2025. f. 291.
55. Ibid.9 f. 292.
56. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA ,2005, . 
ff. 2683-84.
57. Ibid.
58. Neurenbergers the term is probably derived from Neuremburg 
in Germany, thereby indicating the origin of these articles.
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that is, small x/ares such as cutlery, glasses and mirrors, 
among the inhabitants of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. It 
expressed optimism over the prospects of such a trade provided 
the factors studied the market carefully in order to gouge
c: q
the needs of the Banjarese. Unfortunately, the venture
proved a failure when P. Snippe and P. Kamerbeek tried to
60sell these small wares in Tartas in 1730. The situation 
remained the same two years later when C. Marre and D. 3rouwer 
took a small quantity of neurenberger goods with them to 
Banjarmasin.^ The factors informed the Council that there 
was no use trying to further the sale of small articles in 
the area for the Banjarese were already amply supplied with 
these products by the coastal traders of Macassar, Semarang 
and other Indonesian areas.62
Nonetheless, unsaleable goods at Tartas did not pose 
such a grave problem to the Batavian authorities as that of 
the smuggling in fine spices between the Spice Islands and 
Banjarmasin. Early in the 1720's, the governor of Macassar
59. Original General Missive, 17 October 1730, KA 2032«
f. 26.
60. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 31 July
1730, KA 2055. f. 90.
61. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November
1734, KA 2206, f. 55.
62. Original General Missive, 17 October 1730, KA 2032.
f. 26\ Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council,
23 November 1734, KA 2206. f. 55.
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wrote that large amounts of cloves and nutmegs were smuggled 
out of Macassar, Banda and Ceram to Banjarmasin and other 
neighbouring areas by Bugis pirates such as Gonepatjs,
s? Q
Tokinjang, Tosumi and Amanapati. These spices, which 
were distributed among the Banjarese and Chinese merchants, 
were in turn resold to the junk nakhodas and the English at 
various rates ranging between 100 and 130 Spanish reals per 
koyan, depending on the state of demand.64 In return, the 
Bugis smugglers received contraband pepper, various Banjarese 
products such as bezoar stones, gold and Chinese articles.
At times, they also carried on a certain amount of coastal
i
trading with the merchants of Pulau Laut, Kutei and Cambodia. 
Through their connections with the smugglers, some of the 
coastal traders also participated in illicit trading on 
occasions, as for example in 1728, when they shipped pepper 
to East Java and Trengganu.66
Although smuggling was a problem which had plagued 
the Dutch government since the establishment of the spice
63. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 8 July 1727,
KA 643. f. 511.
64. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 
1727, KA 1949, f. 373.
65. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 20 
September 1728, KA 1992. f. 175.
6 6 . Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 16 May 
1728, KA 1992. f. 125.
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monopoly by J.P. Coen in the 1620's, it still caused 
considerable concern to the Dutch authorities because of the 
difficulty of suppressing the pirates. As Governor Gobius 
of Macassar admitted, despite more stringent checks along 
the coasts by the Dutch vessels, the problem could not be 
solved, because the inhabitants of the Spice Islands, who 
resented the monopolistic practices of the Dutch Company, 
conspired with the pirates and smugglers to evade the
go
authorities.
The Batavian Council tried to stamp out smuggling with
the co-operation of the Panambahan. In July 1727 the
Governor-General appealed to Kasuma Dilaga to give full
support to the Dutch factors in checking all ships for
contraband spices and to send the offenders to Batavia to be 
69punished. Although the Sultan was not in favour of 
disturbing the maritime traffic of his kingdom by imposing 
checks and measures in case he should drive away the traders, 
nevertheless, he consented to send perahus to accompany the
67. J.C. Van Leur. Indonesian Trade and Society«, (The Hague/ 
Bandung, 1955;, pp. 122 and 141. For more details of 
the Dutch spice monopoly, see Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian 
Trade and European Influence, pp. 207-38.
68. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975„
f. 621.
69. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 8 July 1727, 
KA 643«> f. 511.
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Volk in hunting down the pirates. Unfortunately, in his
pursuit of Gonepatja up the Barito river, J. Sanderts,
commander of the Volk, found that the water was too shallow
for the vessel. By the time the Sultan1s perahus arrived,
71
Gonepatja had fled to Lombok. In the event, all the other 
smugglers also escaped before action could be taken against 
them.72
In order to guard his territory against the return of
the Bugis, who had fled to Kutei after the civil war of
Banjarmasin, and at the same time enable the Dutch to keep
watch over the activities of the spice smugglers along the
Banjarese coast, Kasuma Dilaga suggested that the Dutch
Company should construct a fortified post or factory in
Banjarmasin. He informed the Batavian Council that he had
deliberately lowered the price of pepper from 6 to 4-J- reals
per pikul to the annoyance of his subjects, so that the Company
would continue to trade with the Banjarese and establish a
factory in order to deter Arun Sinkang, the new Bugis chief,
73
from making any attacks on his land.
70. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 20 September 
1728, KA 1992. f. 129.
71. J. Sanderts to Landsheer, 21 July 1728, KA 1992. f. 135.
72. Ibid.
73. Letter from Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General 
of Batavia, 4 October 1728, KA 1992. ff. 123-24.
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Discussions on the construction of a factory between
the Sultan and Lsndsheer and Broun, who visited Banjarmasin
in 1727, had yielded no positive results as the Dutch factors
had no authority to make decisions without prior consultation
with the Batavian Council. Therefore, with the object of
pursuing this matter further with the Batavian authorities,
Kasuma Dilaga sent an embassy consisting of Kjahi Akaraa bdin
74and Pengeran Mangku Negara in mid-172G to Batavia. The
Council, though sympathetic to the views of the Banjarese,
stated that it could not make any move until it had received
75an answer from the Directors in Holland.
The Sultan became more anxious that the factory should 
be built at an early date after the Zuijderbeek which had 
been despatched to Banjarmasin in 1728 for patrol duties, 
departed for Batavia in August 1729 because of the sick 
aboard, instead of maintaining surveillance along the coasts 
against Bugis attacks. Kasuma Dilaga wrote to the Batavian 
authorities that he would prefer to see a fixed establishment 
rather than the frequent arrival and departure of ships of
74. Landsheer'and Broun to the Batavian Council, 9 July 1728, 
KA 1992q f. 177.
75. Ibid.
76. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 2 September 
1729, KA 2025. f. 277.
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77the Dutch Company. He assured the Dutch that if they 
carried out his request, they could be assured of the 
monopoly of the pepper trade which, for the present, was 
still not guaranteed. Ee added that the Panjarese merchants 
were not convinced that the Company would establish a 
permanent trade with them unless the Dutch made a permanent 
settlement on the island.^ It is obvious that the Panambahan 
had political reasons for stating that the Banjarese merchants 
wanted a Dutch factory. It is inconceivable that the Banjarese 
should feel the same way as their ruler since a factory 
would deprive them of a free trade especially with the Chinese 
junk traders.
The general opinion of the Dutch factors, Landsheer,
Broyell and Broun, and later, Snippe and Kamerbeek, on the
erection of a factory was that while it was advisable for
the Company to heed the request of the Panambahan. if it intended
to continue to take pepper from the region, they, nevertheless,
79doubted the utility of such an establishment, Landsheer
77. Letter from Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General 
of Batavia, 25 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 274.
78. Ibid.
79. Landsheer, Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council,
23 December 1729, KA 2021, f. 6390. Original General 
Missive, 8 December 1732, KA 2101. f, 2196. Snippe 
and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 8 May. 1730,
KA 2055, f. 87.
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and his colleagues maintained that the Dutch trade with 
Banjarmasin was profitable only as far as output, that is, 
exports of pepper, was higher than input of capital in terms
OQ
of personnel, ships and arms. If the Dutch Company embarked 
on the project of building a factory, very much expenditure 
would be entailed in the actual construction work. The 
overhead costs of maintaining such an establishment would 
greatly exceed the profits which could be derived from the 
pepper trade especially during a poor harvest. Additional 
costs would be incurred in the despatch of tioops or military 
stores to the Sultan If there should be a renewal of war 
between the Banjarese and Bugis.
The factors also indicated that several classes of 
people had to be taken into account if the Batavian Council 
intended to build the factory. First, the Company would have 
to deal with the ordinary Banjarese inhabitants. The factors 
did not expect the inhabitants to help in the construction 
project, .such as in transporting the timber supplies 
because the Banjarese generally disliked the Dutch trading
o - i
in their ports. Secondly, there were the Banjarese nobles and 
Chinese private merchants to consider. These people were 
also not keen on having a Dutch factory, since their incomes
80. Landsheer, Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 
23 December 1729, KA 2012, f. 6390.
81. Ibid., f. 6391.
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would be considerably reduced if the Dutch Company should 
establish o monopoly of the pepper trade once the factory 
was completed. The. factors conjectured that the Chinese 
merchants might retaliate by preventing the Dutch from taking
away the pepper supplies?either of their own accord or through
82the interference of the middlemen. The net effect would 
be a loss of profits for the Company.
Finally? Landsheer and his colleagues felt that the
political power of the Sultan was also questionable; apart
from his sovereignty over the lowlands, the Sultan had little
control in the pepper regions of Upper Negara. If the Biaju
chiefs or the regional governors should decide not to abide
by the regulations set down by the Dutch, the Panambahan
would be powerless in compelling them to obey his ruling.
Moreover, the Dutch Company could not be assured of a permanent
trade with Banjarmasin, because if the present ruler were to
die, the Dutch could not predict whether his successor would
83still maintain trade on an old footing with the Company.
Nevertheless, the factors concluded that as long as the
Company traded in Banjarmasin without a fixed residence, it
84
could not hope to engross the whole pepper supply.0 In
82* Ibid.„ f. 6392.
83. Ibid.
84. Original General Missive, 8 December 1932, KA 2101. 
f. 2197.
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other words, they hinted that a factory would not be worthwhile 
under any circumstances.
The Governor-General and Council, after receiving the 
reports of their employees, decided to act cautiously by 
deferring the matter despite the persistent pleas of the
Qcr
Panambahan. They resolved that unless the commercial 
situation improved, in the sense that much larger stocks of 
pepper were transported by their ships, preferably to the 
extent which had prevailed in 1728, it was really not worth 
the expense and effort to stake so much on Banjarmasin 
which was not producing as much pepper for the Company as 
originally anticipated. The Batavian authorities decided 
that they could not afford to abandon the pepper trade of 
Banjarmasin as production fromrBantam and the other pepper 
stations was inadequate for the European market. They, therefore, 
resolved to continue the trade with the Banjarese; consequently, 
Dutch vessels were sent to that region from 1729 onwards to 
obtain pepper supplies.
Unfortunately, the Dutch did not have much success in
85. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729,
KA 645. f . 209. On 14 November 1729 and 1 May 1730, 
the Panambahan wrote again to the Council for an answer 
but the latter declined to give any positive reply.
KA 2025, f. 33 and KA 2055. f. 87.
8 6 . Resolution of the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729,
KA 645. f. 209.
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their commercial ventures. Since the Batavian authorities 
were disinclined to yield to the military expectations of 
the Panambahan, Sultan Hamid Bulla, the new ruler, proved 
even more recalcitrant in making commercial concessions to 
the Dutch, In 1733 for instance, Marre and Brouwer, the 
Dutch factors, were told by Pengeran Suria Dilsga that they 
could not obtain a shipload of pepper although more than
o n
1,200 pikuls of the article had been bought up by the junks. 
Because of the frequent complaints of their employees about 
the difficulties of loading pepper, the Dutch authorities 
felt that positive action was essential in order to rectify 
the imbalance in the pepper trade,
Evren at this juncture, the Batavian Council was still 
not convinced of the feasibility of constructing a 
factory at Banjar. However, the imminent threat of a Bugis 
attack on Banjarmasin, which was evident in the periodical 
raids by Topass Aray and Arun Sinkang along the Banjarese 
coast, impressed upon the Governor-General and Council the 
urgency of signing a contract with the Sultan if they 
intended to continue trade in that region. Such a treaty 
would help to define the Company's political role in 
Banjarmasin. The Sultan had claimed that the Dutch, by 
trading in his land, were morally bound to assist him against
87, Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 August 
1733, KA 2177, f. 2 2 .
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oo
his enemies p .although the Batavian Council had dismissed
such a claim by insisting that all its ventures in the
area were commercial ones according to the contract of 
89
1664. Th.us, guided by the instructions of the Batavian 
Council, Marre and Brouwer, who acted on behalf of the 
Company, signed the treaty with Sultan Hamid ^ulla and 
Pengeran Suria Dilaga on 26 September 1733,
It is unnecessary to reiterate the details of the treaty
90here since they have been mentioned in a previous chapter.
However, it should be pointed out that in ratifying the treaty,
the Batavian authorities, while recognising the importance
of Article VI which provided for a Dutch patrol ship to
guard the Barito river against contraband practices by the
nakhodas, nevertheless, doubted whether the Dutch Company
could maintain a pepper monopoly for long if the price was
91fixed at reals per pikul. They decided to amend Article X
8 8 . Sultan ICasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia,
15 November 1728, KA 1992«, f. 182$ Lau Kim Kong to
the Governor-General of Batavia, 14 December 1729,
KA 2025. f. 235,
89. Original General Missive, 31 March 1731, KA 2045, f* 8130. 
The treaty of 1664 was a ratification of the agreement
of 1661 which granted the pepper monopoly to the 
Dutch Company.
90. Refer to pp.iV3>-*f*t,
91. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734,
KA 653, f . 507.
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QO
by raising the.,popper -rate to 5 Spanish reals per pikul.
In making the amendment, the Dutch authorities hoped that 
the increase in price would encourage the Banjarese merchants 
to bring all their stocks to the Dutch Company and deter them 
from smuggling or selling pepper to other ,traders by illicit 
means. However, they emphasised that the higher rate had 
to be accompanied by better quality pepper which was clean 
and dry, and not the dusty and adulterated type which had"
G O
previously been given to the factors.
Although Hamid Dulla made the mistake of not compelling,
but rather gave the Dutch Company the option of erecting a
factory or pagar in Banjarmasin, and thus left the interpretation
of Article XIII to the Dutch (who decided merely on keeping
94a guard vessel at the river mouth), it was apparent from 
the inclusion of the eighteenth and nineteenth clauses that 
the Panambahan had great hopes that the Dutch would definitely 
construct a factory sooner or later. In fact, two sites 
were allocated to the Dutch Company foritrading purposes by 
the Sultan as far back as 1729.^ The first site, consisting
92* Ibid.o f. 508.
93. Ibid.
94. See Chapter VI, p.-*3 !,
95. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
25 August 1729, KA 2025, f. 275.
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essentially of morassic soils, was located "between Pulau 
Kaget and old Banjar about five miles up the Barito river.
The Butch factors, whose vessels were anchored off the river- 
banks, advised the Batavian Council not to build the factory
06 Q*7
there, because of the incidence of floods in the area.
They proferred the second site on Tomborneo where the land 
was higher and drier. In addition to the abundance of fish, 
fruit and drinking water on Tomborneo, the factors claimed 
that it could serve as a strategic centre designed to obstruct 
pirates and smugglers who had hitherto made the place their 
den.9^ It will be recalled that the suggestions of the Dutch 
were similar to those of some English East India Company 
servants, who had wanted to construct a factory on Tomborneo 
in 1704.
96. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 15 November 
1730, KA 2055. f, 116; Marre and Brouwer to the 
Batavian Council, 23 November 1733, KA 2177, f, 31,
97. The factors noted that the river-banks were normally 
under 4-g- ft. of water in the dry season and 7-jb-10 ft. 
in the monsoon or wet season. According to Hollander,
a9 much as 160 miles of the river-banks stretching from 
the kuala upwards could be flooded doily by the Barito 
river, while the flooded area extended to 420 miles 
in the rainy season. See Hollander, Handleiding ,
Vol. II, p. 25.
98. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 15 
November 1730, KA 2055c f. 116.
99. Refer to Chapter II,pp, 88-89
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As an additional incentive to the Company to establish
a residence, Hamid Julia offered to cede some districts of
Dusun Ulu in Negara, such as Lanan, Siang or Santamen,
Lemmo, and Tawnn.; to the Dutch in 1734.^00 Although the
Panambahan did not furnish any reason for his offer, the
Batavian Council, from the repoits of its factors, learned
that the Sultan had decided to transfer these dependencies
after the inhabitants, the majority of whom were Biajtts,
101had flouted his authority and revolted. While the
Governor-General, Dirck van Cioon, was keen to accept the
Sultanfs offer, apparently because he was interested in the
products, viz. gold, diamonds and bezoar stones produced
102by the districts, he nevertheless made certain that he
would not put the Dutch Company in a position where it
would be obliged to build the factory and pagar if he consented
to the transfer of the districts. He declined to accept
the native districts and preferred to adopt a ,?wait and
see" attitude, for he wanted to be sure that the pepper
contract was observed by the Banjarese before the Company
10*3
could abide by Articles XVIII and XIX of the treaty.
100. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734,
KA 653. f. 511. These four districts, situated east 
of Sukadana, were sparsely populated.
101. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734,
KA 653, f . 511.
102. Ibid. : ; ; , ■/
103. Ibid., f. 510.
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Apart from some initial success in loading cleaner
pepper, the factors, Marre and Brouwer, found that the treaty
neither led to any improvement in their trading position
nor did it ensure the Company the pepper monopoly. In 1734-
104
35, the Dutch ships received 338,8164- lbs. of pepper 
but the quantity fell to 212,363j lbs. one year later.
The increased pepper price offered by the Dutch Company 
certainly had the effect of encouraging the Banjarese merchants 
to bring their supplies more readily to the Dutch.
©ifortunately, this effect was nullified in 1735 shortly 
after Hamid Dulla had declare4 a rise of five per cent in 
the customs levy on all ships engaged in the internal traffic 
of Banjarmasin and an additional quarter real on all pepper 
tolls levied in the interior of Ban jar mas in. This toll 
of five per cent threatened to cut into the profit margin of 
the Banjarese merchants since the pepper rate to the Dutch 
Company was fixed, It also deprived them of the right to 
trade freely with the junks. Because of the prohibitive 
clauses of the Dutch-Banjarese contract and external taxes, 
many cultivators abandoned their pepper gardens or simply 
allowed their plants to rot during the harvest season without
104. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735,
KA 2237« f. 49.
105. Original'General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254« f.1287.
106. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 1 June 1734,
KA 2206, f. 9.
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plucking the fruit. As a result, the Dutch factors hod 
difficulty in loading their ships.
Sultan Tamjeed Dulla was not particularly
enthusiastic about maintaining the pepper contract signed
by his predecessor, Hamid Dulla, Nevertheless, fearing that
the Company would withdraw its military support to Banjarmasin
at the height of the Bugis invasion by not sending any vessels
to the Barito river, which it had the option to do,"!he tried
to force the cultivators to deliver their pepper to the 
108
Dutch. However, many planters disobeyed the ruler*s orders,
for after the ban on the junks which prohibited the nakhodas
109
from loading pepper had been lifted late in 1734, the
Banjarese reverted to their previous practice of delivering
110
their pepper to the Chinese rather than the Dutch factors.
A few cultivators were in fact encouraged by their provincial 
rulers to defy the instructions of the Panambahan since the 
chiefs did not want their incomes to be reduced unduly by 
the Dutch who offered much lower prices for pepper than the
107. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, 
KA 2237. ff. 49-50.
108. Ibid.. f. 50.
109. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 17, July-1734 
KA 2206. f. 17.
110. Ibid.
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nakhodos.^^ Pengeran Singa Sari of T a p i n g , f o r  instance,
refused to part with his pepper stocks even when Pengeran
Anom, on the Sultan*s orders, had personally gone up to the
region to obtain the product. Consequently, Tamjeed Dulla
hod to despatch a small army to subjugate Pengeran Singa
Sari, who was thereafter sent to Kayu Tinggi to beg for mercy
113from the Panambahan,
After obtaining such small supplies of pepper, and
witnessing the ineffectiveness of the compulsive methods
(implicit in the treaty of 1733) used on his subjects by the
Sultan to grant pepper to the Dutch Company, Brouwer and
G, Keyser advised the Batavian Council to terminate its
114commercial relations with Banjarmasin, They stated that
although the bad harvests in Banjarmasin were partly 
responsible for the insufficient cargoes shipped home by the 
Company vessels, the fierce competition of the junks as well 
as the defiant attitude of the upland cultivators towards
111. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 July
1736, KA 2237c f. 51.
112, Taping or Tampang was one of the pepper-producing
regions of Negara and was situated in the upper part
of Kahajan Dlu. - Hollander, Handleiding. Vol. II,
pp* 119-21,
113. Brouwer and Keyser to the Batavian Council, 22 April 
1736, KA 2275. f. 3.
114, Brouwer and Keyser to the Batavian Council, 5 July 
1736, KA 2275. f. 24.
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the Panambahan In not transporting their supplies to the
Dutch* were major causes for the failure of the ^utch to
115get full supplies. The Dutch Company trade became worse
after the Bugis-Banjarese war was over in 1736. Without
further need jodF. the Dutch,. Tamjeed Dulla ignored his pledges
to the Company and permitted the junks to ship large pepper stocks
116
out of Tartas. The Batavian Council was disillusioned
with the broken promises of the Sultan to supply it with
the whole pepper crop. Although it realised that the only
means to obtain the main pepper trade was to construct a
factory or stockade as the Sultan had perpetually requested,
it did not wish to become involved in Banjarese politics or to
incur any expense on a building project. The Council thus
refused to listen to the Sultanfs point of view, but was only
concerned with the half-empty ships that returned to Batavia.
It became convinced that the Banjarese were a "treacherous
117lot" and withdrew its ships from Banjarmasin in 1737.
115. Ibid.. f. 25.
116. Brouwer and Keyser to the Batavian Council, 25 May > 
1736, KA 2275. f. 20.
117. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, 
ff. 1290-91.
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CHAPTER V 
PROBLEMS OF THE PEPPER TRADE
The English and Dutch regarded Banjarmasin as one of 
the supply centres of pepper in south-east Asia in the 
eighteenth century. As long as they had current Spanish 
dollars or reals, they generally expected to procure the 
quantities of pepper they desired. If the Banjarese were 
unable to meet their demands fully, the Europeans would 
often accuse them of keeping their stocks of pepper for the 
Chinese junks. Though the accusations were true at times, 
it can be stated that, generally, the English and Dutch 
merchants tended to ignore or failed to realise that the 
Banjarese were often faced with numerous problems in the 
cultivation and sale of pepper. Some of these problems were 
adverse weather conditions and labour shortage which resulted 
in fluctuations in annual output.
Natural hazards such as monsoonal rainstorms and drought
often destroyed a large percentage of the pepper crop. In
September 1704 heavy rains from the Westerly monsoon spoilt
most of the vines in Kayu Tinggi although the plantations in
1
the Negara highlands were not affected. In mid** 1733 Pengeran
1. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 30 September 1704, SFR (7), 
f. 13.
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Purba informed the Dutch factors, Marre and Brouwer, that
his pepper gardens in the lowlands of Faraingir, Kaluwa, Pringin
p
and Amandit were flooded, while his crop bordering the 
foothills was also unfit for export as the vines were too
3dry and withered owing to insufficient moisture in the ground.
Instead of saving part of their pepper stock for that season
by plucking the riper fruit, the cultivators, many of whom
were afflicted with small-pox, neglected their plants
altogether* Fearing that they would be also infected by the
4disease, the healthier planters deserted to the hills.
In addition to natural calamities, a shortage of labour 
caused production to decline. The scattered nature of 
lad'ang cultivation and the concentration of population 
in the river toms and ports made it difficult for planters 
to employ pepper-pickers during the harvesting period,
5
especially in the peak month of September. Bather than 
risk making long journeys into the interior of Molukko or 
Negara to pluck berries, many young Banjarese preferred to
2. These four districts were included in the region of 
Amuntai.
3. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 7 June 1733, 
KA 2177. f. 19.
4. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1735, 
KA 2237. f. 50*
5. Rodgett to Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6 B), No. 22.
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serve as *hired hands* to the European or Chinese traders in
6Tartas or Banjarmasin* In the pepper-producing villages cf 
Kayu Tinggi where more pickers were available because of the 
region*s proximity to Tartas, the amount of work was limited
7
as production of the crop was about one hundred tons annually.
In Molukko, where the harvesting period was longer, production was
g
restricted to a mere fifty tons per year.
In Negara where the bulk of the pepper was obtained, 
production was seriously hampered during the Biaju-Banjarese 
civil war years of 1711-1717. Many planters, lured by the 
message of the Biaju leaders that they should fight to regain
their independence from the Banjarese rulers, deserted their
9pepper gardens to join the Biaju army led by Purabaya. 
Consequently, the berries were left to rot on the vines
10because of the shortage of pickers in the harvesting season.
The population in Kahajan or Upper Negara in 1879 was
11 12 
estimated at 16,000 compared to about 60,000 in Amuntai
6 . Ibid.
7. Arnold to Stacy, IS January 1702, JFR (6B), No. 23.
8 . Ibid.
9* Original General Missive, 17 January 1713. KA 1708. f . 1266.
10. Ibid.
11. Hollander, Handlelding, Vol. II, p. 122.
12. Ibid.. p. 129.
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13and 50,000 in Martapura. The population figures were
obviously much lower in the first half of the eighteenth;
century* Biajus who stayed' behind to work on their plots
were soon disheartened because of the slump in the pepper
trade after the Indonesian and foreign merchants shopped
14
visiting Banjarmasin in the mid-37lOfs. Moreover, small 
stocks of pepper which were harvested had no access to the 
towns as many rivers were cut off by enemy patrols or 
piratical Bugis.
One of the chief reasons for the continued discontent 
and the reluctance of the cultivators to work their pepper 
gardens was the low prices offered by the Banjarese chieftains 
and traders* Although rates tended to fluctuate according 
to the quantity of pepper each season, they were usually 
disadvantageous to the planters* The Banjarese merchants 
put the blame for these low payments on the Dutch and English 
who came to trade* Prior to 1710, the English could purchase 
13 or 14 gantangs of Negara pepper for one Spanish dollar or 
12 and 11 gantangs of the more expensive Kayu Tinggi and
13. Ibid., p. .134*
14* Original General Missive, 28 November 1715, KA 1751* 
f* 369*
15. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1709* 
f* 1267.
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16Molukko pepper respectively. In comparison, the Chinese 
nakhodas who were willing to pay higher prices on the 
competitive market, obtained only 11 gantangs of Negara
17
pepper and 9 gantangs of Kayu Tinggi pepper per Spanish dollar*
These were, however, the official market rates genex’ally
transacted between the Banjarese and foreign merchants.
The prices were even lower when the district chiefs or
principal Banjarese traders bought pepper directly from the
cultivators5 in Negara, as much as 20 gantangs could be
18procured for one Spanish dollar*
In contrast to the English, the Dutch Company factors
disregarded the different grades of pepper by offering an
equal rate of four reals per pikul to the Banjarese when they
19
came to Banjarmasin in 1711 and the 17201 s. Except for
an extra quarter real as toll duty to the ruler, they refused
to pay higher prices ©ven when production had dropped to a
low level as in the mid-1710's for they insisted on maintaining
20the previous contract terms of 1664* It can be observed
16. Rodgett to Stacy, 13 January 1702, JFR (6 B), No. 22.
17. Ibid.
18. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 25 November 1706, JFR (6 ), 
no page.
19. Original General Missive, 21 July 1711, KA 1691q 
f. 96, and 31 January 1728, KA 1953. f. 2236.
20. Ibid.
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especially in the 1720‘s? that commercial transactions 
between the Ban jarese authorities and the Europeans were 
usually made without consideration for the cultivator. By 
exerting their influence on the Panambahan through the 
presentation of ammunition or by displaying their military 
might, the Dutch and the English ./ere able to negotiate 
their own prices and indirectly compel the Banjarese merchants 
to deliver pepper to them.2-1* This^ , in turn,adversely affected 
the cultivators who were even paid less for their pepper 
by the Banjarese middlemen. As a result of the meagre profits, 
Biaju owners of pepper plots allowed their plants to be ruined
p p
by absconding or changing occupations. During the civil 
war period of the 1710fs9 cultivators in Molukko and Kayu 
Tinggi, who were relatively unaffected by the labour shortage, 
could have intensified their efforts by increasing the acreage 
of their pepper lands. However, they did not find it 
lucrative enough to extend their activities for despite the 
better grains that were grown in these regions, the prices 
remained the same as that of Negara pepper.
21. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975. 
f. 618.
22. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, 
f. 2678.
23. Original General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1708, 
f. 1267.
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The planters were also discouraged by the infrequent 
and irregular payments made by the chiefs and principal 
merchants who were normally the intermediaries at the 
warehouses or weighing houses of the ports. Waterways being 
the main form of transport for goods and men, the journey 
downriver from Tartas to the Ban^jr Bay, approximately
24-eighteen miles, took about two days, ^ while the period was
longer if the starting point was in Negara. Thus, the
intermediary required at least several v/eeks to complete his
schedule before he could pay the cultivators. Further delays
in payment were possible for another reason. The English
and Dutch traders, in accordance with their companies*
orders, were often reluctant to make cash advances before 
25deliveries. Generally, this problem was solved only after
the Banjarese traders had warned that no pepper would be
26delivered until cash advances were made. Instead of 
paying the planters for their pepper supplies as soon as 
they had received the advances, the Banjarese chiefs would 
often use part of the cash they obtained to settle personal 
debts to rich Chinese whom they owed money or spend it on
24. Ship log. Edward and Dudley. (1702-1705), 21 March 1703, 
no page.
25. E.I.C. to ^anjar Council, 21 August 1701, JFR (6B),
No. 31. Original General Missive, 21 July 1711,
KA 1691. f . 96.
26. Banjar Coqncil to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRM (6 ), f. 60. 
Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693,
f. 1176.
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luxury goods such as silk and tea. Consequently, large
arrears were due to the cultivators when payments were
delayed. Instances occurred where some of the Pengerans
conveniently forgot to honour their debts altogether. As
a reprisal, the cultivators would retain part of their pepper
when the Banjarese intermediaries came for supplies the next 
28
time. Unfortunately, the Europeans, and not the
Banjarese traders, suffered the ill-consequences when they
were not given the specified quantity of pepper after making
29the full payment.
Pepper production figures in the 1720‘s and 1730fs 
were generally lower than pre-civil war figures in Banjarmasin 
The English factors tended to exaggerate when they stated
30that about 2,000 tons of the article were produced annually.
A more correct estimate, except for 1702 and 1705 when only
31720 and 355 tons respectively were exported because of bad 
weather conditions, would be between 1,100-1,500 tons or
27. W. Griffith to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, ££& (9), f. 2. 
Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 15 August 
1729, KA 2025q f. 265.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 9 November 1700, FRK (6 ), 
f. 60.
31. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 Uovember 1706, SFR (7), 
f. 37.
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roughly 19,000 to 25,000 pikuls per year. In comparison,
production figures late in the 1710's and 1720ls were
usually below 20,000 pikuls annually with the exception of ,
331728 when a bumper crop was procured. This was because
the pepper gardens, which had been abandoned during the war
years and whose plants had deteriorated, were not renewed,
and moreover, few attempts were made by cultivators to open
34up virgin land for fresh vines.
Early in the 1730's, the situation became worse when 
more plots were deserted by the planters because of their 
discontent over the Dutch attempts at setting up a monopoly 
in the pepper trade. Natural calamities also had an effect. 
Hardly more than 2,000 pikuls were procured in 1733-34 when 
the vines were badly hit by floods and the natives were 
reluctant to pick berries purely for the purpose of export 
by the Dutch Company.*^ Their resentment against the 
Banjarese authorities for raising toll duties by five per 
cent on all internal traffic in 1734 enhanced the planters1
32. Ibid. Original General Missive, 31 March 1731, KA 2045, 
f. 8132.
33. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975. 
f. 618 and KA 2195. (2733), f. 5153.
34. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005. 
f. 2678.
}
35. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 Movesiber 
1734, KA 2206. f. 44.
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36apathy towards pepper cultivation. It can be recalled 
that the Panambahan, in a desperate bid to increase production, 
and angry that his subjects should disobey his orders, issued 
a decree compelling all pepper owners, especially the Biajus, 
to continue to tend their old gardens and to extend their
nn
acreages of pepper. f However, the Biajus, who had already 
flaunted royal orders before, as in 1711 when they rebelled 
against the Banjarese, ignored the decree and either deserted 
their villages or converted their pepper lands into padi
oo
fields.
Although the cultivator was essentially involved 
with the problems of cultivation and production, the Banjarese 
trader also had to face difficulties in the pepper trade, 
chief of which were complaints from the English and the 
Dutch merchants. A common source of dissatisfaction among 
the Europeans was that of irregular and slow delivery of 
pepper stocks at the warehouse or into their ships. They 
claimed that they often had to postpone their departure from 
Tartas or Kayu Tinggi because the loading of their boats
36. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June 1736, 
KA 2237. f. 50.
37. Ibid., f. 52.
38. Ibid.
198
39took a much longer period than expected. Delays in
the prompt shipment of pepper supplies which were inevitable
in many cases, were caused by flooded rivers during the
monsoon season which made it too dangerous for perahus to
40sail downstream until the floods had subsided, Also^ , it was
impossible for the intermediaries to transport their stocks
to the ports during non-rainy periods, when the river-level
was too low for rafts or perahus, as for example in August
and September 1706.^  In that same year, the rains arrived
only in December by which time most of the grains had rotted
due to poor handling and storage. Hence, the pepper which
was of poor quality, fetched very low prices although
42initially the crop was a good one.
Another common complaint among the English and the 
Dutch was the use by the Banjarese of fraudulent weights and 
measures in commercial transactions. Landon and Rodgett, 
members of the Banjar Council between 1700 and 1702,,alleged 
that the measurement of pepper in gantangs early in the 1700ls
39. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 5 April 1706, LB (12), f. 567.
Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 23 November
1733, KA 2177, f. 31.,
40. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 25 November 1706, SFR (6 ),
no page.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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was disadvantageous to the English for it was a light
40
measure compared to the pound weight. The disadvantage 
was especially marked in the sale of different grades of 
pepper ♦ The Banjarese, in order to obtain more profits 
from the expensive Molukko or Kayu Tinggi grains, would ~>dd 
the light Negara pepper to them oince it was volume rather 
than weight which counted on the pepper market.44
The change from measurement in gantangs to that by
45weight in pikuls or koyans was made around 1710, apparently
after the Banjarese court had realised that frequent disputes
occurred between the foreigners and its subjects over the
gantang measure. Although a Banjarese official was appointed
to the weighing house to supervise operations, there was
A6no standardization of the scales,* particularly the crude 
home-made daching, as one scale could differ as much as a 
few katis from another. Kjahi Aria, a Banjarese noble, for 
instance, kept two daching. One^ which was used for 
obtaining pepper from the cultivators, and in which only 
half a pikul of the product could be measured at a time,
43. Stacy to E.I.C., 21 April 1703, ETO1 (6 ), f. 163.
44. Ibid.
45. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 825.
46. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 
1720, LB (17), f. 446.
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was designed to hold surplus weight* The other daching,
meant only for transactions with the foreign merchants,
could measure quantities up to one pikul, but was highly 
47inaccurate.
Neither the Europeans nor the Chinese merchants could
use their own weights to measure pepper* The former, in
their protests over inaccuracies in the daching, attempted
to persuade the Sultan to permit them to use their own
weighing methods. The English pointed out that because
of its thick edges, the dachine was not designed to weigh
49very small quantities of pepper. Moreover, to increase
its weight, the Banjarese would normally add one or two
mata buronn to the daching.^0 Hence, a pikul of pepper weighed
on the daching would register about 132 lbs. on the English
scales when the correct weight should have been 133 1/3 - 
, 51
133-g- lbs. The Bnnjarese authorities refused to standardise 
their weights and measures for the benefit of their English 
customers by warning them that no pepper would be sold if
47. Ibid.
48. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Thistleworth and the Borneo, 
10 December 1718, LB (16), f. 5*74. Supercargoes of the 
Onslow to E,I.C., 31 October 1746, CFR (52), f. 35.
49. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Hester, 14 March 1715,
LB (15), f. 817.
50. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 827.
51. Ibid., Supercargoes of the Onslow to E.I.C., 31 October 
T746, CFR (52), f. 35.
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they raised further objections. On the other hand, the 
Dutch factors were more successful in their requests 
to use their own scales in weighing pepper. In 1728 
shortly after Broyell and Broun, the Dutch factors, had 
protested that they had been cheated because a tin instead 
of a copper weight had been used, resulting in a shortage of 
about 3 lbs. in every pikul (or 125 lbs.) of pepper,^3 
Panambahan pacified them by granting them permission to 
weigh their own pepper stocks.5^
Besides their demand for accurate weights and prompt 
supplies, the European merchants expected pepper to be well- 
garbled. They alleged that the pepper which was delivered 
to them, was more often than not, dusty and impure containing 
clay particles and black corns.^ The Sultan and the 
Pengerans considered that it was inevitable for some impurities 
to be present, since the cultivators could not afford to 
discard too many grains with the meagre profits which they
52. Ibid.
53. Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council, 7 July 1729, 
KA 2025. f. 309.
54. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Batavian Council, 31 August 
1730, KA 2055. f. 144.
55. Journal Julia, (1699-1701), 12 April 1701. Landsheer 
and Broun to the Batavian Council,,20 September 1728,
KA 1992. f. 126. . f
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56obtained in the process of garbling. During the initial
stages of the English East India CompanyTs trade with
Banjarmasin between 1701 and 1703, the Directors tolerated
dusty pepper stocks which were shipped home by their factors.
However, in 1704 when an Act was passed laying down a freight
duty of lOd. per lb. on all imports into England, the
Directors instructed their covenanted servants to accept
only clean pepper as they did not want to incur extra freight
costs because of the additional bulk if pebbles and pepper
57corns were present. Thereafter, despite persistent
requests to the Banjarese merchants, the English factors
found that there was little improvement in the standard of
deliveries, for just as many pebbles and empty pepper corns
58were present in the gunny sacks as before. The factors 
wore informed by the Panambahan that unless the English
Company paid higher prices for pepper, his subjects would
59not be prepared to sift their stocks thoroughly. Consequently, 
the English decided to garble the pepper themselves.
56. Sultan Kasuma Dilaga to the Batavian Council, 31 August 
1730, KA 2055. f. 144.
57. E.I.C. to Banjar Council, 16 December 1704, LB (12), 
f. 351.
58. Banjar Council to E.I.C., 29 November 1706, SFR (7), 
f. 37.
59. Ibid.
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In the garbling process carried out by the English,
all wet grains were laid out to dry under a shed with-a
detachable roof ao that when the rains came, the roof would-
60be covered to protect the pepper. Dusty particles and
leftovers were thrown into the river or sea. Shortly afterwards
the English merchants discovered uhat at night when they
were out of sight, the Banjarese would steathily retrieve
particles floating on the water surface, dry them in the sun
61and then mix them with new supplies of pepper. Moreover,
in loading pepper from the perahus onto the English vessels,
the Banjarese,who acted as hired hands, would steal small
bales of pepper, and similarly, these would be sold together
62
with the fresh stocks to the English.
Realising that the Banjarese authorities would not 
punish the offenders if they protested, the English subsequently 
devised a method to outv/it the Banjarese. Instead of 
disposing the waste particles all at once during the day, the 
factors would work at night and throw small quantities into 
the water to ensure that they sank to the bottom of the sea
60. T. Butler and J. Collier to E.I.C., 29 November 1742, 
SFR (9), f. 167.
61. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Hester, 14 March 1715, 
LB (15), ff. 817-18.
62. Ibid.
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o
before the next lot of dusty grains were dropped in. The
method was only partially successful, for on occasions, the
Banjarese could still retrieve dusty pepper corns. The
problem of impure pepper supplies continued into the 1730fs
64
and the early 1740*s. Although the ^atavian Council tr: ed 
to obtain cleaner pepper by inseiuing a clause to this effect 
in the Dutch-BanjaT*ese treaty of September 1733, it soon 
found that the Banjarese complied with the regulation only 
for a short while but reverted thereafter to their former 
ways of delivering dusty stocks. The Council thus came 
to realise that if it wanted to obtain large quantities of 
pepper from Banjarmasin, it had to sacrifice quality for 
quantity on some occasions, for the same high standard of 
garbling could not always' be maintained by the Banjarese.
63. Ibid.
64. Snippe and Kamerbeek to the Batavian Council, 14
August 1730, KA 2055, f. 1140. T. Butler and J. Collier
to E.I.C., 29 November 1742, SFR (9), f. 167.
65. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 June
1735, KA 2237. f. 49.
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CHAPTER VI
CHINESE JUNK TRADE; 1700-1737
The Chinese resorted to Banjarmnsin for pepper from
the first hr.If of the seventeenti century after they had
been ousted from Bantam and Jambi by their Dutch and English
competitors.'*' When they were informed about the vast
commercial possibilities of the pepper.trade of Banjarmasin
o
by the Portuguese of Macao, they arrived in junks at the 
rate of four to thirteen annually from the ports of Amoy, 
Canton, Ningpo and Macao. The nakhodas were welcomed at 
Tartas or Kayu Tinggi by the Banjarese because they brought 
along articles which were in high demand among the inhabitants.
1* B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies., Pt. I, 
pp. 29-30.
2 . Chinese junks, often unwieldy and massive, had square 
hulls and double planking riveted together with iron 
bolts. It was not unusual for one junk to have five or 
six layers of planks on top of old ones. As the junks 
were mainly propelled by bamboo-matted sails, great 
reliance was placed on the trade-winds. The junks which 
visited Banjarmasin and Java weighed between 60 and 100 
lasts each and there were 90 to 200 men in each boat. 
Because of their sturdy build, the junks could resist 
typhoon winds of the China Sea much better than the 
lighter Arab or Indian vessels although they were less 
manoeuvrable.- List of Chinese junks to Batavia in 
1746, KA 2550. f . 960^ H. Yule, The Book of Ser Marco 
Polo, the' Venetian, concerning the kingferns and 
marvels' of the East. Vol. II. (London. 3.903), pp• 250-515 
Meilink-lRoel'ofa z. Asian Trade and European Influence, 
pp. 74-75.
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Different types of raw and finished silk, tea, camphor, salt,
copper utensils, lacquered boxes and porcelain ware were
bartered for pepper, gold, dragons-blood and birds-nest.
The frequent appearance of the junks developed Banjarmasin'
into a bustling port where traders of various countries,
the Arabs and GujGratis, and those of the neighbouring
Indonesian areas of Java, Madura, Celebes, Lombok, Bali and
Sumbawa flocked to transact business with the Chinese.^
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the junk trade
had become so important that the Barito river was also
known as the China Biver because of the frequent movement
4of junks up and down stream.
Although the season of the pepper sales in Banjarmasin 
was from early October to March of each year, the junks did 
not normally arrive in Banjarmasin until the end of February,
5
just before the sales season came to an end. One would 
think that because of their late arrival, the junk merchants 
would obtain only the remnants or the left-overs of the 
popper crop from the sellers. However, the "first come, 
first served” policy did not generally apply to the Banjarese
3• Report of J. de Wolff to the Governor-General of Batavia,
18 July 1707, KA 1626. f. 360.
4* D. Beeckman, A voyage to Borneo, p. 58.
5. E. Arnold, "Instructions on the Trade of Banjarmasin**, Iwuaru lloi/ 
JFR (6B), Nos. 22 and 23.
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traders. It was common for the Banjarese to reserve the 
major portion of their pepper supplies for the junk traders 
instead of giving them to the English or Dutch as they were 
attracted not only by the Chinese commodities, but also 
by the higher prices offered by the junk merchants. For 
instance, the common type of pepper which was produced in 
the region of Negara, with brittle, light and dusty grains, 
was sold to the English at Banjar for thirteen gantangs per 
Spanish dollar by the B a n j a r e s e  in 1701, while the nakhodas 
of the junks acquired it at nine gantangs per Spanish dollar. 
The English factors argued that the Chinese could offer 
higher prices simply because they could evaluate pepper 
prices in terms of the prices of the Chinese goods, while 
the English merchants had to make payment in hard cash with
n
Spanish dollars. Very often, the junk owners did not have 
to make any cash payment at all; their commodities were 
so lucrative that they were able to acquire large
o
pepper cargoes with them. They only used leaden string cash0
6 * Banjar Council to E.I.C., 21 March 1704, SFR (7), No. 1.
7. Griffith in Batavia to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, JFR (9), 
f. 2 .
8 . Leaden string cash usually consisted, of small coins 
which were threaded together. Each coin, cast out of 
lead or coarse brass with Chinese characters on both 
sides, had a square hole in the middle.^ See_A.
Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies<> Vol. II, 
(London, 1930), p. 172.
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(the Chinese currency) which was considered to be very much 
inferior in value to the pillar dollar in the East Indies, 
to pay the balance if the pepper costs were higher than 
the costs of the Chinese wares
With the establishment of the English settlement on Banjar 
in 1700, the junks and the Indonesian perahus, which normally 
resorted to Tartas, made Banjar their new port of call.
The Asian traders changed their destination not by choice 
but from necessity as Pengeran Dipati, who was in charge of 
port duties, moved his customs house from Tartas to Banjar 
and the Chinese and Indonesians had to pay tolls at the new 
centre*^0 After the defeat of the Banjarese in the first 
Anglo-Banjarese war of October 1701, the Chinese found 
that they had lost their place of honour on the pepper 
market. It has been observed that the Panambahan, whose 
actions were largely dictated by the English as the victors 
of the war, ordered his subjects to deliver pepper to the 
English factors at fixed prices, while the junk merchants 
could buy pepper only under the supervision of the English 
who placed a guard vessel at the mouth of the Barito river.
As a result of the English East India Company's control of
9. Griffith in Batavia to E.I.C., 25 February 1708, 
JFR (9), f. 2.
10. Journal Borneo, (1701-1702), 10 May 1701.
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Banjar, the junks shifted book to Tartas in 1702 to conduct 
their commercial transactions and in the following years, 
fewer junks came to Banjarmasin to trade.
The decreased junk trade and the diversion of the
junks from Banjar to Tartas alarmed the Banjar Council
which hod hoped that the Chinese would stay on in the
settlement. One of the principal reasons for the construction
of a fort on Banjar by the English Company in 1704 was to
attract the junk trade, since the Chinese had declared that
they would not return unless they \*ere assured of proper
British protection against unscrupulous men like London
12who had exploited them. It is an undeniable fact that
the English dreaded the fierce competition of the junk
merchants in the pepper trade of Banjarmasin. Nevertheless,
for the soke of acquiring valuable Chinese products, the
English welcomed the idea of the junks coming to their
factory, for they discovered that they could buy goods from
the Chinese as easily os the Banjarese. Early in 1702,
Landon mentioned that it was in fact easier to obtain
13Chinese wares in Banjar than . China. The prospective
11. Report of J. de Wolff to the Governor-General of 
Batavia, 18 July 1707, KA 1626. f. 363.
12. Rodgett and Griffith to E.I.C., 23 March 1704,
SFR (7), f . 1.
13. London to E.I.C., 20 April 1702, FRM (6 ), f. 119.
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customer of silk, for instance, could unpack all the 
materials for examination before he made a purchase* The
junk trader nmade allowance for every small band /~of silkj?
14'
which practice was not possible in China e11
The Anglo-Chinese trade at Banjar was not a one-sided 
affair* Besides the purchases which they made from the 
junk traders, the English could sell vast quantities of their 
goods, especially copper, fine Indian cotton, tu.tenngue and 
sappan wood to the Chinese. Prior to the establishment 
of the English settlement at Banjar in 1700, the junk 
merchants had obtained these products mainly from the Dutch 
at Batavia. Junks from Amoy, Canton and Ningpo came to 
Batavia in the "months of March to May each year to purchase 
Indian cotton, benzoin, saltpetre, indigo, sugar, pepper, 
cloves and nutmegs. In return the Chinese merchants 
furnished the Dutch Company with silk, tea, camphor, sandalwood, 
gold and Chinese medicines. The junk trade at Batavia was 
highly esteemed by the Dutch as their sales to the Qhinese
14. Ibid.
15. The total cost of the purchases of the English 
Company's goods was estimated at £4,000 annually. - 
Minutes of the Council of the Bay of Bengal, 25 
January 1702, FRM (6 ), f. 152.
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brought in profitable returns to their Company. In 
return the Dutch also acquired valuable Chinese goods 
without having to go to China to buy them.
In 1701 however, the Batavian Council noticed that
its sales to the junk nakhodas had declined considerably for
that year5 not only did it yield no profit on some goods,
but it had also incurred losses on others9 such as certain.
17types of Indian cloth. The Batavian Council gave two 
reasons for the decrease in Dutch-Chinese trade. First, 
there was a change In some of the tastes of their Chinese 
c u s t o m e r s . T h e  Dutch declared that it was extremely 
difficult to ascertain the likes and dislikes of the Chinese, 
For example, the junk traders would want only red cloth in 
a certain year and black cloth in another. The Council 
conjectured that it was possible that in 1701, the junk 
merchants had been dissatisfied with some types of materials, 
and consequently, had made few purchases. The otiher reason 
for the reduced trade with the junks was the competition 
from the English who sold their products to the Chinese at
1C. In 1700, the Chinese bought goods valued at 355157^ reals 
from the Dutch Company, but in 1701 the purchases of 
iron and -^engal goods had decreased to f »' 15605.15.8 - 
Original General Missive, 1 December 1700, KA 1520„ 
f. 405, and 31 December 1701, KA 1543. f. 1128.
17. Original General Missive, 31 December ,1701, KA 1534, 
f. 1128.
18I Ibid.
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lower prices than the Dutch Company. The Batavian Council
claimed that since the establishment of English trade with
China5 the Chinese had resorted more to the purchase of
cheaper English articles in their own Chinese ports and as
a result, fewer junks came to Batavia and thus less Dutch
goods were bought. The Governor-General, Von Outhoorn,
considered that if the Dutch Company wished to increase
its sales to the Chinese at Batavia so that the junk trade
could be brought back to the profitable level of previous
years, it would either have to reduce its prices or send
its employees to Canton to compete with the English on the
19Chinese market.
Apparently, the Batavian authorities during the early
1700!s did not have any correct notions as to the manner in
which the English were undercutting their trade with the 
20Chinese. It was not in China but in Banjarmasin that the
19. Ibid., ff. 1128-29.
2 0 . The Dutch Company gathered information on the English 
traders in China from the nakhodas or captains of junks 
at Batavia. The nakhodas were thoroughly interrogated 
by the Dutch and they were asked questions such ass
"How many English ships came to Amoy or Ningpo this year?" 
"What goods did the English sell to the Chinese and 
what did they buy?"5*
"How many English vessels ore expected in China in the 
coming year?"
It can be explained that the nakhodas could not always 
be relied on to furnish accurate information| hence, 
the inaccuracy of the Reports of the Batavian Council* - 
Questions and answers between the Dutch authorities and 
the nakhodas, 28 January 1701, KA 1522, ff. 1718-20.
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English had established profitable commercial ventures with
the junk merchants. Instead of sailing all the way to
Batavia to obtain cotton, saltpetre, cloves and nutmegs,
the Chinese were going to Banjarmasin which was not only
nearer to China, but it had a more abundant and cheaper supply
of these goods and pepper. Besides, the Chinese could also
dispose of their own merchandise in Banjarmasin, However,
the junk trade at Batavia was not terminated altogether.
Chinese junks still frequented Batavia to carry on their
business transactions with the Dutch Company, but in fewer
numbers before 1710, The sale of goods to the Chinese
dropped from 355157^ reals in 1700 to 229396 3/8 reals in 
21
1706.
Commercial relations between the English and the 
junk merchants in Banjarmasin ended after the expulsion of 
the former by the Banjarese in the second Anglo-Banjarese 
war of 1707,22 Shortly after the flight of the English 
factors, the Chinese re-established themselves as the 
principal traders of Tartas and Kayu Tinggi. From then on, 
there was neither a guard vessel nor a military force to 
obstruct the movement of the nakhodas in their transactions
21, Original General Missive, 30 November 1706, KA 1608, 
f. 472,
22. See Chapter II, pp. 109-111.
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with the Banjarese or Biaju pepper cultivators. Greater
numbers of Chinese flocked to Banjarmasin than before. These
consisted of two classes, namely the junk merchants, and the
private traders or individuals who came to set up their
homes in the area, bringing their families and belongings
with them. The junk traders only stayed temporarily in
Tartas or some other Banjarese port. After completing their
commercial activities which included stocking their vessels
with pepper and disposing of their goods, they sailed off
to Canton, returning to Banjarmasin only in the next season.
As for the Chinese immigrants and settlers, they considered
Banjarmasin their second home. For a living, many of them
established shops in the towns or ports while others became
warehouse keepers, middlemen or agents for the nakhodas in
the pepper negotiations with the Banjarese traders. Beeckman,
the supercargo of the Borneo, observed that the Chinese
there were Mye only persons that have shops tolerably well
furnished: they set them off with coarse chintz, callicoes,
23
bastees, tea, drugs, china ware and many other things.1’
Although there were about eighty Chinese families in Tartas
and Kayu Tinggi prior to 1708, the number steadily increased
24to over two hundred units after that period. Gradually9
23. Beeckman, op. clt. p. 91.
24. Beid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9), no page.
23 5
many of them were able to communicate with the Banjarese in 
the Indonesian tongue, thus making themselves an integral 
part of the community, and they could move freely about the 
place as they liked.
The chief of the Chinese community in Banjarmasin was 
Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China or Kjahi Roxa Sirana, as he 
was known among the Banjarese. A wealthy and renowned 
personality, he managed to advance the interests of his 
countrymen through.his influence over the Banjarese authorities, 
particularly with Pengeran Dipati and Kjahi Aria. According 
to Captain Reid, the commander of the Arabella who was sent 
by the English Company to buy pepper in Banjarmasin, Lim 
had frequent audiences with the Panambahan and his court 
“where he is in great estcome and makes a good interest on 
behalfe of his countrymen."^5 Sultan Suria Alam and some 
of his subordinates trusted Lim to. tho oxtent that on.many 
occasions, they delegated him os spokesman and representative 
at meetings with the European traders. For instance, it can 
be recalled that late in 1708 after Cunningham and his 
colleagues had failed to persuade the Banjarese to reopen 
trade with the English, Lim was sent to Batavia to inform 
the Governor-General that Suria Alam was keen , to renew
25. Ibid.
216
2 6
commercial ties with the Dutch Company. A headman, named
Wang Ling, was included in the committee established in
September 1711 to negotiate pepper prices with the Dutch
factors, Bosch and Indus, when they came to make purchases
27on the orders of the Batavian Council.
Although the success of the junk merchants in the 
pepper trade can be attributed to their willingness to pay 
high prices and to their rich cargoes, it cannot be doubted 
that a great deal of credit for their success went to the 
influential Chinese of Banjarmasin. When the English 
successfully reopened trade with the Banjarese in 1713 and 
obtained pepper cargoes for the Eagle Galley and the Borneo, 
the Chinese residents of Tartas, who were apprehensive of a 
British re-settlement on Banjar, were alleged to have nleft 
no stone unturned to blacken the name of the English before 
the Banjarese nobles" so thatkthey would be evicted once 
more and thereby leave the Chinese in peace to trade with 
the Banjarese.^ Reid observed that the Chinese fully 
recalled "ye former transactions / “of 1700-1707J  at Banjarmasin 
culminating and misrepresenting ye English on all occasions.
26. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 30 October 1708, 
KA 624. f. 758.
27. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693. 
f. 1176. ~
28. Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9).
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They are also very diligent in prepossessing the natives,
telling them ye English designe revenge and destruction to
their country, totally to subdew it and make them and their
children servants and slaves as they formerly attempted and
ye Dutch everywhere does. This wonderfully affects them
29and much obstructs converse and commerce . ..n
As long as their commercial interests were protected
and their stocks of pepper were bought by the nakhodas, the
Chinese residents of Banjarmasin were all in favour of the
withdrawal of the English. They depended largely on the
purchases made by the nakhodas, but once the junk trade was
stopped, eyen temporarily, the Chinese residents were in a
dilemma. In 1717, an Imperial Edict by Emperor Kang-Hsi was
issued forbidding all junks to leave China for the south-east
30
Asian ports of call. This prohibitive measure adversely 
affected the pepper trade of Banjarmasin, since no junk came 
to Tartas in 1717 or 1 7 1 8 . We.althy Chinese such as Ong
29. Ibid.
30. Governor of Macassar to the Batavian Council, 24 October 
1717, KA 1782. f. 1453. The emperor Kang Hsi had issued 
the edict as a retaliatory measure against the Dutch 
authorities at Batavia for regulating and lowering prices 
of Chinese tea, after tea purchases to the Butch had 
exceeded pepper sales to the junks as a result of the  ^
higher demand for tea in Europe. - Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic 
Trade, p. 216.
31. Glamann, op. cit.. p. 216.
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Gie Ko and Lim Kim Kb, had to find alternative means to 
dispose of their supplies which they had stocked uft for 
the junk owners, Ong, on behalf of the Banjarese and the 
Chinese merchants, tried to draw the Dutch Company into 
Banjarmasin by offering very good terms for the pepper 
purchases, viz, at 4-g- reals per pikul. It has already been 
observed that the Dutch were somewhat reluctant to re-establish 
trade at this stage when political conditions created by the 
Biaju-Banjarese war were still unsteady and they could 
obtain adequate stocks from Batavia and Palembang which were
qo
relatively more peaceful. ^ As a result, the pepper traders
were compelled to sell their supplies to the English who,
since 1713, had periodically paid visits to Banjarmasin
33while they were on their way to Canton.
A common method whereby the nakhodas managed to outwit 
their European rivals in the pepper trade was to send Chinese 
middlemen directly into the pepper areas of the uplands or 
the interior, such as the region of Negara, and get hold of 
the pepper before it was transported down-river to the ports 
where the English or the Dutch were waiting to make purchases<■ 
Hence, by the time the perahus reached the towns, only
32. Ibid.
33. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex. 28 
December 1720, LB (17), f. 453.
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limited quantities of pepper were available for sale to
the other traders. Even at the height of the Biaju rebellion
in 1712, when many pepper gardens were at a standstill,_the
junk merchants, through their agents, managed to obtain a
large consignment of pepper from the remaining pepper areas.
This distressed the Dutch factors, Bosch and Indus, who had
to return to Batavia with the Peter and Paul half-laden
with p e p p e r .34 jn 1713 after they had been foiled in an
attempt to acquire pepper cargoes by the English of the
Eagle Galley and the Borneo, who had been given the bulk
of the pepper crop for that season by Suria Alam, the junk
owners intensified their efforts by despatching more agents
to obtain the product from the interior. As a result, seven
35
^unks sailed away with full cargoes of pepper in 1714.
Owing to the numerous economic and political difficulties 
of trading in Banjarmasin, the Dutch authorities withdrew 
their vessels in 1713. Two years later, the Governor-General 
of Batavia, C» van Zwoll, received a surprise visit from 
Lim Kim Ko, the Capitan China, requesting him to renew trade
34, The Peter and Paul obtained 586^- pikuls or 73312-jr lbs, 
of pepper while the Lui.itpool and the Jambi, the two 
smaller boats which accompanied the former to 
Banjarmasin, sailed away empty-handed,- Original 
General Missive, 17 January 1713, KA 1706, f, 1265,
35, Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9).
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with the Banjarese." Lim stated that the Chinese of 
Banjarmasin resented the presence of the English in 1714, 
and wanted the Dutch to oust them from the region. In 
return, the Chinese pledged assistance to the Dutch in their 
pepper purchases. Evidently, the Capitan China wanted the 
Governor-General to believe that the Chinese inhabitants 
sincerely wished the Dutch to return to Banjarmasin. It is 
more likely that the Sultan, more than the Chinese, was keen 
that the Dutch should revive trade with the Banjarese so 
that he could obtain armed support against the Biajus and 
Bugis in the internal disturbances of the 17101 s. Though 
they disliked the English, the Chinese were used as an excuse 
to persuade the Governor-General to despatch ships to 
Banjarmasin. However, the Batavian Council was unmoved by 
such pleas and refused to revoke its policy of non-renewal 
of commerce in south-east Borneo.
Further evidence to testify that the Sultan,and not 
the Chinese inhabitants wanted the Dutch in Banjarmasin was 
recorded in 1728, two years after the Batavian Council had 
sanctioned fresh voyages to Banjarmasin. Although more than 
a decade had elapsed since assurances had been given by the 
Capitan China, the Council felt that the Dutch would still
36. Lim Kim Ko to the Governor-General of Batavia, 5 
November 1716, KA 1779. f. 57.
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be welcomed by the Chinese merchants. Unfortunately, the 
Dutch] factors .Landsheer and Broun, received little 
co-operation from the Chinese in their purchases of pepper
0 7
when they arrived in Kayu Tinggi in January 1727. It 
was only after Sultan Kamid Dulla had issued a public 
proclamation that all pepper stocks should be given to the 
Dutch factors that the Chinese were compelled to part with 
their pepper. Because of the Sultanfs injunction, the Dutch 
managed to procure 19785 pikuls of pepper in 1728 at the 
rate of 4£ reals per p i k u l . I n  that same year, no junk 
was present in Banjarmasin possibly because the nakhodas 
had received the news that only the Dutch would be allowed
QQ
to trade. The actions of the Dutch in engrossing the bulk 
of the pepper crop and the absence of the junks created 
great, discontent among the Chinese merchants. Therefore, 
the fact that the Chinese were eager to trade with the Dutch 
during this period can be definitely ruled out in favour of 
more apparent political motives on the part of the Panambahan, 
namely, Dutch protection and military aid against future 
Bugis invasions of Banjarmasin.
37. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 1727, 
KA 1949. f. 367.
38. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, 
f. 618.
39. . Ibid.
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There were various reasons why the Chinese merchants
disliked trading with the Dutch factors. Compared to the
high prices, viz. 6£ reals per pikul which the Chinese
q-o
nakhodas paid for pepper prior to 172S, the sums received
from the Dutch factors we re relatively much lower3 namely,
414£ reals per pikul. x Invariably, the level of profit for 
the merchants was much reduced when they were compelled to 
deliver their pepper to the Dutch. Through their long 
commercial dealings with the Banjarese and Chinese residents 
of Banjarmasin, the high rates offered for pepper by the 
junk merchants, even though they were often evaluated in 
terms of their products, had come to be regarded as the 
prevailing market pr^ce by the sellers. If other traders 
offered lower rates or were given the pepper at prices below the 
market price, then inevitably, there would be dissatisfaction 
among the sellers. The rate of 4£ reals paid by the Dutch 
suited only the Panambahan since he was very keen .to obtain 
Dutch military aid against the Bugis, but not his subjects 
who were connected with the pepper trade, -and whose immediate 
concern was for their own economic welfare. Moreover, with 
the abstention of the junks from Tartas in 1728, no Chinese
40. The price paid by the nakhodas for pepper ranged from 
5i to reals per pikul. The price of 6-J- reals was 
about the highest given at this time because of the 
competition the junk owners faced from he Dutch.
41. Landsheer and Broun to the Batavian Council, 3 June 
1727, KA 1849. f. 369.
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commodities uere brought along. This move affected the 
pepper traders and the retail merchants whose livelihood 
depended essentially on the products of China which were 
given to them by the junks for sale to the Banjarese and 
Biaju inhabitants of the interior
The success of the Dutch in loading pepper,in 1728
encouraged them to intensify their efforts to gain the
monopoly of the pepper trade for their Company.Landsheer and
Broun, the Dutch factors, realised that although no junk came
to Banjarmasin in 1728, it would not be long before the
nakhodas would appear on the commercial scene again, as
the Chinese required large quantities of pepper and were
eager to sell their products. In order to prevent the Chinese
merchants of the ports from storing pepper in their warehouses
for the nakhodas, the Dutch acted in a similar manner as
some of the Chinese agents by going direct into the uplands
42to obtain the crop. The Dutch action incurred the anger
of the Qhinese .middlemen’ who felt that this type of business
transaction was their prerogative and that the Dutch had
43intruded into their sphere of activity. They were happy 
to act as agents for the junk merchants because they were
42. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia,
18 April 1728, KA 1992. f. 7.
43. Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia,
5 October 1729, KA 2025. f. 294.
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paid for their efforts as middlemen. As for the Dutch, they 
had dispensed with the middlemen- by going into the pepper 
regions on their own. Consequently, the agents brought the 
issue before Lim, the Capitan China, who in turn appealed to 
Hamid Dulla not to offer the pepper at such low rates to 
the Dutch unless the Batavian Council definitely gave the 
Banjarese its word on creating a factory in Banjarmasin, for
A4
so far, the Dutch factors had been silent on the subject."
The attempts of the Dutch to obtain a monopoly of the 
pepper trade created two major difficulties for their 
Company. The first was the problem of pacifying the Chinese 
inhabitants who had become antagonistic towards the Dutch 
because of reduced revenue, and the obstruction of their 
free trade through the injunction of the Sultan. One of the 
influential Chinese merchants who was greatly affected by 
the Sultan*s compulsive measures was Lau Kim Kong, whom the 
Dutch Company alleged, attempted to discredit Landsheer, the 
chief factor, in front of Hamid Dulla. The Company pointed 
out that Lau had accused Landsheer of extortion and intimidation. 
Landsheer had vehemently denied the charge by stating that
44. The Dutch factors had stated that their Company coulcl 
not meet its obligations to build a factory in 
Banjarmasin until all the pepper commitments due from 
the Banjarese to the Dutch had been fulfilled.- 
Broyell and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
5 October 1729, KA 2025. f. 294.
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as Lau had only fulfilled part of the pepper supply on which 
he had paid cash advances, he had merely taken extra stocks 
without making additional payments.4^ It is probable that 
Lau and some of the other merchants could have made false 
charges in order to have the Dutch evicted, and in the 
event, encourage the nakhodas to return, as they had done to 
the English when the Arabella arrived in Bgnjarmasin in 1715. 
On the other hand, Landsheer could have acted in a high-handed 
manner towards the Chinese by compelling them to surrender 
their pepper supplies$ such compulsion was possibly regarded 
by the Chinese as extortion. However, the fact remains that 
wide discontent was caused by the sale of pepper at a cheap 
rate to the Dutch,
The other serious problem which faced the Dutch Company 
was the Increased smuggling trade around the creeks and 
coasts of Banjarmasin. The steady arrival of the junks, 
especially after the termination of the Biaju rebellion in 
1717, had drawn more and more Indonesian and Malay vessels 
to the Banjarese ports. Merchants from Macassar, Cambodia, 
Kutei, Semarang, Pulau Laut, Sumbawa, Bali and Trengganu 
brought their cloth, rice, rattans, birds1-nests, mats, wax 
and betlfl nuts to trade with the nakhodas for the usual and
45. Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, KA 2005, 
ff. 2684-85.
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popular Chinese goods. u Together with the ordinary
commercial transactions, a certain amount of illicit trading
was carried on between the Indonesians and the Chinese in
opium, cloth and pepper. When these Asian traders
discovered that none of the junks came to Banjarmasin in 1728
and their goods could not be sold, they resorted more to
smuggling with the Banjarese and the Chinese inhabitants of 
47Tartas. Instead of giving all the'r stocks of pepper to 
the Dutch, many Banjarese merchants furtively delivered large 
portions of their produce to the Indonesian vessels which 
thereafter transported the pepper to East Java, Trengganu 
or Macassar. A few intrepid Chinese merchants sent their 
pepper supplies in small boats to Batavia and sold them at 
6i reals per pikul to the Javanese merchants.48 In return, 
they carried large quantities of Indian cloth, opium and 
other Dutch goods back to Banjarmasin for sale to the 
inhabitants. Thus, the Dutch factors found that their 
consignments of these goods were never saleable in any of the
46. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
3 June 1727, KA 1949. f. 372.
47. Ibid.. f. 373.
48. Among these coastal vessels, one which sent 800 pikuls 
of pepper to Batavia in 1728 belonged to Lau Kim Kong 
while another was owned by Oey Hwan Ko, another Chinese 
merchant. - Original General Missive, 30 November 1729, 
KA 2005. f. 2679.
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Banjarese towns. " Furthermore, with the intrusion of the
Bugis, piracy increased off Tomborneo. Gonepatja, a Bugis
pirate, outwitted the pepper dealers bu stating that he had
come to load pepper on the orders of Joan Gobius, the
50
Governor of Macassar. As a result of all these illicit 
activities, the Dutch never managed to obtain very much 
pepper after 1728 and the amounts continued to decrease year 
after year until 1733, when the Dutch Company tried to impose 
severe regulations to impede the smuggling trade.
As the Dutch had expected, the order of the Psnr.mbahan
to restrict most of the pepper sales to them could not deter
the junks from returning to Banjarmasin. During the bumper
crop season of 1732 when the Dutch Company anticipated
large supplies of pepper from the Banjarese, the arrival of
51three junks frustrated its hopes. Once more, the pepper 
dealers reverted to their former practices by despatching 
most of their stocks to the junks at 5k to 5k reals per pikul. 
As a result, the Dutch boat Langerak under the command of 
P. Snippe and C. Braine obtained only 276,834 lbs. of pepper
49. Original General Missive, 30 December 1728, KA 1975, 
f. 662.
50. Landsheer and Broun to the Governor-General of Batavia, 
14 November 1728, KA 1992, f. 173.
51. Original General Missive, 25 October 1732, KA 2097 
f. 58.
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In 1732. Instead of rebuking his subjects for flouting his
orders v/hereby anybody who was found loading pepper to the
junks would have his supplies confiscated, Sultan Hamid Dulla
did not only remain silent,but refused to punish the
offenders, much to the annoyance of the Dutch. In July 1733
the Panambahan permitted two of the three junks which returned
53to Tartas to ship away 12,800 pikuls of pepper. As the 
production of the crop from the other pepper regions of 
Bantam and Palembang was still limited and deoiand exceeded 
supply, the Batavian authorities felt that the time had come 
for them to make more definite terms with Hamid Dulla over 
Dutch rights in the popper trade. The ruler had made repeated 
assurances to the Dutch Company that the junk owners would 
be unable to interfere with the pepper deliveries to its 
factors, but everytime the Dutch had been disappointed.
It has been noticed that as a last resort to gain the 
monopoly of the pepper trade, the Dutch Company persuaded 
Hamid Dulla and Pengeran Suria Dilaga to sign a contract on 
26 September 1733. The Dutch had hoped that if the ruler 
granted them the sole trading rights to the pepper trade,
52. Ibid.
53. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 10 August
1733, KA 2177. f. 2 2 .
54. Dutch-Banjarese contract, 26 September 1733, Stapel,
Corpus Diplomaticum, Vol. V, pp. 165-70.
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then inevitably9 the junk merchants would be ousted from
Banjarmasin. Alas, they were proven wrong, for the
Ponambahan agreed to exclude all other peoples from the
commerce of his kingdom, but not the Chinese. He argued that
it was still possible for the Batavian Council to get the
bulk of the pepper supplies if a restricted number of junks
were allowed to enter Banjarmasin. All along, his subjects
had depended on the junks to bring in valuable Chinese
articles. A great hue and cry would be raised against him
if he were to deprive the nakhodas of the opportunity of
56
trading in his land. It can be recalled that Marre and 
Brouwer, the Dutch factors, reluctantly agreed to the 
insertion of a clause which made it possible for the junks 
to visit Banjarmasin but it was explicitly stated that only 
one junk could load pepper not exceeding 4,000 pikuls 
annually.^ The factors, however, impressed on Hamid Dulla 
that Dutch ships should be stocked with pepper first at all
50
times before the nakhodas could load their junks.
55. Original General Missive, 31 October 1733, KA 2150, f. 116.
56. Ibid.
57. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 18 May 1734,
KA 2206. f. 3. The amount of 4,000 pikuls was not 
specified in the original contract which stated vaguely 
that the junk could have a full cargo of pepper, but 
was an amendment made by the Dutch early in 1734.
58. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 18 May 1734,
KA 2206. f. 3.
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Despite the fact that the Dutch had virtually become
the sole buyers of pepper except for the inclusion of one
junk under the contract of 1733, the Batavian authorities
were disgruntled over the outcome of the agreement. ^  They
considered it useless to exclude the other foreign merchants
from the pepper trade if the Chinese, their most aggressive
rivals, were permitted to participate in the commercial
transactions. Although the Panambahan had stipulated that
only one junk per year would be allowed to load pepper,
yet it was possible for just this one junk to inflict great
harm on Dutch commerce in Banjarmasin unless it was brought
under control. When the factors were out of sight, the
Banjarese could ship the pepper from their perahus into one
junk after another but still pretend that certain quantities
of the produce were due to the nakhodas before the maximum
60amount of 4,000 pikuls was reached. The only safeguard 
against such malpractices was that in emergency cases, the 
Dutch Company could confiscate contraband pepper in the 
absence of the Banjarese Shahbandrr. Therefore, it was 
vital for the factors to maintain a strict check on all the 
junks, otherwise abuses would occur to the great disadvantage
59, Resolution of the Batavian Council, 26 February 1734, 
KA 653, f. 507.
60, Ibid.
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of the Company. Consequently, a Dutch patrol boat, the
Veriangen, was stationed at the mouth of the Barito river
to supervise the shipment of pepper into the junks and to
6 ?prevent smuggling by interlopers. Before the junk could 
load any pepper, the nakhodas had to obtain a permit from 
the chief Dutch factor first. Otherwise, the commander of 
the Verlangen could detain the junk and confiscate the pepper 
aboard. This intended measure was similar to that practised 
by the Dutch in Bantam late in the 1610!s when they seized
S* Q
junks which were loaded with pepper for China.
For a short period, Marre and Brouwer were content to
see that although three junks were present at Tartas, they
did not make any surreptitious move to obtain pepper while
64-the Dutch vessels were stocked with cargoes. On his part, 
Hamid Dulla adhered to the regulations by instructing the 
pepper merchants not to ship pepper freely aboard the junks. 
The Dutch factors were confident that as long as the ruler 
maintained the contract terms of 1733, and the Verlangon
61. Ibid.
62. Instructions by Marre and Brouwer to the Verlangen,
10 May 1734, KA 2206, ff. 6-7.
63. Meilink-Hoelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence,
p. 253.
64. Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 13 Kay 1734,
KA 2206, f. 4.
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was not prohibited from patrolling the river, the Chinese 
would soon be disheartened and stay away from Banjarmasin,
65except for the despatch of a single vessel to buy the pepper.
The hopes of the Dutch were suddenly shattered by
Hamid Dulla in May 1734 when he unexpectedly announced that
a five per cent custom dues would be imposed on all in-coming
and out-going ships of Banjarmasin regardless of whether they
were Asian or European vessels, furthermore, another
quarter real would be added to the existent toll for every
66pikul of pepper purchased. The factors considered the new 
ruling a very unjust measure on the part of the ruler to 
increase the price of pepper, and thereby eliminate the few 
advantages which the Company could derive from the contract. 
Also, with the imposition of a five per cent toll on all 
internal traffic, less porahus would transport pepper to 
them, as the cultivators and the Banjarese merchants would 
have a reduced incentive to dispose of their crop even 
during a good harvest season.^
Before Marre and Brouwer had recovered from the shock 
of the royal announcement, Pengeran Marta Negara informed 
the factors that the Sultan had requested them not to hinder
65. Ibid.
6 6 . Ibid.. f. 9.
67. Ibid.
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the movement of the nakhodas in collecting pepper and to
68
withdraw the Verlangen. When they refused by declaring 
that Hamid Dulla was acting contrary to the regulations of 
the contract of 1733 by issuing such an order, two court 
favourites of the Sultan, Kjahi Warga and Juregan Bosji, 
proceeded to deliver pepper into three junks and the guards 
of the Verlangen were unable to take any. action against them.
In a situation where they were under the constant 
surveillance of the patrol boat and where they could not 
collect pepper, the nakhodas had turned to the Panambahan for 
help. With the aid of Kjahi Aria and Kjahi Ingabcy, who 
were influential Banjarese nobles, the Chinese managed to 
persuade Hamid Dulla to relax his orders and let their junks 
obtain pepper. The junk owners had realised that if they 
tried to acquire pepper on their own, the Dutch would 
confiscate their supplies by treating them as contraband. 
Therefore, the only way to attain their end was to send the 
two Banjarese favourites along in order to avoid a clash 
with the Dutch factors. Consequently, in the bad pepper 
season of 1734 when the price of pepper rose to 8 reals per 
pikul, the Dutch received only 500 pikuls while the junks
6 8 . Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 17 July 1734, 
KA 2206. f. 17.
69. Original General Missive, 30 November 1734, KA 2190_, 
f. 1275.
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7 0shipped away 1,200 pikuls.
It is difficult to imagine how the wealthy Chinese 
merchants could tolerate the regulations of 1733 for long 
even if the ruler had not taken sides with the nakhodas.
As in former tines, the Chinese were highly dissatisfied 
when they were compelled to deliver their pepper which was 
far below the market rates, especially during n year of poor 
production. Once more, they had used, their position and 
wealth to influence the decision of the Panambahan, Part 
of the blame for the failure to make the contract of 1733 
workable lies with the Dutch factors. If they had not been 
so rigid in fixing the pepper rates, instead of attempting 
to establish the same price of 4 reals per pikul as was 
stipulated in the old treaty of 1664, the Dutch Company would 
have succeeded in compelling the Banjarese to deliver pepper 
to them. Once competitive prices were set up, the Banjarese 
and Chinese merchants would not have been so keen to give 
their pepner to the junks. Moreover, the reluctance of the 
Company to erect a factory or pagar in Banjarmasin according 
to the contract terms, added to the odds against the Dutch 
in making the ruler steer away from his promises, Practically 
all the Dutch factors, Broyell, Landsheer, Broun and Snippe, 
had made it clear to the Batavian Council that if it wanted
70. Ibid.
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to carry on a successful trade in Banjarmasin, it had to
construct a factory or pagar«, as the Panambahan had made
persistent pleas to this effect in order to obtain protection
71
against the Bugis. The Dutch Company, despite its desire 
to continue trade, was not prepared to undertake such a 
building project as it considered that a factory was useless 
and involved the Company too much in the internal politics
72
of Banjarmasin when the explicit purpose was merely trade*
On their side, the junk owners had maintained the friendship
at court by a frequent offer of gifts to the Banjarese ruler
an by a readiness to pay high prices when they faced stiff
73competition on the- pepper market.
Even before a year had elapsed, the contract of 1733 
had become a dead letter to the Banjarese. The failure of 
the Dutch to obtain the pepper monopoly of Banjarmasin 
became more apparent in September 1734 with the death of 
Hamid Dulla. The new Panambahan, Sultan Tamjoed Dulla, was 
unsympathetic towards the Dutch as he firmly believed in a 
strong Sino-Banjaresc trade since his subjects could derive
71, Landsheer, Broyell and Broun to the Batavian Council,
23 December 1729, KA 2012. f . 6390. Snippe and Kamerbeek 
to the Batavian Council, .8 May 1730, KA 2055,' f.' 87.
72. Resolution of the Batavian Council, 23 December 1729,
KA 645. f. 209; Original General Missive, 8 December 
1732, KA 2101. f. 2197.
73. Original General Missive, 15 January 1712, KA 1693. f. 1176. 
Marre and Brouwer to the Batavian Council, 17 ‘July 1734,
KA 2206, f. 17.
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more profits from that commercial sphere.. The main objective
of the Dutch Company to oust the Chinese junks from
Banjarmasin had not been fulfilled. The suppression of
the junk trade had merely led the nakhodas to moke more
determined attempts to load their vessels with pepper. After
a prolonged stay of two more years in which the Dutch had
limited pepper cargoes, the Batavian authorities once again
withdrew all their ships and gave up the idea of making
Banjarmasin one of their chief supply points for pepper in 
74the East. The junk trade was left to thrive in Banjarmasin 
without any Dutch interference until 1747 when the Dutch 
Company compelled the Sultan to sign a new treaty giving 
it the monopoly of the pepper trade. The Company also decided 
to construct a factory in Banjarmasin then,as it realised 
that the dictum that "force prevailed more than persuasion11 
was true, if it intended to maintain its control over the 
pepper trade and deprive the Chinese nakhodas of lucrative 
pepper cargoes.
74. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, 
f. 1286.
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CHAPTER VII 
ENGLISH ACTIVITIES: 1713-1747
In 1713 the English East India Company sent its first 
two ships to Banjarmasin after a lapse of six years in a 
fresh attempt to trade with the Banjarese. The Directors 
hoped that their deficit in the pepper stocks from Malabar 
would be remedied by large exports from Banjarmasin. They 
felt that it was possible to convince the Panambahan, Suria 
Alam, of their fervent desire to reopen commercial relations 
with his state, and in the process,recoup at least part of 
their losses incurred in the Banjarese coup of 1707.^
B. Swartz and J. Becher were appointed as first, and D. Beeckman 
and T. Lerves as second, supercargoes of the Eagle Galle.v and 
the Borneo.
Unlike the former expeditions where the Company permitted 
its employees to risk their own capital in some private stock 
trade, this policy had been altered by 1713. The Directors 
realised that private trade by their factors had adversely 
affected the Company by reducing its profits when the 
supercargoes advanced their own interests before those of 
their employers. In order to reduce the amount of private
1. E.I.C, to the supercargoes of the Eagle Galley and the 
Borneo, 14 August 1713, CM {45), f.451.
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trade carried on by their servants to a minimum, the Directors 
introduced the practice of granting to the supercargoes a 
commission of five per cent on the total value of the
p
merchandise. Each ship xras no longer to form a separate
venture, with the accounts kept independently, but henceforth,
the supercargoes of both ships were to constitute a Council
on their arrival at Banjarmasin. To give added 'ncentive*
to the factors to return the Eagle Galley and the Borneo to
England during the westerly monsoon via the Straits of Bali
or Lombok, and not Batavia, the factors were promised an
extra fifty guineas if they returned by the scheduled route.
Otherwise, if they sailed via Batavia, the supercargoes would
only be paid a commission on the net, and not the gross value
3of the merchandise. Moreover, if they met any Dutch ship 
on the high seas, the supercargoes were not to divulge their 
destination but to state that they were proceeding to 
Bencoolen.
2* Ibid. The 5% commission was shared by the two or three 
factors on each ship in the following proportions; 
equally, or 3% and 2% in the case of two factors, and 
2j$, l i 1% in the case of three factors. The commission 
was later increased to 6% m
3. The Directors intended the expedition through the Straits 
of Bali to serve as an experiment so that if the 
supercargoes discovered that the route was a safe one, 
then all Company ships could make use of it in future and, 
therefore, by-pass Batavia. -23 September 1713, LB (15), 
ff, 85-91.
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As in the previous voyages, the factors were instructed 
not to advance money to the Banjarese when buying pepper but 
to pay for the product only when it was brought to the scale 
at the weighing house. If this practice was not acceptable 
to the Banjarese, then the English could advance a small 
sum to the pepper merchants provided sufficient pledges in 
the form of gold or jewels were made,^ Although the Directors 
were eager to renew trade with the Banjarese, nevertheless, 
they felt that they were treading on unsteady ground. They 
still remembered the unsuccessful attempt of Cunningham and 
his Council to re-establish a foothold on Banjarmasin in 
1708, They reminded the factors of the Eagle Galley and 
the Borneo that it was possible that.Sihe Banjarese would still 
demand $3,000 (regarded as an old debt) from them, as they 
had in 1707, before they were allowed to resume commercial 
connections. If this was so, the factors should remind the 
Banjarese that an outstanding debt of $20,000 was still)owed 
to the English. If the Banjarese refused to listen to them, 
then the; English should pay this initial sum. In addition, 
the willingness of the Directors to pay further duties to the 
Banjarese indicated clearly their desire to resume trade at 
Banjarmasin, which in itself reflected their contemporary 
difficulty in procuring sufficient stocks of pepper from
4. E.J,C* to the supercargoes of the Eagle Galley and 
the Borneo, 23 September 1713, LB (15), f. 90.
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Indio.5
With their cargoes of silver worth.‘£4,315 and £4,313
respectively, the Eagle Galley and Borneo sailed to
Banjarmasin in 1713. On arrival in Tartas, the factors
discovered that the Banjarese still harboured resentment
against the English. The Banjarese informed the factors that
they did not regret expelling the English from tneir factory
in 1707 "because there was always such enmity, and inveterate
hatred between them, that the natives declared they never
carryfd to them the tenth part of what they did us 5 buipg
6willing to have as little to do with them as possible."
Even the Banjarese nobles, Kjahi Raden Tuka and Kjahi Chitra
TJdn, hesitated to welcome the supercargoes until they had
been assured that the factors were private merchants and
7
not servants of the English East India Company.
Initially, the supercargoes were unable to persuade 
the Banjarese officials to give them any pepper os both sides 
could not agree on the price of five Spanish dollars per 
pikul insisted upon by Pengeran Purba. Nevertheless, after 
further negotiations whereby the English promised to deliver
5. Minutes of the Court of Directors, 22 July 1713, 
DM (45), f. 438.
6 . Beeckman, A Voyage to Borneo„ p. 101.
7. Ibid.
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twenty muskets end two barrels of gunpowder to the Panambahan 
to assist him in the current Bugis-Banjorese war* the 
Banjarese authorities agreed to sell 4*000 pikuls of pepper 
to the English at the rate of 4-J- Spanish dollars per pikul, 
while an additional suku or quarter dollar per pikul was
o
also charged os customs dues,0
Evidently, Sultan Suria Alam was keen ’toreceive armed
support fronr the English in order to help him to subdue the
Biajus in the civil war. His overtures to the Dutch Company
for arms and troops between 1711 and 1713 were unsuccessful
as the former did not want to be politically involved in
Banjarmasin. Therefore the Sultan had to resort to the
English. Lnder such circumstances, the topic of military
assistance was raised by the Banjarese authorities whenever
they had an audience with the supercargoes. For example,
at a subsequent meeting with the English at Kayu Tinggi in
July 1714, the ruler insisted on more arms to fight his
enemies. Except for one occasion when the crew members gave
military support to the Banjarese, the factors generally
declined on the grounds that they needed all the men and
ammunition they had for their own defence against any piratical
9
attack on their return voyage.
Ibid., pp. 65-67.
9. Ibid., p. 77.
In their commercial transactions, the supercargoes
rented a small wooden house as a godown for the storage of
pepper which was delivered to them by pernhus in bales of
four to five pikuls at a time. As soon as the pepper had
been weighed with a daching, payment was made to the Banjarese.
At other times, the English went direct to the merchants'
warehouses to procure pepper which they shipped to their
boats in hired perahus.^ ~Q Although a great taount of pepper
had been promised to them by the ruler, the English found
that delivery was slow and that only small quantities could
be obtained. Tiro reasons accounted for the sluggish despatch
of pepper, namely the upland war between the Biajus and the
Banjarese, and the monsoonal rains, which hampered production
11as well as delivery of the crop.
In addition, the supercargoes encountered several 
other problems. Instead of obtaining a steady supply of 
pepper, the English found that most of the stocks were 
hoarded by the Chinese merchants of Tartas who intended to 
sell them at' a higher price to the junk-traders who came in 
February or March of each year. Moreover, some Banjarese 
had hesitated to give the English further supplies when the 
factors paid two-thirds in Spanish dollars and one-third in
10. Swartz to the E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 822
11. Ibid.
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pillar dollars, for as usual, the Banjarese wanted all
1 p
financial transactions to be conducted in Spanish currency, ^
As a result, by the end of September 1714, a short while
before the Eagle Gnlle.V and the Borneo left Tartas, less
than one quarter of the stipulated amount of 4000 pikuls. had
been sold to the English, Consequently, the Borneo had to
13retrun to England without a full cargo. Despite the Sultan’s
protestations that he would compel his subjects to sell
their pepper to the supercargoes under threat of seizing all
their stocks, Beeckmon and his men realised that it was
impossible to dispatch both ships with full cargoes by
mid-October. Only the Eagle Galley was fully stocked when
14it left Banjarmasin on 10 December 1714.
Althaugh the pepper supplies brought back by the
Eagle Galley and the Borneo were not fully up to the Director’s
expectations, they continued to send ships to Banjarmasin
to purchase pepper. This was because they become convinced
that subsequent trade missions would be more successful after
they had heard that the Banjarese were willing to grant the
15
main pepper trade to the English Company. T0 ensure that
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Minutes of the court of Directors, 22 February 1715, 
CM (46), f. 581.
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the Banjarese would not expel the English again, Swartz, the
first supercargo of the Eagle Galley« had advised future
factors to play on the fear of an Ehglish invasion of
Banjarmasin. He considered that if the civil war between
the Biajus and Banjarese was continuing, a more effective
guarantee for the English would be to pretend that they had
many offers of military assistance from the Bugir commanders,
who were currently supporting the Biajus against the 
16Banjarese. This was a very odd way for Swartz to reassure 
the English as this sort of threat would only make the 
Banjarese more suspicious of the English. Nevertheless, 
Swartz felt that it would be a workable plan because he was 
confident that the Banjarese authorities could not afford to 
wage a war with the English at this stage when most of their 
troops were deployed in curbing the internal disturbances.
Despite the optimism .of Swartz, the voyage of the
Arabella to Banjarmasin in 1715 was unsuccessful. As soon
as the Banjarese nobles met Captain Reid and. his men, they
insisted that the Arabella should sail up to Tartas before
17any commercial transactions could be begun. Apparently, 
the Panambahan wanted the English vessel to act as a bulwark 
against any Bugis invasion of Tartas. Reid, however, asked
16. Swartz to E.I.C., 14 March 1715, LB (15), f. 823.
17. Reid to E.I.C., 4 May 1715, JFR (9), no page.
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to be allowed to conduct trade at the kuala of the Barito
river if he paid all the port charges. The Banjarese
authorities refused on the ground that Suria Alam had issued
instructions that all foreign merchants could only procure
IBpepper if their ships were anchored in Tartas harbour.
Reid indicated that he would agree to bring the ship
to Tartas if he could purchase pepper at a similar price of
4| Spanish dollars per pikul as the Eagle Galley and the 
19
Borneo« The Banjarese authorities objected and claimed 
that they had no power to fix pepper prices in a free port 
like Tartas. Moreover, the Panambahan could not restrict 
the sale of pepper to particular individuals or bodies. In 
a situation where free trade existed, it was impossible for 
the ruler to attempt to impose his authority on his people*
The Biajus had rebelled because the nobility had tried to 
interfere with the pepper supplies and custom dues. The 
Banjarese officials added that the English could dictate 
prices to the pepper merchants during the time of Captain 
Barre because they were powerful then and had a well-garrisoned 
establishment at Banjar. Since the English were merely 
ship-based traders now, they had to listen to the Banjarese 
for a change, namely, to conduct trade and pay according
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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2 0to what was stipulated by the Banjarese traders. Reid was
not convinced by these arguments and insisted on meeting the
penper traders to enter into direct negotiations. He felt
that it was unfair for the Banjarese authorities to grant
commercial privileges only to the Chinese junk merchants
and not to the English. The Chinese could reside in Tartas
and move freely to ply their trade in exchange for pepper,
but the English could purchase the product in a piecemeal
fashion from year to year as they no longer had any resident
21
to protect their trading rights at Banjar. In other words, 
Reid refused to abide by the Banjarese regulations unless 
the English were given a permanent residence and a guaranteed 
annual supply of pepper.
Shortly after, the Banjarese nobles re-attempted to
persuade Reid to bring his ship up to Tartas to obtain pepper
supplies. On this occasion, however, Reid had grave doubts
about whether he would be able to secure any pepper, since
the Pengeran had already informed him that the junk-merchants
had obtained the contract for the whole pepper crop that
season, thus making what little pepper there was in the
22lowlands,scarce and expensive. Reid felt that even if he
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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were willing to pay the same pepper rates as the Chinese,
namely, at nine or ten Spanish dollars per pikul, he was
doubtful of getting more than twenty pikuls because the
Banjarese always tried to exchange pepper for Chinese wares.
,TTo what purpose then,11 Reid argued, "to bring ye ship over
a long dangerous barr, in a tempestuous time of the year and
height of a violent monsoon, hazard ship and treasure, lose
a great deal of time in getting out again, be obliged to pay
all port charges which is considerable, and ye only thing I
found they drove at, as they had before declared that they
intermeddle with nought but customs and port charges, and all
these without the least prospect of any pepper or other
23advantage thereby."
After his two futile attempts at conducting negotiations 
with the Banjarese nobles, Reid departed from Banjarmasin 
without obtaining a single grain of pepper. This was because 
he did not comply with the demands of the Banjarese 
authorities; doubtless, he was keeping rigidly to the advice 
of the directors that he should only trade with the Banjarese 
merchants off-shore. In the case of the Bagle Galley and 
the Borneo, the Panambahan had allowed the supercargoes to 
anchor their ships in the Banjar Bay, but this example was 
not repeated when the Arabella arrived in the area. Moreover,
23. Ibid.
248
the Shahbandar was non-committal when Reid requested that
two or three English merchants should make a permanent residence
at Tartas in order to facilitate Anglo-Banjarese commercial 
24relations.
Because he had failed in accomplishing his iaission, Reid
declared that the English Company*s trade in Banjarmasin was
25"irretrievably lost." He saw no other way for the Company 
to re-establish a settlement there except by using arms to 
subjugate the inhabitants. Since Barre and Landon, who had 
a small force but superior weapons, could dominate the 
Banjarese, there could be no doubt of the Company's success 
if it were willing to risk the venture. He pointed out that 
it was unnecessary to have a large army in Banjarmasin,
"but a small and well prepared </one7 , which would infallibly 
reduce the place, settle and secure the whole trade of that 
island."^
It is open to speculation why the Banjarese authorities 
did not supply pepper to the Arabella and allow it to be 
stationed in the Bay of Banjar. It has been observed that 
although Suria Alam did not see eye to eye with the English 
Company, nevertheless, he expected the factors to supply him
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
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with arms. Beeckman and Swartz had disappointed him by not 
furnishing him with sufficient military aid. Therefore, when 
the Arabella arrived, he was not very eager to make any 
further move to befriend the English.
Another possible reason for the unresponsive attitude
of the Banjarese towards Reid was the Chinese merchants who
exercised considerable influence over the Banjarese court.
According to the Governor of Macassar, the imposition of
one suku on every pikul of pepper as port charges on all
27European vessels was the Chinese Capitan*s idea. Evidently, 
the Chinese inhabitants of Tartas did not want the English 
to settle in Banjarmasin because of their bitter experiecce 
with them prior to 1708. The English had not only compelled 
the Sultan to grant them the monopoly of the pepper trade 
then, but had also severely checked the junk-trade and exacted 
heavy tolls from the nakhodas. Very likely, if the suku tax 
had been suggested by the Chinese Capitan, it was a 
retaliatory move against the English.
The factors of the Hester and Thistieworth also 
encountered several problems when they tried to purchase
27. The Governor of Macassar obtained the information from 
a Bugis inhabitant of Banjarmasin. - Governor of 
Macassar to the Batavian Council, 30 November 1716,
KA 1782. f. 1450.
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28
pepper in Tartas in 1716. Although it was customary to
give presents to the Banjarese chiefs, the English refused
to give more than was thought necessary even when they were
cajoled by the chiefs. This provoked Kjahi Aria, who
administered and fixed the pepper rates, not to give any
29rebate to the factors. Even when they approached the pepper 
merchants directly, the English could not obtain any reduction 
in the pepper price of 6t Spanish dollars per pikul, as the 
merchants had been forewarned by Kjahi Aria that all offenders 
would be severely punished. Furthermore, the English had 
to pay m  extra suku for every pikul of pepper purchased.
These custom dues differed considerably from the rate of 300 
dollars for every ship prior to 1707. The factors calculated 
that a ship weighing over 200 tons now had to pay treble the 
original amount. In addition to these high duties, the 
Shahbandar forced the English to pay an extra sum of 100 
dollars for anchorage dues.^l
The Directors could never predict what action the 
Banjarese would take when the next Company ship arrived. The
28. Minutes of the Court of Directors, 20 February 1716, 
Cl (46), f. 281.
29. E.I.C. to supercargoes of the Middlesex. 28 December 
1720, LB (17), f. 446.
30. Ibid.
31. E.I.C. to the Committee of Correspondence, 27 August 
1718, Reference to the Committee of Correspondence  ^
(2 ), f. 85.
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Banjarese could behave in a perfectly calm and friendly
manner one moment and change to complete antagonism the
next* as happened in the case of the King George which sailed
to Banjarmasin in 1719. Although C. Small of the Thistleworth
informed the Directors that the Banjarese had indicated that
they wanted the English to trade at Tartas, yet six weeks
32elapsed before any pepper was given to the King George.
After one hundred tons of pepper had been supplied and the 
factors were still awaiting for more to come, the Banjarese, 
numbering about one thousand and five hundred, under the 
command of Pengeran Purba, suddenly .(launched an attack on 
the English ship in the harbour. The English managed to 
escape in the nick of time at night and came to Tomborneo 
roads after crossing the Ban jar Ba tv.
The factors could not explain this sudden outbreak of
hostility on the part of the Banjarese, for all along, the
supercargoes of the King George had pretended that they were
34private traders and not employees of the Company. It is 
possible that the Banjarese suspected the English to be 
Comptny merchants* They must have realised that if the 
supercargoes were private merchants as they claimed, they
32* E.I.C* to the supercargoes of the Godfreyq 29 November 
1721, LB (18), f. 57.
33. Ibid*
34. Ibid.
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would only conduct ship-based trading instead of requesting
& permanent residence. The Sultan would probably have
allowed the English to remain in Banjarmasin if they had niot
refused his overtures to obtain military aid. When the
English refused to do so, the ruler decided to launch an
attack on the King George in order to oust the English from
his land. This bitter experience of the supercargoes served
as a warning to the Directors when they remarked that the
Banjarese were ,Tvery tricking and deceitful tho1 fawning,
and in appearance both in language and behaviour very submissive
and complaisant. Experience has taught the English ^that7
they are very vindictive and will conceal their resentments
35till they have a fair opportunity to do mischief.”
The Directors were, however, undaunted by the attack 
on the King George and subsequently risked more ships to 
Banjarmasin. This persistence of the English Company in 
advocating a policy of continued trade with Banjarmasin was 
evidently the result of its dissatisfaction over the station 
at Bencoolen or Fort Marlborough which was established in 
1685 as the headquarters of the English pepper trade.
Bencoolen was badly situated to have much commercial or 
strategic importance. It was not in the direct route of the 
China-bound vessels to serve as an intermediate station, and
35. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 
1720, LB (17), f. 448.
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was also too far from India to act as a revictualling and
refitting eentre for ships engaged in the Indian trade.
Although heavy financial losses were incurred in upkeeping
the settlement, nevertheless, the Directors were determined
to maintain it in the face of intensive Dutch rivalry in the
Archipelago. They were of the opinion that Bencoolen should
he used as a bulwark against Dutch attempts to secure the
monopoly of the pepper trade in .'the Malayan region. The
following comment testifies to the Directors1 anti-Dutch
sentiments: nThis financial loss we cannot, we must no
longer bear. It would be much better to quit the whole
coast, and so we should have done before this were it not
that we consider it a national benefit to secure a footing
in the pepper settlements to prevent the Dutch engrossing 
36
the whole.!f Therefore, it is understandable why the Company 
refused to surrender its ventures in Banjarmasin^ it 
fervently hoped that the- port would offer the commercial 
advantages which Bencoolen lacked.
The Middlesex« which sailed to Banjarmasin in 1720, 
was followed by the James and Mary., the Godfrey and the 
Princess Amelia in 1721, 1722 and 1724 respectively. The 
supercargoes were bound to the English Company by the same 
system as that of the mid-1710's whereby they could obtain
36. E.I.C. to Council at Fort Marlborough, 14 September 
1720, LB (17), f. 450.
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six per cent commission on the gross'Cargoes brought to 
37
England, The Directors did not raise any objections to
the increase in the pepper price •from $4*2- to $6 i-per pikul
between 1713 and 1716 at Banjarmasin. In fact, they ordered
their employees to pay the rate stipulated by the Banjarese
merchants because they felt that If they could offer a
higher price to the Banjarese merchants than the other foreign
or separate stock merchants, they could outbid and discourage
38
their competitors. This interesting new approach raises 
the question of why the Company should have been more liberal 
than formerly inthe jpayments for pepper. It is conceivable 
that the Directors realised that new opportunities were 
present for an expanding trade in pepper far the English 
Company at Banjarmasin,
When the Chinese junks were prohibited from the south-
39
east Asian ports under an Imperial edict of 1717, the English
*
Company wanted to take advantage of the situation by breaking 
into the pepper market of Banjarmasin, The Directors 
conjectured that in the absence of the Chinese, the Banjarese 
would face an economic crisis if their pepper stocks were 
not sold to any prospective buyer. There was even a possibility
37. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex, 28 December 
1720, LB (17), f. 453.
38. Ibid.
39. Refer to p. 217.
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that prices would be reduced in the event of unsold pepper 
supplies. It was true that the pepper merchants could offer 
garbled pepper to the Dutch, but at this juncture, even the 
latter were not very interested in trading at Tartas or Kayu 
Tinggi. Thus, if the English factors wanted to obtain pepper 
at this stage, they were likely to succeed. In their 
instructions to their employees, the Directors reminded them 
that they should not reveal their plans to the Dutch 
authorities at Batavia in case they were obstructed on the 
high seas.^
During this period, the Directors were interested in
shipping pepper from Banjarmasin to China and not England.
They made it clear to the supercargoes that it did not
matter whether pepper was purchased at Banjarmasin or Batavia
41if the price was about the same. Another surprising addition
was that regardless of whether the ship obtained a full cargo
or not, it had to leave Banjarmasin by 31 July for Canton
where the factors could dispose of their pepper cargo to the
Chinese traders. On their departure from Canton, the factors
should purchase Chinese goods for sale at Mokha in exchange
42
for well-garbled coffee for Europe. Instead of directing
40. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Middlesex. 28 
December 1720, LB (17), f. 453
41. E.I.C, to the supercargoes of the Princess Amelia. 30 
September 1724, LB (19), ff. 293-95.
42. Ibid., f.f 295.
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their pepper imports to England, the English had to channel 
their cargo to China simply because many Chinese merchants 
who were forbidden to make any outward voyage, were willing 
to pay high rates for pepper which was brought to their 
shores. Thus, this explains the intention of the Directors 
to focus their attention on China, and not on the European 
market.
In 1723/4 the return of the Chinese, and about two years 
later, the arrival of the Dutch in Banjarmasin put an abrupt 
stop to the ambitious plans of the English Company to open 
extensive trade with the Banjarese, The few private English 
ships which called at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi hardly received 
any attention from the pepper merchant s . T h e  latter either 
delivered their cargoes to the Dutch factors so as to gain 
support to defend their land against the Bugis invasions, or 
to the Chinese nakhodas who had re-established trade with 
Banjarmasin after the royal edict had been revoked at the 
death of Emperor Kang-Hsi.^ It was not until a decade later 
that the English managed to trade in the area again after 
the Batavian government had abandoned all its expeditions
43, Original General Missive, 30 November 1725, KA 1911, 
f. 606.
44. Although the Imperial Edict was revoked at the end of 
1722, it took some time for the junks to reorganise 
their expeditions to South-east Asia. ' " **
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to Banjarmasin. This was because the Butch were frustrated 
by the decreasing annual supply of pepper although the 
commercial agreement of 1733 had stipulated that the main 
pepper trade would be given only to the Dutch Company,
Another reason why the Butch abandoned Banjarmasin in 1737 
was probably due to a shortage of current silver cash at 
Batavia which had led to the discontinuation of the direct
AC.
trade in tea between the Netherlands and Canton.
Although the Banjarese authorities would have preferred 
to transact business with the Chinese rather than the 
Europeans, their wishes were overruled by the Panambahan. 
Motivated more by political interests, the Sultan was anxious 
to reopen commercial relations with the English. Evidently, 
if Tamjeed Dulla wanted to maintain his balance of power in 
the absence of the Dutch, since the Dutch-Banjarese treaty 
of 1733 had proven ineffective, he had to depend on English 
military assistance. Thus, he was obliged to invite the 
English East India Company to trade in his land. It was true 
that the notorious Bugis leaders, such as Daing Mamantuli, 
had been expelled, but the insecurity and dangers of external 
raids were still present as large numbers of Bugis continued
45, Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, 
f . 1289.
46. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740, (Copenhagen, 
1958), p. 24(51
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to commit piracies off the shores of Banjar. internally, 
the ruler could never be sure when one of his jealous and 
discontented relatives or court aides would stage a coup d *etat. 
Sultan Tamjeed Dulla was only acting as regentfor his
40
nephew, Mohammed, Until such time as the latter ascended 
the throne, Tamjeed Dulla still had to contend with the 
numerous chieftains, who were envious of his position and of 
the control which he exercised on the young Mohammed, He 
apparently felt that there was less likelihood of threats to 
his personal safety if the -English were in his land.
It should be noted that this was the first time since
the abortive English settlement of Banjar in 1707 that the
English Company was officially invited to trade in Banjarmasin
by the Fanambahan. The Company voyages between 1713 and
491726 had been made to appear as private ventures. Late in
1737, however, the picture changed when Tamjeed Dulla made
50
the first approach to the English Company since 1707, The 
Directors, though surprised that the Dutch factors had left
47. Original General Missive, 31 December 1736, KA 2254, 
f. 1289.
48. Mohamed was the son of the deceased Panambahan, Sultan 
Hamid Dulla. - Marre and Brouwer to the Governor- 
General of Batavia, 9 July 1734, KA 2206„ f. 13.
49. Refer to p. 240.
50. The Panambahan*s letter reached the Directors in 
October 1737. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the 
Prince of Wales, 12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 268.
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Banjarmasin so hurriedly in that year, accepted the ruler*s
invitation to trade by despatching the Prince of Wales in 
s i
1738.
Undoubtedly, the Company was pleased to re-establish 
relations with the Panambahan for two reasons. First, it was 
given fresh opportunities to obtain pepper which i^ as still 
very much in demand in the Asian and European markets* 
Secondly, the Directors were of the opinion that the pepper
trade of Banjarmasin was "of great consequence especially in
52enlarging and improving the China trade." The sale of 
large supplies of pepper to the inland merchants of Canton 
who normally found difficulty in procuring sufficient stocks 
from the junk nakhodas, would reduce the drain of bullion
from England and provide a satisfactory medium of exchange
53for the purchase of Chinese luxury goods.
With regard to the first objective, the Directors were 
eager to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the 
absence of the Dutch to make Banjarmasin one of their chief 
pepper markets .in south-east Asia, The steady demand for
51. Ibid., f. 269.
52. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 
1738, SFH (9), f. 8 .
53. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales. 
12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 270.
pepper encouraged the Directors to proceed with their plans
in developing the pepper trade of Banjarmasin. To give an
indication of the pepper price on the London market, white
pepper, considered to he the most expensive of all types of
pepper, was sold at a constant price of about 3.5s. per lb.
in the 1720*s and 1730*s, compared to the rate of 2%5s. per
54
lb. in the 17001 s. At Banjarmasin, the English suggested
to the Sultan that if the Dutch Company had not complied with
the Dutch-Banjarese contract of 1733 by leaving Banjarmasin,
then Tamjeed Dulla should not be obliged to the Dutbh anymore
55and could sell pepper to whoever he wished. If a "well
established trade" based upon " a well grounded mutual
confidence" between ’the Banjarese and the English could be
developed, then, claimed the Directors, "we might besides ye
immediate benefit thereof, have a continual account of all
transactions in those eastern parts, and thereby further
enlarge our commerce with Malays of all sorts as occasion may 
56offer." With these two objectives in mind, the Company was 
prepared to send two ships each year to Banjarmasin, and even
54. White pepper is used as the example since brown pepper 
is not listed on the price list. - Lord Beveridge,
Prices and Wages in England from the twelfth'to'the 
nineteenth century. Vol. IV (London, 1965)V Appendix II 
(on Price Relatives).
55. Council at Fort Marlborough to J. Hurlock, 31 December 
1738, SFR (9), f. 5.
56. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 1738, 
SFR (9), f. 9.
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advised its factors to bribe the Banjarese authorities if 
necessary m  order to purchase large stocks of pepper.
When they reached Tartas late in 1738, the factors of
the Prince of Wales were warmly received by the Banjarese
authorities and were given a full cargo of pepper. The Jane,
which was sent to Banjarmasin in the same year, was treated 
58likewise.' The Marlborough and the Walpole, however, were 
not so fortunate. Captain J. Hurlock, the chief factor of 
the Marlborough, had negotiated for a cargo of 2,000 pikuls 
of pepper for every Company ship at six Spanish dollars a
59
pikul inclusive of custom taxes from Tamjeed Dulla in mid-1739. 
Nevertheless, the Banjarese, after supplying only 820 pikuls, 
stopped delivery to the English, and started to load pepper
60
into the two junks which had arrived from Canton and Ningpo. 
Possibly, the Sultan had realised that his overtures to the 
English in 1737 had produced no political results and thus 
he was inclined to favour the Chinese again. When the 
supercargoes asked him for an explanation, the Panambahan 
claimed that a bad drought had dried up the rivers and
57. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales,
12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 269.
58. Council at Fort Marlborough to J. Hurlock, 31 December
1738, SFR (9), f. 3.
59. Supercargoes of the Walpole to supercargoes of the Dukeq 
17 July 1739, SFR (9), f* 20.
60• Ibid., f. 22.
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presented the pepper from doming down to the ports. It was 
essential to fill the junks first since 5,000 pikuls of 
pepper had been contracted to the/nakhodas before the arrival 
of the Marlborough and the Walpole. The Shahbandar, 
however, furnished the English merchants with a different 
account. He said that for every pikul of pepper, the nakhodas 
were paying eight Spanish dollars and half a dollar or two
sukus extra as eustom charges. Since they paid higher rates,
62the junks invariably obtained pepper first.
From the Shahbandar*s explanation and the complaints
of the factors, it would seem that the junk owners, through
their competitive bidding on the pepper market, had managed
to succeed where the English had failed. By giving preference
to the junks, the factors asserted that the ruler had not
kept his promise to the English Company to grant it an
63equitable and profitable trade at Banjarmasin. The English 
did not realise that their failure to provide million aid to 
the Sultan had encouraged him to help the Chinese in loading 
their vessels with pepper. The supercargoes were also to 
blame for giving unacceptable currency to the Banjarese. 
instead of making the customary payments for their pepper
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
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purchases in Spanish dollars, the supercargoes of the
Marlborough and the Walpole advanced new milled dollars to
64the Banjarese. This type of currency had been introduced 
into Banjarmasin by the English Company to replace the old 
Spanish coins which were becoming obsolete and scarce. The 
factors discovered that it was increasingly difficult even 
to obtain Spanish reals from Batavia which was also experiencin 
a shortage of the c u r r e n c y . T h e y  hoped that the new milled 
coins, which were widely circulated in other parts of the 
East Indies, would be acceptable to the Banjarese merchants.
For a while, the Sultan was willing to take the new
currency, and the factors, including those of the Prince of
Wales and the Jane, were permitted to load their vessels
with pepper. However, when the ruler realised that he had
accumulated new milled coins to the value of 60,000 dollars,
he insisted on exchanging them into Spanish currency with
Captain Hurlock and Captain Boddam, the chief factor of the 
66Walpole. When the English pointed out that they did not 
have more than a few Spanish coins, Tamjeed Dulla gave 
instructions to his subjects to stop the pepper supply to the
64. Ibid.
6 6 . E.I.C. to Council at Fort Marlborough, 6 April 1738, 
SFR (9), f. 12.
6 6 . Supercargoes of the Walpole to supercargoes of the 
Duke, 17 July 1739, SIB' (9), f. 22.
m
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67supercargoes, ' This partly explains the ruler*s excuse that 
further supplies were meant only for the junks. The 
Banjarese resumed delivery of pepper into the English vessels 
in mid-1739 only after the factors had given 3,000 Spanish 
dollars to the Panambahan,68
However, after 1,200 pikuls of pepper had been weighed,
Tamjeed Dulla became discontented again and demanded one
suku or a quarter dollar extra in duties for every pikul
bought by the English.69 Captain Hurlock felt that the
ruler was extorting money from the English. Since he did
not wish to sever commercial ties with ‘^amjeed Dulla without
prior orders from his employers, Hurlock accepted the Sultan!s
proposition bn condition that he would grant a chop for
6,000 pikuls of pepper annually to the East India Company at
the fixed price of 6% dollars, Tamjeed Dulla then made it
clear that he would agree only if the Directors sent him a
70guard ship to defend his land against his enemies. ^ Hurlock, 
not willing to commit himself in a matter which involved 
politics, decided to leave Tartas. Hence, the Walpole sailed 
off in July 1739 with only one-third of the pepper cargo
67. Ibid.
6 8 . Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
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which had been consigned to it. The Marlborough, meanwhile,
71remained in Tartas to await the next harvest koffWfrt.
Instead of sending vessels out to south-east and east
Asia only from London, the English Company in 1738 authorised
its employees in Bencoolen to conduct expeditions to
72Banjarmasin so as to save time and money. In this respect,
the Marlborough was the first outward-bound ship from
Bencoolen to Banjarmasin since the renewal of trade with the
Banjarese, and it was shortly followed by the Duke in February 
73
1740. The authorities at Fort Marlborough did not forsee 
much difficulty in the Duke obtaining a full cargo as Tamjeed 
Dulla had written that the forthcoming harvest would be a 
much better one. The English could expect 4,000 to 5,000
74pikuls of pepper if they arrived early in the Bay of Banjar. 
However, when the Duke returned to Bencoolen about five months 
later, the invoice of the ship showed that not more than
71. Ibid. The supercargoes of the Marlborough remained in 
Banjarmasin on the understanding that Tamjeed ^ulla 
would compensate their loss from their longer stay in 
Tartas by giving them a full cargo when the next 
harvesting season occurred.
72. E.I.C. to the Council at ^ort Marlborough, 6 April 
1738, SFR (9), f. 8 .
73. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 24 February 1740,
SFR v9), f . 16.
74. Letter from the Council at Fort Marlborough to Sultan 
Tamjeed Dulla, 6 January 1740, SFR (9), f. 2.
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2,000 pikuls of pepper hsd been purchased^ -an amount 
which fell far below that promised by the Panambahan.
Although the Banjarese faction at court, consisting of 
Juree Tulis, Pengeran Suria and their subordinates, can be 
held responsible for the small quantity of pepper which was 
furnished to the English, the factors of the Duke and the 
Marlborough were also to blame, especially for the undiplomatic 
way they treated the Banjarese. The Sultan v/as probably 
sincere in his pledges, but when Tamjeed Dulla was away in 
Kayu Tinggi, he left Juree Tulis, his representative, to 
handle commercial matters with the English at Tartas.
T. Hindeman, the chief factor of the Duke, tried to insist 
on going up to Kayu Tinggi to see the Sultan as he felt that 
Juree Tulis, being a good friend of the Chinese junk traders, 
would not advance the interests of the English East India
n / ;
Company, but was refused. By acting in this manner, Hindeman 
had antagonised the Banjarese official, who thereafter was 
instrumental in halting supplies of pepper to the Duke since 
it was within his power to do so.
Hindeman and Hurlock also traced the cause for their . 
poor pepper supplies to the few junk owners who received
75. Letter from E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 17 March 
1741, LB (25), f. 562.
76. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 1 April 1740,
SFR (9), f. 28.
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77large bales of pepper daily from the merchants. \ They
alleged that the Chinese intensified their efforts by
sending their own men into the interior of Banjarmasin to
78procure pepper. Fearing that the junk traders would 
deprive them of a large cargo, the factors went to persuade 
Pengeran Suria and Tamjeed Dulla to stop the practice of 
ventures up-country by the Chinese, but if that was not
79possible, to permit the English merchants to do the same.
The Panambahan, however, would not allow the supercargoes
to go inland to transact business because he felt that they
would be able to obtain pepper at .a cheaper rate from the
Biajus. The English would not only dispense with the profits
of the middlemen, but also could avoid the payment of duties,
since they could cheat by not weighing their pepper at the
customs-house. In the case of the nakhodas, the Sultan had
made an exception because they had advanced more than 10,000
dollars to the merchants; hence, the Chinese had gone upland
80to receive payment in kind. If the English wanted to load 
their ships quickly, Tamjeed Dulla stated, they should give
77. Ibid., 17 March 1740, f. 24.
78. Ibid. The practice of the Chinese to go into the interior 
of Banjarmasin to procure pepper was not new but want 
back as far as 1712. Refer to p. 218
79. Diary of Duke in Banjarmasin, 17 March 1740, SFR (9), 
f. 24* Also letter from supercargoes of Duke to 
Pengeran Suria and Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 22 June 1740,
SFR (9), f. 41.
80. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 7 May 1740, SFR (9),
f. 38.
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large advances to the Banjarese in Spanish currency.81
Sultan Tamjeed Dulla was granting favourable treatment
to the Chinese and he was perhaps paitially justified in his
actions. Apparently, he was very disappointed with the
English for not providing arms or the guard vessel as he
had previously requested. Thereafter, the Sultan refused
to co-operate with the supercargoes in their loading of
pepper. His disappointment was reflected in his displeasure
at the way the supercargoes conducted trade. The Sultan
objected to the frequent payment of new milled coins by the 
82
English. Jloreover, instead of making cash advances, the
supercargoes of the Puke made payment only when pepper was
brought to them, although they realised that the Banjarese
always operated on advances. Nevertheless, Hindeman asked
Tamjeed Dulla not to misconstrue their non-compliance Mas
a diffidence of your Majesty*s paying us again, but flatter
ourselves that you!d relinquish your proposal /to do us harm7
and put it upon no other footing than that we are obliged to
83be tenacious of our employer*s orders.,!
81. Ibid.
82. E.I.C. to the Council at Fort Marlborough, 10 May 1740, 
SFR (9), f. 35. In one instance, the supercargoes of 
the Duke had to borrow $200 in current cash from Kjahi 
Dipa to buy a few bales of pepper.
83. Letter from T. Hindeman to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 1 July 
1740, SFR (9), f. 43.
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When the supercargoes found that they could not make 
much progress in their negotiations with the Sultan* they 
decided to deal with the nakhodas. Hindeman and Hurlock 
thereupon approached Kjahi Raksa, a Chinese official who
04
was in charge of pepper deliveries to the junks. They
told him that the nakhodas, by giving more than the fixed
price of six dollars per pikul, had broken the commercial
regulations whereby the Panambahan had decreed that it was
an offence for anyone to bid for pepper at more than the
above rate. The factors were of the opinion that it was
fair for Kjahi Raksa to give them the extra pepper rather
than to the junks as the latter had already loaded over 3,000
85pikuls of pepper. When Kjahi Raksa explained that the 
contract did not concern him since it was a matter between 
the junk owners and the Panambahan, the English then tried 
to threaten a certain nakhoda.^6 They warned him that unless 
he delivered port of his pepper stock to the £uke? they would 
insist on making a thorough check of his junk at the Bay of 
Banjar so that if his supply exceeded 1,000 pikuls, they
a n
would take the extra amount by force. The nakhoda refused 
and reported the matter to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, who subsequently
84. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 26 April 1740,
SFR (9), f. 31
85. Ibid.
8 6 . Ibid., 29 April 1740, f e 32.
87. Ibid.
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88reproached the factors.
When Hindeman reminded the ruler of his promise to
supply full pepper cargoes for the English Company ships,
the Sultan stated that it was difficult for him to keep his
bargain when the Directors had not despatched the guard ship
89which he had requested in 1739. The incident alienated
the Sultan1s feelings towards the supercargoes for the
English found that after the meeting, hardly any pepper was 
to 90
brought them. The supercargoes of the Duke and 
Marlborough decided thereafter to leave Banjarmasin. Before 
their departure, they warned Tamjeed Dulla that the English 
Company would have no further dealings with him as ,fwe are 
thoroughly convinced that you only mean to amuse us to what 
end we are ignorant; we deem the pretended friendship as not 
to be rely!d on, having already forfeited ye promise of giving 
us all ye last crop you gave under your hand in a letter to 
ye Governor and Council of Bencoolen so much to our prejudice 
and your dishonour* that we justly conclude no confidence is 
to be put in future assurances which we shall punctually 
acquaint ye Honourable Company not doubting but that they
Ibid.„ 3 May 1740, f. 33. Sultan Tgmjeed Dulla referred 
to the factors as "Dutchmen" (in a derogatory sense) who 
intended to create disturbances in Banjarmasin.
89. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 3 May 1740, SFR (9), 
f. 33.
90. Ibid.. 7 May 1740, f. 38.
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91will have due regard thereto.’1
Hindeman and Hurlock were responsible for weakening
commercial relations between the Banjarese authorities and
the Company. The Banjarese were aggravated when the
supercargoes became insolent towards the junk owner and
threatened to confiscate his supplies of pepper. Sultan
Tamjeed Dulla who was already disappointed with the Company
for not despatching the guard vessel, therefore decided to
expel the English from Banjarmasin, On 16 July 1740 the
Banjarese attacked the two English ships which were anchored
in the Bay of Banjar. The English, who had been forewarned
by Dato Mas that the Sultan intended to launch an onslaught,
retaliated by firing upon the Banjarese perahus. After three
days of sporadic fighting, when the English heard that the
Banjarese intended to send for reinforcements, the supercargoes
resolved to leave the Bay. The Duke and Marlborough sailed
92
off in the direction of Bencoolen on 20 July 1740.
The complaints of the supercargoes of the Duke and the 
Marlborough about the treachery of the Banjarese went unheeded 
by the Directors in London although the Bencoolen Council
91. Letter from the supercargoes of the Duke and the 
Marlborough to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 12 July 1740, 
SFR 19). fT 45.
92. Diary of the Duke in Banjarmasin, 20 July 1740,
SFR (9), f. 45.
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wanted to abandon the project of despatching further vessels
93
to Banjarmasin. The Directors did not intend to give up 
so easily, particularly when/possibilities' of an extensive 
trade in pepper could be explored in the absence of the 
Dutch. They did not doubt that the Chinese nakhodas were 
highly successful competitors and it was out of the question 
for the English Company to topple or outbid them. However, 
the directors were sure that in a normal year when the yield
9 a
was between 15,000 and 20,000 pikuls, the market at Tartas 
or Kayu Tinggi could offer pepper to buyers other than the 
Chinese.
The Directors could have thought that their employees 
had blundered and hoped the mistake could be rectified by 
inviting the Panambahan or his representatives to Bencoolen 
for negotiations. In fact, they were keen to hold discussions 
with the Banjarese authorities as early as 1738 when the 
Prince of Wales was sent to Banjarmasin in order to foster 
goodwill and to improve commercial relations between the two 
peoples.95 The Directors realised that the only way to bring
93. Letter from E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 17 March 
1741, LB (25), f. 562.
94. This estimate of the annual pepper yield in a normal 
harvest season is cited by J.A. Baron van Hohendorff, 
"Radicale Beschrijving van Banjermassing11, BTLV, Vol. 4, 
(Amsterdam, 1861), p. 201.
95. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince of Wales«
12 October 1737, LB (24), f. 270.
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about harmonious relations was to send a guard ship to the
Sultan. They accordingly despatched a letter to Tamjeed Dulla
96outlining their intention.
The Panambahan, obviously pleased with the English
Company*s pledge to assist him, accepted the invitation and
sent two officials to Bencoolen* When the Banjarese arrived
in July 1742, they were warmly received by the Deputy Governor
97and Council of Fort Marlborough. In the ensuing negotiations, 
the Banjarese delegates were personally assured by the 
Bencoolen authorities that the guard ship would be sent as 
soon as commercial relations were re-established between the 
Company and the Banjarese. In his letter to the Bencoolen 
government, Tamjeed Dulla had stated that he could supply only
3,000 pikuls of pepper to the English Company each year, for 
part of the crop had to be given to the junks which brought 
valuable goods to his people. Shortly before the Banjarese 
delegates left with a declaration "that they would on all 
occasions, contribute their best endeavours to render our 
/English/ correspondence to their country agreeable and friendly," 
a subsequent letter from the Sultan encouraged the Bencoolen 
government to anticipate a much larger supply of pepper for
96, Letter from E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla, 17 March 
1741, LB (25), f. 563.
97. Council at F0rt Marlborough to E.I.C., 28 February 1743, 
SFR (9), ff, 178-79.
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its ships at Banjarmasin. Hereby, Tamjeed Dulla promised,..
that he would deliver 8,000 pikuls of pepper to the Company
98if its ships reached Tartas within two months1 time.
Possibly, the Sultan felt that-a'" pledge'to grant a larger 
quantity of pepper to the English would produce swifter results 
as far as the despatch of the guard vessel was concerned.
The Bencoolen Council conjectured that the Sultan had
made the new offer after he had found out that the nakhodas
did not come to collect the pepper stocks which were consigned
to them in that year, probably because the Chinese were short 
00 sense^
of cash. In this / the Council was mistaken* Tho
. visiti**
nakhodas had refrained from/Banjarmasin in 1742 not because 
they lackdd money, (as it has already been noted that the 
lucrative Chinese cargoes were easily exchangeable with pepper), 
but because of disturbances in Java which prevented them from 
sailing to the south seas.
These revolts in Java were the outcome of mass immigration 
of Chinese into Batavia in the 1730fs* The Dutch, unable 
to check the inflow of more Chinese and faced with the problem 
of mass unemployment, decided to deport some of them to 
Ceylon and South Africa. This action of the Batavian Council 
provoked the Chinese to rebel in 1740. In the event, the
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., f. 180.
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disturbances spread to northern ^aVa when certain Pengerans
100
also took up arms against the Dutch, Fearing that the 
riots would become more widespread and that the Javanese 
chieftains would be incited to rise against their masters 
and declare their independence, the Batavian authorities 
invited neighbouring Sultans to support them against the rebels 
It is conceivable that in the midst of these disturbances, 
the nakhodas from Canton, Amoy and Ningpo who frequented 
Batavia annually, preferred (or were instructed) to refrain 
from visiting the area until the situation had returned to 
normal. Since many junk owners also stopped at Banjarmasin 
while they were on their way to Java, the number of junks in 
the former place inevitably decreased during this period. 
Meanwhile in Banjarmasin, when Tamjeed Dulla noticed the large 
leftovers from the pepper crop of the last harvest of 1740-1741 
he decided to make the offer to the English instead, and hoped 
that they would send the guard vessel very soon.
The Directors, eager to accept the Panaaibahan*s offer,
100. J.K.J. de Jonge, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag 
in Post Indie, vol.1 9, ( Bag*®,1881}, p. 9235
B. Hoetink, ,fI\fi Hoekong, Kapitein der Chineezen te 
Batavia In 1740”, BTLV, Vol. 74,,(The Hague, 1918), 
pp. 447-5185 E.S. de Klerck, History o? the Netherlands 
East Indiesq Vol. I, (Rotterdam, 1538), pp.' '36^-l6S.
101. The Batavian authorities specially asked the Sultan of 
Madura to assist them by sending his armies 11 with 
expeditiousness to demolish the Chinese our enemies at 
Kartasoorah,M - Account of the Chinese War in Java, 
Mackenzie Collection 1822, (24), ff. 1-12.
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despatched the Severn and Neptune to Banjarmasin in 1742.
Within one and a half months of their arrival, the supercargoes
102were able to procure a total of 6,700 pikuls of pepper:
a record collection compared to the low figures obtained by
the previous English vessels which stayed as long as six to
seven months in Banjarmasin. Although he was willing to
concede a large pepper supply to the English, Tamjeed Bulla,
however, was reluctant to sign any contract with them. When
T. Butler, first supercargo of the Severn asked him for a
chop granting 8,000 pikuls of pepper yearly to the English
10*3Company, he evaded the issue. He considered it unwise to 
give commercial privileges to the Company when it had not 
sent the guard*,vessel that had been promised. Perhaps Tamjeed 
Dulla was also hoping that the Chinese would return to 
Banjarmasin very soon to resume their trade.
The successful loading of the Severn and the Neptune 
encouraged the English Company to send more vessels to 
Banjarmasin.’*-^ The Colchester. Porto Bello and the Onslow 
were despatched in 1743, 1744 and 1745 respectively. It is
102. T. Butler and J. Collier to E.I.C., 29 November 1742, 
SFR (9), f. 167.
103. Ibid., f. 168.
104. The Directors stated that the supercargoes of the 
Neptune and the Severn received kind treatment from 
the.Banjarese. - E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the 
Porto Bello. 25 April 1744, LB (26), f. 382.
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noteworthy that during this period when the Company was
expanding its commercial activities in China, the Directors
advised their employees to pay special attention to the
106purchase of tea besides pepper at Banjarmasin. ^ The 
supercargoes were told that in case they came in contact with 
the junk owners at Tartas or Kayu Tinggi, they should persuade 
the latter to sell their tea, particularly the cheap type of 
brown Bohea tea or green tea,to them at the rate of 20 dollars 
to 25 dollars per pikul.1^ 6 The factors of the Dragon and 
the Norfolk who sailed to Borneo in 1746 were even instructed 
not to load any pepper if they could fill their ships wjLth 
tea at Tartas.107 v
Tea had become a very important beverage in Europe in 
the first quarter of the eighteenth century. In England, the 
tea sales of the East India Company had risen from 316,182 lbs. 
in 1720-1721 to 1,049,593 lbs. a decade later. Moreover, 
the prices had Increased steadily after Walpole had introduced 
the tariff reform act of 1724$ roughly speaking, Bohea tea 
rose from 8s. 9d. to 12s, per lb., while the price of green
105. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Dragon. 13 February 
1745, LB (26), f. 382.
106. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Prince Edward,
6 August 1746, LB (26), f. 512.
107. Ibid.. f. 513.
108. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 225.
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tea (which had a more phenomenal increase)^had escalated to
. 109
14s. 6d. from 6 s. 6d. per lb* by. 1727. By 1734, the
price of green tea was 16s. per lb. It increased to 19s.
per lb. one year later. This rate probably remained constant
in the 1740*s. In contrast, the price of pepper practically
showed no increase at all from the 1720fs to the 1730*s
when it remained at 3.5s. per lb.11^ Unfortunately, the
supercargoes who went to Canton discovered that it was not
easy to purchase tea. They encountered stiff competition
from the other European companies, such as the Dutch, Ostend,
Danish and Swedish companies, and also met with difficulties
n  ifrom the Chinese authorities. A Hence, the Directors thought 
that it would be a good idea if their factors at Banjarmasin 
could procure tea from the nakhodas there. This was not to 
be the case. When the English factors reached Banjarmasin, 
they found that the nakhodas either gave all their stocks of 
tea under contract to the Banjarese retail salesmen or 
exchanged tea for pepper with the pepper merchants, hence 
leaving none for the English. As a result, the English could 
only hope to purchase tea at Canton.
109. Ibid., p. 226.
110. Lord Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England. Appendix II, 
no page.
111. Glamann, op. cit.„ pp. 212-435 Morse, The East India 
Company trading to China. Vol. I, pp. 18i-9(J.
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With regard to the pepper trade, the English also
received poor response from the Banjarese who did not seem
very eager to supply pepper to the English ships which
arrived in the Bay of Banjar after 1742. Tamjeed Dulla was
unimpressed by the repeated assurances of the English Company
to despatch a guard ship to him for in 1745, three years
after the English had made their promise to send the vessel,
there were still no signs of the ship. As a result, the
factors of the Porto Bello had great difficulty in persuading
112the Banjarese to deliver pepper into their boat. In the 
case of the Orford and the Colchester, the supercargoes were 
compelled to pay another suku in addition to the quarter dollar 
for the custom duties by the Temenggong before they were
1 1 o
permitted to buy pepper. °
Apart from the Sultan*s dissatisfaction over the non- 
appearance of the guard ship, another obstacle contributed 
to the ill-succoss of the English expeditions, namely, the 
return of the junks to Banjarmasin in 1743. After the 
Chinese revolts in Java had subsided at the end of 1742, the 
nakhodas resumed their commercial activities in the East Indies, 
including Banjarmasin.
112. Supercargoes of the Orford to the supercargoes of the 
Onslow, (exact date not specified, probably mid-1746), 
dFR CS2). f. 12.
113. Ibid.
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Instead of maintaining the pepper contract which the
Banjarese emissaries had negotiated with the Bencoolen
government, the supercargoes complained that the merchants
in Tartas and other ports reverted to the old practice of
114loading their stocks into the junks. Moreover, they
claimed that the Sultan would have detained the Orford to
defend his land if the factors, T. Sandys, E. Smith and
W„ Churchey had not convinced Tamjeed Dulla theft the guard
ship would definitely reach Banjarmasin before the end of 
116
1745. This action of the Sultan to detain the vessel
shows the extent of his disappointment with the English for 
not keeping their promise to provide political aid.
In fact the guard ship, the Dragon., did not reach
Banjarmasin until 6 October 1746, although instructions
for its departure had been issued in February 1745. The
date for despatching the ship had constantly worried the 
Directors, Each time they wrote to Tamjeed Dulla that the 
Dragon would be sent soon, some problem had cropped up 
to hinder its departure, chief of which was the war in
114. Ibid.. f. 13.
115. Diary of the Orford, 3 April 1746, Dutch Records (A). 
Vol. 7, f. 59.
116. Diary of the Dragon in Banjarmasin, 6 October 1746, 
CFR (52), f. 31.
117. Letter from the E.I.C. to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla,
5 February 1745, LB (26), f. 385.
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Europe -which prevented military supplies and warships from
11S
leaving England,
In their instructions to the factors’, J.; Butler,
F* Steward and H. Kent, of the Dragon, the Directors stipulated
that the ship would be maintained strictly as a guard vessel
for six months after \diich it would be relieved by another
boat* The factors should not take advantage of their position
119to create hostilities in Banjarmasin, The functions of
the Dragon would be left to Sultan Tamjeed Dulla who would
120be requested to pay half the cost for its maintenance.
Moreover, the factors were forbidden to establish any factory
in the place or to leave the ship unnecessarily. After six
months, if they found that conditions in Banjarmasin were
peaceful and that it was not necessary for the Dragon to
guard the area anymore, then they should return to England
121with a full cargo of pepper.
The despatch of the Dragon to Banjarmasin marked a 
forward step in cementing relations of the English Company 
with the Banjarese. This was the first time since 1707 that
118. Letter from Tihe E.I.C. to Kjahi Temenggong, 3 July 
1745, LB (26), f. 347.
119. E.I.C. to the supercargoes of the Dragon, 13 February 
1745, LB (26), f. 382.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
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the Directors had sent a military vessel to the region and
by doing so, the Company had indicated that it iras supporting
Sultan Tamjeed Dulla against his enemies# The Directors
realised that in the 1710!s and the 1720!s, their refusal
to render aid to the Sultan had resulted in the displacement
of the English by the ^utch# They also thought that the
Dutch were able to gain a relatively strong foothold in
Banjarmasin because of their willingness to give armed aid
against the Bugis. However, when the Dutch withdrew from
Banjarmasin on their own accord, Tamjeed Dulla had invited
the English to re-establish trade relations with him
primarily in the hope of getting military support. Thus,
there was no reason why the English Company should not take
the opportunity to consolidate its position in the area by
stationing a guard vessel in Banjarese waters. As long as
the Dragon was in Banjarmasin, the Directors felt that there
was little likelihood for the ruler to bring in other foreign 
122powers. In attempting to secure commercial objectives, 
the Company allowed itself to become politically committed 
to the Panambahan.
However, the ftragon arrived too late in Banjarmasin 
to be of any use to Tamjeed Dulla for by then, external 
events had affected the course of Anglo-Banjarese relations#
122# Ibid#
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In June 1746, shortly after the arrival of the Onslow in
Tartas, the Sultan of Madura who had also reached Banjarmasin,
asked the English supercargoes to protect him and his
123family against the Dutch who had besbiged his land*
He alleged that the Batavian authorities had taken drastic
measures against him after he had refused to return certain
territories in Java which they had ceded to him for helping
to suppress the Chinese rebels during the Javanese civil war 
124
in 1742. Since then, he had attempted to enlist military
support from the Bencoolen Council to regain his kingdom
125but this had proved futile. Therefore, he had come to
Banjarmasin for refuge. When they realised the Sultan's
plight, the supercargoes allowed the Madurese to station
their perahus beside the Onslow, but did not make, any pledges
126
of help to the Sultan.
Unfortunately for the Sultan of Madura, the Butch had 
pursued him to Banjarmasin. When the Dutch commodbre, Van 
den Burg, discovered that he was under the protection of the 
English, the commodore accosted Tamjeed Dulla and threatened
123. C.F. Noble, Vo.vage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748, 
(London, 1762) , p>. 96'.' '' * J -- * * ■
124. Ibid., p. 97.
125. Consultations of the Council at Fort Marlborough,
14 October 1745, Dutch Records (A). Vol. 7, f. 60.
126. C.F. Noble, op. cit.. p. 98.
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"that if he did not immediately secure ye English captain
he knew was ashore and put him in close confinement, till
ye King of Madura was delivered up to him, he would represent
him to his master ye Governor-General of Batavia, who would
soon take satisfaction on his refusal, by using him in the
127
same manner with ye King of Madura.1' Fearing Dutch
reprisals if he did not act accordingly, the Panambahan
ordered his men to capture Congreve, the chief supercargo
of the Onslow. Congreve, tricked into going to Kjahi
Temenggong's house to discuss pepper rates, was put in chains
128as soon as he reached his destination. The other English
factors were told that Congreve would be released only if
the Madurese Sultan and his family were surrendered to the
129Dutch commodore. The English had to agree. Even after
the Madurese had been delivered up to their pursuers, Sultan
Tamjeed Dulla insisted on making Congreve his hostage until
the guard ship arrived, but later on he relented and released
130
his prisoner at the end of July 1746. By resorting to 
Banjarmasin for refuge, the Madurese Sultan had indirectly 
brought back the Dutch into the region. Thus, when the
127. Ibid.. p. 99.
128. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 27 June 1746,
CTO (52), f. 16.
129. Ibid.
130. Captain Congreve was not freed until 29 July 1746. - 
Diary of the Onslow. 29 July 1746, CFR (52), f. 22.
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Dragon arrived, the factors found that the Panambahan was 
not interested in the guard ship anymore^ in fact, heavy 
pressure was put on him by the Dutch to expel the English 
from Banjarmasin.
Undoubtedly, the presence of a Dutch squadron in the
Bay of Banjar in March 1747 indicated the determination of
the Dutch Company to establish itself in the area again.
This revision in the policy of non-interference to one of
direct control in Banjarmasin was due mainly to Baron van
Imhoff, the new Governor-General of Batavia. He considered
it imperative to oust the English and to re-establish the
Dutch Company*s monopoly of the pepper trade. With the
increased smuggling trade in opium and spices between the
Moluccas and Banjarmasin, Van Imhoff felt that now, more than
before, the Dutch Company should secure Banjarmasin for itself
in order to impose more rigorous measures on the contraband 
131traffic. He argued that formerly, his predecessors had 
given lame excuses for abandoning Banjarmasin after the 
previous expeditions had proved financially unsound. By 
leaving the region, the Dutch had given the chance to other 
foreign powers, especially the English, to take away the 
pepper which rightfully should belong to the Dutch Company 
by virtue of the fact that It had signed a series of treaties
131, Secret Resolution of the Batavian Council, 17 February 
1747, KA 2552, f. 1784.
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with the Banjarese in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
132centuries. The time had come for the Company to make a 
permanent settlement in Banjarmasin and to evict all English 
and Chinese merchants so that the Dutch would have exclusive 
rights to the pepper trade.
The pursuit of the Madurese Sultan provided a good
excuse for the Dutch to re-enter Banjarmasin. Van den Hoyden
and Van Akervelt, two Dutch commanders, were instructed by
the Batavian Council to join Van den Burg in Tartas, and they
were to blockade the coast (as a demonstration of Dutch
military power) if the Sultan was reluctant to act in
134accordance with the Governor-General1s orders. When the
Hartenlust reached the Bay of Banjar in March 1747, the
Dutch noticed that the factors of the Onslow and the Dragon
were busy negotiating with the Banjarese authorities for
135pepper to be supplied to their ships. Although Ratu 
Anom tried to prevent the English from obtaining any stocks
13<
as he wanted the pepper to be reserved solely for the junks,
132. Ibid.. f. 1785.
133. Ibid.
134. Instructions from the Batavian Council to Van den
Heyden, 3 March 1747, KA 2552, ff'. 1794-95.
135. Van den Heyden to the Governor-General of Batavia,
7 April 1747, KA 2591. f. 10.
136. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 19 May 1747,
CFR (52), f. 8 8 .
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Pengeran Suria and Kjahi Nabi were more accommodating and
persuaded the merchants to bring small bales of pepper to
137the English factors. With the Dragon in Tartas, Congreve.
felt that the English were entitled , under previous agreement,
to certain commercial privileges from the Banjarese, namely,
that of free access to the Sultan, the right to participate
freely in the pepper trade and also to weigh pepper on the
138
English scales.
It has already been observed that at this stage, Sultan
Tamjeed Dulla hardly paid any attention to the demands of
the English factors as he was involved with more important
political matters when Van Akervelt and Van den Heyden
arrived in Tartas, Under the threat of having his ports
blockaded if he did not comply with the orders of the Dutch
Company, Tamjeed Dulla was compelled to sign a preliminary
treaty with the Dutch factors on 27 March 1747. The draft
139treaty was subsequently ratified on 18 May 1747. In the 
treaty, the Dutch Company promised to protect Banjarmasin 
against all its external enemies but stipulated that it would
137. Ibid., 28 December 1746 and 1 March 1747, f. 50 and f. 63.
138. Ibid., 28 August 1746, f. 26. With reference to the 
last clause, the factors claimed that the Banjarese 
scales were much lighter than the English weights as 
the former were 1 lb. 4 oz. short in the pikul which 
was estimated at 134-g- lbs. according to English weight.
139. Dutch-Banjarese Treaty, 18 May 1747, Stapel, Corpus 
Diplomaticum, Vol. 5, pp. 448-54.
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not meddle in internal p o l i t i c s . I n  return, the Sultan 
had to grant the main pepper trade to the Dutch Company at 
the rate of 6 Spanish dollars per pikul of 125 lbs. The 
pepper, which should be dry and unadulterated, would be 
weighed on the Company*s scales in the presence of two parties, 
namely, the Dutch and the Banjarese. They would settle any 
dispute'arising from inaccuracies in the pepper weight,
142All Europeans would be excluded from trading in the area.
In accordance with the Sultan*s request, the Chinese would 
be permitted to load one junk with pepper annually at the
1 4 0
rate of 8 Spanish dollars per pikul. All incoming and
outgoing ships would be checked for contraband pepper, spices
or opium. If any contraband goods were found, the crew of
144 t-ithat vessel would be sent to Batavia for punishment. So
long as the contract remained valid, the Banjarese would be
allowed to go to Batavia and the rest of Java as far as
Grisek and Surabaya, but were prohibited from sailing further
east to Bali, Loimbok, Sumbawa and Timor, or the west and
145north, namely, Billiton, Palembang, Johore and Malacca.
14.0. Ibid*. Artiele711 - IV, pp. 449-50.
141. Ibid., Article VIII, pp. 450-51.
142. Ibid., Article VI, p. 450.
143. Ibid.. Article VII, p. 450.
144. Ibid., Article IX and XI, p. 451.
145. Ibid.„ Article X, p. 451.
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Finally, the treaty stipulated that the flutch Company would 
build a factory in Banjarmasin to conduct its commercial 
affairs.146
When they ratified the treaty, the Governor-General
and Council made it clear that since the Company was pledged
to defend the Banjarese, the latter on their part, could not
147grant any asylum to an enemy or rebel of the Company.
Because of previous experience in which the Madurese Sultan 
had sought asylum at Banjarmasin, the Council felt that it 
was necessary to prevent similar practices in future and 
therefore, had inserted this clause.
Until early April 1747, the English had no idea that 
a contract had been concluded between the Butch and the 
Banjarese government. They were hopeful of obtaining a full 
cargo and had split hairs among themselves as to whether the 
Onslow or the Dragon should be loaded.'with pepper first. 
Butler, the factor of the Dragon, accused Congreve of not
148lending him current money which he lacked, to buy pepper. 
When Congreve obstinately refused to part with any cash,
Ibid.. Article XII, p. 452.
147. Separate Articles of the Governor-General and Council 
of Batavia, I and II, Stopel, Corpus Diplomaticum. 
pp. 453-54.
148. T. Butler to R. Congreve, 8 December 1746, CFR (52), 
f. 47.
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the Dragon had to sail off in mid-March 1747 without any
149pepper supply. When they were assured by the Banjarese
nobles that their ship would be fully stocked with pepper,
the supercargoes of the Onslow decided to remain in Tartas.
Congreve only realised the futility of his stay when Ratu
Anom informed him that ,!as so many Dutch ships are arrived,
it is not in our power to grant you more pepper, therefore
150
we do advise you to set sail Since his political
power had been transferred to the Dutch Company by the signing
of the treaty of 1747, Sultan Tamjeed Dulla had to make it
clear thet if they wanted to make further trading negotiations,
they had to go through the Dutch authorities "for I must
acquaint them /the English7 if they have a desire to continue
a trade here, they must be obliged to ask liberty of the
151Dutch Company,rr Thereafter, the supercargoes found that 
it was pointless to stay on in Banjarmasin.
Before their departure in June 1747, the English wanted
to make a last attempt at procuring a full cargo but the
15?Dutch objected, ^ It was the intention of the Batavian
149, Diary of the Dragon in Banjarmasin, 15 March 1747, 
CFR (52), f. 82,
150, Letter from Ratu Anom to R, Congreve, 7 April 1747,
CFR (52), f. 76.
151. Letter from Sultan Tamjeed Dulla to R. Congreve,
9 May 1747, CFR '(52), f. 84.
152. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 17 May 1747,
CFR (52), f. WT.
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1 r-authorities to oust the English from Banjarmasin, 00 and 
the Dutch factors felt that they were not obliged to accede 
to their request even though the English had advanced money
1 C/1
to the pepper merchants. On the other hand, as in 1733,
the Dutch factors made an exception in the case of the 
Chinese by allowing one junk to ship out 4,000 pikuls of 
pepper at 8 dollars (rix) per pikul in accordance with the 
treaty terms. By refusing the request of the English, the 
Dutch showed that although they feared the aggressive Chinese 
competition and wanted to stamp it out by limiting the 
supply of pepper to the nakhodas, they were even more resolved 
to oust the English who were in the main, their most dreaded 
rivals in the East Indies.
The establishment of the Dutch in Banjarmasin did not 
utterly deter the English away from the area. Although a 
junk nakhtoda warned the Delaware not to proceed to Tartas in 
1749, the captain refused to listen to him. ^ 5 On arrival, 
the Delaware found that the Banjar coast hod been blockaded 
on the orders of Van Imhoff, and subsequently, it did not
153. Secret resolution of the Batavian Council, 24 February, 
1747, KA 2552q f. 1788.
154. Diary of the Onslow in Banjarmasin, 29 March 1747,
CFR (52), f. 72.
155. Journal Delaware. (1749-1750), 25 March 1749.
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1 5 6procure any pepper,
A r revival of English interest in Banjarmasin occurred
in the 1760*s when the Bencoolen Council,, in accordance with
the Directors recommendations of 1763, resolved to despatch
vessels to that quarter in order to obtain pepper for the
157 fCanton market. The Council held the opinion that the 
existence of a factory at Banjarmasin did not mean that the 
Dutch had the sole right to the pepper trade. When Tangee,
a certain nakhoda, left for Banjarmasin in December 1764,
Ml oU ,
Governor Carter sent a letter to Sultan and the regent through
A
him. Carter also signed a contract to buy Banjar pepper 
at Bencoolen at ton dollars per pikul, and in return, the 
English would sell arms to the Banjarese if the directors 
permitted them to do so. ^ 8
The plan of the Council to send vessels to Banjarmasin 
did not materialise until January 1766 when the Royal George 
and Diligent were despatched. At this juncture, the 
Bencoolen authorities had little information about Banjarmasin 
then as Tangee did not return to Bencoolen the previous year. 
In its instructions to the supercargoes of the Royal George,
156. Ibid.
157. D.K. Bassett, British Trade and Policy in Indonesia, 
1760-1772. BTLV. Vol. 120. (Tho Hague, 1964), p. 212.
158. Ibid., pp. 212-13,
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the Bencoolen Council stated that if the supercargoes were
unsuccessful in procuring pepper at Banjar, then they should
proceed to Pasir, Surnbawa and other eastern islands to trade
159or to gather information on these places. Meanwhile, a 
current rumour that the Dutch Company intended to abandon 
Banjarmasin raised the hopes of the English, The Bencoolen 
authorities thereupon expected their supercargoes to be 
warmly received by the Banjarese, They even indicated that 
if 6*000 pikuls of pepper could be obtained from the 
Banjarese every year at six dollars per pikul, then the 
English Company could establish a settlement at Banjarmasin, 
Pulau Eaut was proposed as the site of the new settlement.
When the Royal George reached Banjarmasin in July 1766,
the supercargoes did not receive an enthusiastic welcome from
the Banjarese as the Council had anticipated. In fact, on
the advice of A. Palm, the Dutch Resident, the ^ultan refused
to sign any commercial contract with the English, Since it 
did not obtain any pepper cargo, the Royal George had to leave 
Banjarmasin. The supercargoes felt that they would be more
*1 r A
successful in their commercial ventures at Pasir and Surnbawa. 
After this futile attempt to trade at Banjarmasin, the English 
Company refrained from despatching further trade missions to 
south-east Borneo. By th6ir withdrawal, the English ' left 
the Dutch as undisputed masters of that region for the rest 
of the eighteenth century.
159. Ibid.. p. 213.
160. Ibid., p. 214.
294
CONCLUSION
From the mid-fourteenth to the seventeenth century, 
Banjarmasin v/as subjected to extensive Javanese influence 
when it repeatedly came under the hegemony of different 
Javanese states, beginning with the kingdom of Majapahit 
and followed soon afterwards by the Moslem harbour principali­
ties, and eventually by Mataram. By 1600.politics! disunity 
and internal dissension among the Javanese states had caused 
considerable migration into Banjarmasin* To retain their 
cultural and social links with the motherland, the early 
Javanese immigrants introduced their traditional institutions 
and customs into south-east Borneo.
Simultaneously, the infiltration of Arabs, Indians and 
Chinese transformed Banjarmasin into a significant commercial 
centre. Pepper, which had hitherto been sold in small 
quantities together with the other products, such as besoar 
stones and dragons blood, became the major crop of the region 
when large amounts were exported by the Asian and European 
traders. The difficulties of procuring sufficient stocks in 
Patani, Palembang and Bantam had encouraged the Asians, 
especially the Chinese nakhodas, to treat Banjarmasin as an 
alternative source of pepper.
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Meanwhile, through the accumulation of wealth and 
the dynamic rule of the Javanese immigrant chieftains,' Banjar­
masin managed to extend its political boundaries so that by 
the mid-seventeenth century, the east, south-east and south­
west coasts of Borneo were included in its domain. With the 
acquisition of greater power, it was natural for the Banja­
rese to regain their autonomy from Mataram. To achieve 
this, Banjarmasin made a military alliance with Su-kadana, 
and attempted to enlist European support, especially from the 
Dutch. The latter, undeterred by their initial failure to 
establish successful relations with the Banjarese, readily 
accepted the invitation to trade.
As a profit-making concern, the Dutch East India Company 
was only interested in obtaining pepper and not in the 
acquisition of territory or involvement in local politics.
In concluding the early treaty of 1635 the Banjarese authorities, 
mad© It certain that the Dutch Company was under no military 
obligation to the Sultan, but demanded the right to the 
monopoly of the pepper trade as it held the strong belief 
that the economic objective could best be attained through 
such means. However, the Dutch overlooked Banjarese interests, 
and by trying to suppress free trade and oust their 
competitors, the Portuguese, English and Chinese from the 
market, they incurred the hatred of the local merchants and 
their Banjarese sympathisers. The Banjarese faction, who 
had pro-Javanese interests, openly revolted, and murdered the 
Dutch factors at Martapura in 1638.
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Instead of adjusting its commercial policy to suit 
the Banjarese merchants after its factors had re-entered 
Banjarmasin in 1660, the Butch Company attempted to continue 
its monopolistic practices by signing a series of treaties 
with the Banjarese in the same decade. Apparently, with 
the fresh outbreak of hostilities between Mataram and 
Banjarmasin in the 1660fs, the Panambahan was willing to 
concede commercial privileges to the Company in return for 
Dutch protection which should extend, if necessary, to the 
construction of fortifications. It is significant to note 
that the Batavian Council realised that henceforth, it could 
no longer be free from political responsibilities if it 
intended to make the pepper monopoly work. It continued to 
trade with the Banjarese only as long os the internal situation 
was calm in Banjarmasin, but in the late 1670*s once chaotic 
conditions prevailed, abandoned the place with the ostensible 
excuse that its pepper supplies wore drastically reduced by 
foreign competitors.
English ventures in Banjarmasin in the seventeenth 
century were not very successful either. The English East 
India Company had hoped to obtain lucrative cargoes after 
Dutch competition was removed. But the contraction of large 
debts by its agents, poor pepper cargoes of the vessels, and 
the severe competition of the Asian merchants, indicated 
the inability of the English to secure a strong trading
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position in the area, with the consequence that Company 
operations were terminated in 1651* Attempts to resume 
trade with the Banjarese a decade later proved futile, fcr 
the factors discovered that the firm establishment of the 
Butch in the area rendered commercial transactions by other 
Europeans unprofitable.
After witnessing the Dutch withdrawal and the ambitious, 
though futile, designs of the Portuguese to establish a 
commercial monopoly, the Banjarese were increasingly 
suspicious of European activities. Nonetheless, because of 
the need to maintain Banjarmasin as an international pepper 
mart in order to boost its economy, the Banjarese had to 
pursue a policy of tolerance towards the Western merchants 
in the eighteenth century.
Interest in the Far East trade attracted the English 
to Banjarmasin in 1700. Evaluating the importance of the 
port in terms of the China trade, the Directors of the new 
English East India Company intended Banjarmasin to act as 
an intermediate station, and as a source of raw materials 
for exchange with Chinese articles. Moreover, the Directors 
foresaw large returns if their employees could engross the 
whole pepper trade. However, though the early efforts of 
the factors to set up a factory were extremely fruitful, to 
the extent that they even managed to build up a thriving 
port at Banjar, the Company, nevertheless, at the end of
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six years, could not regard the ■venture as a success.
Within this period, only 6011 tons of pepper we re shipped 
out though the factors estimated that the total production 
was about 10,000 tons. The above export figure, compared 
to that made between 1713 and 172-6 when o smaller amount 
of the product was loaded, was a relatively good one. But 
the Directors were dissatisfied as they felt that the figure 
could have been much higher if the Company had sufficient 
current money to buy pepper.
As a matter of fact, until the end of the first half 
of the eighteenth century, a shortage of current Spanish reals 
proved to be a perennial problem to the factors in their 
commercial transactions with the Banjarese. Since the latter 
did not accept pillar dollars, the usual type of currency 
kept by the English, the factors often had to retail Indian 
wares to obtain popper, or in certain cases, Company vessels 
would exchange their pillar dollars into Spanish currency at 
Batavia before proceeding to Banjarmasin. The Banjarese 
proved especially intransigent towards the English with 
referonce to the medium of exchange. Even in the 1730's and 
1740's when Spanish dollars were becoming scarce and falling 
into disuse, the Banjarese, convinced of the intrinsic 
value of the Spanish dollar, were reluctant to accept new-milled 
dollars, which had replaced pillar cash, from the English. 
However, they relaxed their rules when trading with the
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Chinese, Despite the fact that Chinese string cadi was less 
valuable than the. pillar dollar in other parts of the 
Archipelago, the Banjarese would not hesitate to accept 
Chinese money; because of the popularity of Chinese goods 
which could easily be bartered for pepper; the string cash 
thus served only to pay the extra costs when the price of 
pepper exceeded that of the luxury articles.
Besides the shortage of money, considerable damage 
was inflicted on the English Company trade by the private 
or separate stock merchants. By allowing their employees to 
participate in a certain amount of’ private trade apparently 
with the intention of supplementing the low salaries of their 
servants, the Directors wore partially responsible for thoir 
ov.T.1 economic loss. The factors, striving for personal gains, 
often co-operated with separate stock merchants, who were the 
Company’s competitors in the pepper trade to obtain cargoes, 
instead of devoting their energies to loading the vessels.
Corruption was rampant among all the English Council 
members at Banjar. Like the officials of the Dutch Company, 
a senior official like the English Council chief was just 
as interested in enriching himself as his subordinates.
Strict supervision was therefore out of the question, and 
the outcome was theft of the Company’s goods, falsification 
of the account books, the abuse of power , the increase of 
personal grievances among the officials, and the further
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growth of private trade. Judging from the few accounts of 
separate stock trade in the 1710’s, it is apparent that 
private trade decreased after the Directors had banned 
individual trading by their factors and introduced the 
commission system as a substitute.
These economic problems however would not have led to 
the Companyfs abandonment of Banjar in 1707 if the factors 
had not encountered political difficulties. Within six years, 
the English experienced two wars with the Banjarose, in 1701 
and 1707. Why did the Banjarese, who had displayed a great 
degree of tolerance towards:the English initially, suddenly 
turn hostile or were the English to blame? Also, after they 
had lost the war in 1701, why did the Banjarese, abandoning 
caution, decide to go to war again? The English factors, 
for lack of other reasons, put the blame on the Banjarese, 
alleging that they were war-like and treacherous. Since the 
latter had attacked the Dutch factories twice in the seventeenth 
century, there was no doubt some truth in the English 
accusation. But in assessing the motives for these clashes, 
it is necessary to consider the Banjarese as well as the 
European point of view.
On their first arrival, the Panambahan had permitted 
the English factors to establish a factory strictly for 
commercial purposes, without the mounting of any cannon or
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other arms. For a while, the English kept within the limits 
of the ruler*s terms. However, when they found it difficult 
to procure pepper stocks in the face of fierce competition 
from the Chinese and Indonesian merchants, the Banjar Council 
led by Landon, assumed more powers on their own accord. A 
guard ship was placed at the Barito river mouth to stop 
foreign vessels from taking away pepper, and on occasions, 
foreign ships were plundered. These acts were apparently 
repeated under Joyner*s presidency. By using force,, the 
English hoped to obtain exclusive rights to the pepper trade. 
It should be recalled that in the 1630's the Dutch had applied 
the same tactics to achieve similar ends. In fact, they 
had more justification as the right of exclusive trade was 
guaranteed to them in the contract with the ruler, but no 
such agreement was mutually signed between the English and 
the Banjarese. Even though allowance was made for the 
extension of English trade after 1702, this was done only 
because the Banjarese, as losers in a trial of armed strength, 
had to accept the terms dictated by the English East India 
Company. As a result of the oppressive measures imposed by 
the English, the commerce of Banjarmasin apparently suffered 
when the Asian merchants stayed away from the area.
To guard their factory, the English chiefs recruited 
Bugis mercenaries. Whilst it can be said that an 
insufficient number of European soldiers led to such a move,
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it cannot be doubted that the infiltration of the Bugis 
caused great uneasiness among the Banjarese, especially at 
a time when the Eugis were extending their political influence 
over other parts of the East Indies, such as the Malay states. 
For the past few centuries, the Banjarese had been subjected 
to Javanese control; with their newly acquired freedom, 
it was obvious that they did not want further subjugation 
by another Indonesian power. Such a threat was indeed 
imminent considering the fact that Pengeran Purabaya, a 
prospective claimant to the throne of Bsnjarmasin, was at 
that period enlisting military support from the Bugis in 
Pulau Laut. Thus, the import of Bugis soldiers by the 
English only enhanced indigeneous fears of a Bugis-Banjarese 
war.
These fears were confirmed when the Bugis soldiers 
became involved in a brawl with some Banjarese in October 
1701, It is conceivable that a misunderstanding arose on 
the part of the English that the Banjarese authorities 
intended to evict them from Banjar. As a result, they 
launched an attack on the Banjarese, thereby turning a 
minor clash into an Anglo-Banjarese war. In the event, 
the Panambahan was compelled to take a defensive position 
in Kayu Tinggi although he was not at the scene of the 
clash when hostilities started. The unruly behaviour and 
impetuosity of the English in launching the attack on the
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Banjarese can be regarded as a major reason for the war of 
1701.
Nevertheless9 one cannot completely rule out the 
English viewpoint that some Banjarese nobles, who were 
insolvent, deliberately created disturbances in an attempt 
to drive the English out of Banjar. Insolvency was common 
among the Banjarese nobles as a result of the system of 
commercial operations, viz# advance payment before 
delivery of the product. Often, the Banjarese chiefta.ins 
were unable to honour their debts in cash or kind mainly 
because they had spent the money before obtaining the pepper" 
stocks from the Biaju producers. In 1651 the English had had 
to desert the factory because the nobles were unable to pay 
their debts. The Dutch, faced with a similar problem, had 
also pressed for payment from the Panambahan in the draft 
treaty of 1600. Apparently, the English also encountered 
such difficulties in the eighteenth century. An instance 
occurred when Captain Coatsworth threatened to shoot 
Pengeran Aria because he had not paid his debts. It can be 
argued therefore, that the Banjarese could hove -contributed 
to the disturbances of 1701 with a view to liquidating their 
debts.
Political motivation and indigenous resentment of 
the English is more likely to have accounted for the 
second Anglo-Banjarese conflict of 1707. Probably, the
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Sultan neyer forgave the English or ceased to suspect them 
after the Anglo-Banjarese war of 1701. He only tolerated 
their presence because the English had insisted-on reisettling 
in Banjar. However, Banjarese suspicions of the extension 
of English power, aroused by the behaviour of Landon and 
Joyner and the employment of Bugis, ware'i<he;£ghtinned with the 
arrival of Barre. The English Council chiefs did not pay 
any attention to Griffithfs warnings that the Banjarese 
should be pacified*, instead, to add fuel to fire, their plan 
to fortify the factory only served to confirm Banjarese fears 
of English domination in the region. To preserve their 
freedom, the Banjarese revolted. This attack of 1707 was 
thus explicable in terms of an indigen|ous reaction to English 
impolitic conduct since 1701. The Banjarese succeeded in 
evicting the English from Banjar largely because the latter 
were unable to defend themselves effectively with only fev 
half-completed fort.
It would hot be too far-fetched to say that the 
Dutch contributed towards the English defeat at the hands 
of the Banjarese in 1707. Ever since the establishment of 
the English factory in Banjar at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the Batavian Council had shown grave 
concern over English activities in the Archipelago. Although ' 
the Council was not interested in returning to Benjarmasin 
itself, nonetheless, it was jealous of English commercial 
contacts with the Banjarese. To hamper trade, the Batavian
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Council imposed economic sanctions by prohibiting the 
export of rice to Banjarmasin. These checks on rice 
exports were, however, also made because of the necessity 
of preserving the Dutch Companyfs stocks during a period of 
bad harvests. Nevertheless, the sanction on exports was 
ineffective as rice supplies still managed to reach Tartas 
and Kayu Tinggi via smugglers from Java. It should be pointed 
out that Rodgett's advice that the Banjarese should cultivate 
their own padi for self-dependency did not create much 
imoact on the native inhabitants of Banjar who found it more 
lucrative to produce pepper. Moreover, the small acreages 
uadi grown in the hinterland of Negara were essentially 
of the hill variety and the cultivators were not Banjarese 
but Biajus, who hardly came into direct contact with the 
English.
When the ban on rice exports failed, the Batavian 
authorities were determined to enforce other measures to 
check the English, especially after they had learnt about 
the fortification plans of Barre. It was apparent that the 
Dutch were apprehensive of British domination in Banjarmasin 
once the fortifications were completed. If these plans 
materialised, then there was no question of a Dutch re-entry 
into south-east Borneo. Even more to the point, the 
Batavian authorities felt that from their base at 
Banjarmasin, the English could extend their authority to
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the rest of the Borneo territories, and eventually, to 
other parts of south-east Asia, The warnings of the 
out-going Governor-General of Batavia, William van Outhoorn, 
to his subordinates were indicative of Dutch fears over 
the increasing pov&rs of the English Company. By 
prohibiting the supply of important raw materials such as 
wood and bricks from the coastal ports of Java to Banjarmasin 
and deporting smugglers, the Dutch were able to hinder 
progress on the fort and thereby foil the English plans. 
Subsequently, the Banjarese managed to destroy the factory.
Shortly after the expulsion of the English, the Dutch 
reiEwed commercial relations with the Banjarese by despatching 
a trade mission to Tartas in 1711. Though the ostensible 
purpose vas to load pepner, the real motive for the Dutch 
move was to prevent the English East India Company from 
re-establishing contacts with Banjarmasin. Despite its 
initial enthusiasm, the Batavian Council swiftly abandoned 
the project at the end of 171£J. Dutch expeditions to 
Banjarmasin were not undertaken again until fourteen years 
later but these ventures lasted only for a decade. Why 
were they so short-lived? If the Batavian Council was 
apprehensive of the English, why then did it not attempt to 
establish a fort similar to that planned by the latter in 
order to consolidate its powers in Banjarmasin? Before these 
questions can be answered, it is essential to survey the
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political background of south-east Borneo,
At the time of the Dutch arrival in 1711, Banjarmasin 
was on the verge of a major revolt by the Biajus against 
their Banjarese masters. Since the mid-seventeenth century 
after the more northern and eastern districts of Banjarmasin 
were colonised by the Banjarese, the original inhabitants of 
these districts had become the subjects of the Panambahan.
Regents or pengerans were sent to govern the outer 
territories and to collect taxes in the form of gold and 
pepper from the Biajus as homage. The Biajus soon fell 
prey to the avaricious chieftains i/ho exploited them for 
their own personal gains. With a structure of government 
where court intrigues were prevalent and aspiring claimants 
sought to oust the ruler, the Panambahan, aware of his own 
i/eak position, could not redress these wrongs.
The perpetration of malpractices by the Banjarese 
masters sowed the seeds of discord and bitterness among their
subjects. In the seventeenth century, the Biajus had
expressed their resentment in various ways: as the major
cultivators of pepper, they had refused to deliver their 
product to the mere., ants. When this method failed, they 
would leave their pepper gardens untended, or merely 
abandon them. These forms of protest, though affecting the economy
of the country, were not fully effective, as the abuses did
not cease. Minor rebellions had also occurred but they
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were easily quelled.
In the eighteenth century, after decades of Banjarese 
misrule, the Biajus decided to stage a major revolt in an 
attempt to achieve independence. They were fully supported 
and encouraged by Pengeran Purabaya, who intended to use 
the Biajus to further his ambitions of becoming the 
sovereign. With the intervention of Furabaya and Daing 
Mamantuli, the Bugis pirate chief, the Biaju revolt, initially 
fought on a small-scale, developed into a major war. 
Understandably, when the Dutch factors arrived at'Tartas 
towards the end of 1711, the Panambahan pleaded for military 
assistance, but was rejected because the former had been 
instructed not to involve themselves in political matters.
By the end of 17125 when the Batavian Council realised the 
gravity of the situation and the fact that the odds were 
very much in favour of the Bugis participants, it decided to 
terminate further voyages to Banjarmasin.
Disillusioned, the Panambahan allowed the English
to re-establish trade with his kingdom, hoping thereby to
obtain support from the English East India Company. However, 
English
the/ Gampany was also not prepared to shoulder military 
responsibilities. Eventually, assistance came from the 
neighbouring Indonesian traders whose livelihood had been 
adversely affected by the disruption of the Banjarese 
economy. Consequently, in 1717 with the reinforcement of
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fresh troops, the Banjarese managed to defeat their enemies.
Despite the death of Purabaya and his son Gusti Busu, 
the Panambahan realised that the external threats to his 
kingdom were still present, particularly when the Bugis 
were taking refuge in Pasir. His plan to provoke the Dutch 
to return by granting commercial favours to the English 
between 1714 and 1726 had not worked because the Batavian 
Council was more conscious of the danger of involvement in 
internal politics than of the loading of pepper* In 1726, 
the Banjarese court again offered the pepper monopoly to 
the Dutch if they were willing to return to Banjarmasin.
On this occasion, the Batavian Council readily complied as 
it was very keen to replenish the depleted pepper stocks 
from Palembang and Jambi in order to meet the increased 
demands of the European market.
Because of the inadequacy in the supply of arms t/hich 
he received from the Europeans, the Panambahan felt that 
a fortified factory would offer security against all future 
attacks. Thus, when the Dutch factors returned to Banjarmasin 
in 1727, he stressed the necessity for a factory and 
fortifications which the Batavian Council had promised in 
the treaty of 1664. Here, one notices the glaring contrast 
between the ruler*s eagerness for a fortified factory in 
1727 and the bitterness of the Banjarese court in the early 
years of the eighteenth century against the English attempts
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at fortification* This was because the Banjarese realised 
that the English, by building a fort around their 
settlement at Banjar, meant to utilise it for their own 
protection. On the other hand, a Dutch stockade at Tartas, 
whichwa3 densely populated by the Banjarese, would protect 
the inhabitants against the Bugis assaults in critical times.
The Panambahan's plea put the Batavian authorities in 
a dilemma. As trade and politics were inter-linked, they 
reasised that on the one hand, they could not remain neutral 
if they wanted to load pepper, but on the other haGd, 
construction of a factory or pa p. car would mean full 
involvement in Banjarese politics, and possibly, the 
extension of their territorial responsibilities. However, 
when the majority of their employees who had been in Tartas 
before testified to the impracticability and worthlessness 
of such a stockade, the authorities decided not to implement 
the project for some time,but preferred to adopt the 'wait 
and see* attitude.
Despite some initial success in the pepper trade, the 
Dutch factors experienced delays in their loading of theii 
cargo, and finally non-delivery of the product. The 
difficulty of obtaining sufficient pepper cargo constantly 
worried the Dutch authorities5 although it was not the 
principal reason for the Company's withdrawal in 1712, 
nevertheless it precipitated or hastened the process of
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withdrawal. In 1711, the Company had clearly indicated its 
intention to re-establish the pepper monopoly in Banjarmasin 
when it sanctioned the expeditions, for it treated the 
contracts signed with the Banjarese in the seventeenth 
century as valid. The Banjarese, however, did not regard 
the treaties in the same light. They felt that by leaving 
Banjarmasin for about half a century since the dote of the 
last treaty , viz in 1664, the Dutch Company, through its 
own default, had effected the breakdown of the contracts.
It should be pointed out that the Banjarese detested . 
the system of monopoly just as much in the eighteenth as in 
the seventeenth century. They did not want any European 
power to dominate them commercially, and therefore deprive 
them of lucrative revenues. Maintenance of the laissez-faire* 
system was the policy of the Banjarese —  high prices for 
pepper could be expected on the competitive market whereas 
in a system of monopoly fixed prices to the benefit of the 
monopolist prevailed. For instance, the Dutch were only 
willing to pay four Spanish reals per pikul of pepper whilst 
the Chinese offered six to seven and a half reals for the 
same amount. Hence, despite the Panambahan*s keeness to 
give the exclusive pepper trade to the Dutch, the Banjarese 
merchants were reluctant to deliver their crop by applying 
’dilly-dallying* tactics or stocking the supplies for other 
Asi an buyers such as the Chinese.
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Another factor which accounted for the reluctance of 
the Banjarese to trc?.de with the Dutch and also the English 
was the meticulous trading system of the Europeans, The 
English and Dutch insisted not only on cheap but good 
quality pepper. Time and agian, the Europeans lodged 
complaints to the Banjarese authorities about the delivery 
of adulterated, dusty and sandy pepper. The Banjarese 
merchants alleged that the Europeans failed to take account 
of the fact that a certain amount of impurity was inevitable 
since production of pepper was carried out according to 
primitive methods by the Biajus.
Moreover, the Dutch and English often accused the 
Banjarese of cheating because of inaccuracies in their 
weights and measures. Apparently, they expected commercial 
operations to be conducted according to European standards, 
but here again, they tended to ignore the 1 cheating1 habit 
of the Banjarese. In many parts of south-east Asia, petty 
cheating in business transactions was not regarded as 
dishonesty but as shrewdness. As Beeckman observed, the 
Banjarese "esteem him ^fthe chea t_7 the best qualify'd, and 
most ingenious man, that can most over-reach and cheat his 
neighbour by false weights, measures, etc. Neither do they
1
reckon it a fault but glory in it as a masterpiece of wit."
1. Beeckman, A Voyage to Borneo, p. 105.
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Undoubtedly, the main reason for the Butch and English 
failure to operate successfully in Banjarmasin was due to the 
aggressive competition of the Chinese nakhodas. Since the 
beginning of the seventeenth century when they contributed 
to the growth of Banjarmasin as an international mart through 
bulk pepper purchases, the Chinese had become a significant 
commercial element in the area. Despite the many attempts 
of the Europeans to oust them, the Chinese managed to hold 
their position of pre-eminence in the commercial sphere.
This was because apart from the payment of high prices and 
the sale of luxury goods, the junk nakhodas had agents to 
work for them and powerful Chinese friends who could wield 
influence on the Banjarese nobility.
With the influx of more Chinese immigrants into 
Banjarmasin after the expulsion of the English in the 1700's, 
the number of intermediaries increased. By resorting to 
these agents, the nakhodas saved much time, ancl avoided che 
trouble of making preliminary transactions with the Banjarese 
merchants; perhaps this partly explains why the junk traders 
could afford to arrive late, viz. in February of each year 
while other merchants, especially the Europeans, hod to come 
much earlier to Banjarmasin. Normally the junks were able 
to load supplies immediately on their arrival without incurring 
high demurrage charges. Also, the Chinese agents constantly 
harassed the European buyers by going directly into the
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pepper regions to procure pepoer, and thus the English and 
Dutch were left with insufficient cargo by the time the 
perahus reached the lowlands bringing the pepper stocks.
The nakhodas would not have been such fierce and 
successful competitors if they.were not assisted by'the.,- 
Chinese leaders of Banjarmasin such as Lim Kim Ko. These 
Chinese heads, who did not have such extensive political 
and economic authority . as the Chinese Capitans of the 
Straits Settlements of the nineteenth century to create an 
"Imperium in Imperio", nevertheless, wielded sufficient 
influence on the Banjarese nobility to gain commercial 
privileges for their junk counterparts. For instance, if the 
nakhodas were frustrated by the European merchants in the 
delivery of pepper, then the Chinese leaders would contrive 
to procure the next season*s crop for the nakhodas. It was 
inevitable that a close relationship should exist between the 
'resident* Chinese and the junk merchants since a large 
proportion of the wealth of the former was derived from the 
retail trade of products imported by the junks of Canton or 
Amoy, '^hus, any attempt to lay obstacles in the path of the 
junk trade was fiercely resisted by the Banjar Chinese as in 
the 1700's when the English extorted money from the nakhodas.
In 1733, the urgency of coping with the pressing 
demands of the European market for bigger pepper supplies, 
and the problem of suppressing smuggling in fine spices
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between Banjarmasin and Macassar which was rife, led the 
Batavian uouncil to conclude a new treaty with the Panambahan. 
It is clear that the Council, recognising the tremendous 
handicaps confronted by its factors in pursuing an exclusive 
trade policy in the absence of a valid contract, was obliged 
to take positive measures towards securing economic advantages. 
Hamid Dulla apparently agreed because he felt that the Dutch 
would abide by the political conditions to defend Banjarmasin 
which were an essential part of the agreement. Although the 
ruler was willing to concede the main pepper trade to the 
Dutch, he was however unprepared to exclude the Chinese 
totally from it, but insisted on allowing the nakhodas to 
ship a specified amount of pepper from Banjarmasin annually.
To the Batavian authorities, the inclusion of the 
Chinese defeated the prime purpose of negotiations with 
the Panambahan, which was to oust the Chinese competitors. 
Henceforth, the Dutch felt that the contract for the jnonopoly 
of the pepper trade would be ineffective despite the 
exclusion of all other rival merchants. It is possible 
that ^amid Dullafs insistence on the continuance of the junk 
trade provoked the t)utch to refrain from fulfilling their 
military obligations. On the other hand, serious doubts 
can be raised as to whether the Batavian authorities who 
had shunned political involvement in Banjarmasin all along, 
were really genuinely interested in constructing a factory,
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as has previously been observed. Rather, it would be truer 
to say that they wanted the maximum'commercial advantages 
with the least political commitments. Hence, the careful 
wording of the articles to ensure that no specific date was 
set for the construction or completion of the factory and 
stockade. Instead, to maintain the defence clauses, the 
Dutch posted a guard ship at the mouth of the Barito river 
for surveillance and also to check the junks for contraband 
pepper, thereby hoping at least to achieve a 'near perfect* 
system of monopoly. . \
The presence of a Dutch squadron was invaluable to
the Banjarese, Early in the 1730's the Bugis, after a 
temporary respite, decided to launch new attacks on Banjarmasin. 
Smuggling and plundering off the Banjar coasts were rampant* 
Despite their vast numbers and military prowess, the ventures 
of the Bugis leaders, Arun Sinkong, Toassa and Topass Aray,
were ill-timed as a strong defence was mounted by the Dutch
and the Banjarese troops. After the initial exchanges in 
which neither side gained a positive advantage, the Dutch, 
through sheer naval strategy and the use of better arms, 
managed to defeat the Bugis in Pulau Laut.
Instead of showing his appreciation by assisting 
the Dutch to enforce the monopoly contract, Hamid Dulla, 
apparently influenced by the court nobles, imposed a five 
per cent tax on all incoming and out-going vessels and
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prohibited the guard vessel from continuing its surveillance 
duties. I’his worsening of the commercial situation led the 
Dutch, noting their decreased importance and also the poor 
results of the pepper trade, to abandon Banjarmasin in 1737.
In a survey of European voyages to Banjarmasin in the 
eighteenth century, it should be pointed out that normally, 
the English and the Dutch were not in the area simultaneously. 
As soon as the Dutch factors left, the English would 
invariably move into Banjarmasin again. As co-signatories 
of Dutch-Banjarese treaties, the Dutch would not tolerate 
the presence of the English and hence the latter, in order 
to avoid direct conflict, discreetly sailed off. The 
necessity of having a European power late in the 1730's in 
Banjarmasin to preserve his status quo and to defend his 
territory against future enemy incursions persuaded Tamjeed 
Dulla to invite the English Company to trade after the Dutch 
withdrawal. This was the first time since 1707 that the 
Company received an official invitation from the Banjarese 
court, for hitherto the ventures conducted between 1713 and 
1726 were made to appear as private voyages, because of the 
Banjarese distrust and 'inveterate' hatred of the English.
Initially, the Directors had no intentions of providing 
armed support, since their objectives in renewing commerce 
with the Banjarese were to procure pepper and to perpetuate 
the China trade, which still held vast possibilities
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especially in tea* where the market value had increased 
rapidly because of its popularity as a beverage in Europe. 
Unfortunately? as in previous instances, the ruler was not 
prepared to grant pepper supplies unless the English complied 
with his request for military support. Realising that 
military commitment was the only practicable way of 
establishing a permanent foothold in Tartas, and to forestall 
future Dutch designs of renewing commerce with the Banjarese, 
the Biroctors proraised to despatch a guard vessel to the 
Panambahan in 1741.
However, events did not turn out favourably for the 
English. Baron van Imhoff, the new Governor-Penoral of 
Batavia and an Ang3.ophobe, contrived not only to oust the 
English from Banjarmasin but to resettle the Dutch permanently 
in the area. He considered his predecessor1s action in 
withdrawing from Banjarmasin as sheer acts of cowardice.
Though it was all right for the Dutch Company not to be 
involved in Banjarese politics, it should not have abandoned 
the place at the first signs of commercial failure. By 
leaving Banjarmasin, the Dutch, through their own default, 
had allowed other competitors, especially the English, to 
re-establish trade. Van Imhoff also felt that only force 
could subjugate the Banjarese and compel them to maintain 
the treaty effectively.
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The resurgence of smuggling in opium and spices on a 
wide scale off Banjarmasin and the incident involving the 
Madurose Sultan provided the Dutch with the opportunity of 
entering Tartas with a squadron of armed vessels in 1746.
The English factors, who had unwittingly given refuge to 
the Madurese Sultan, a 'wanted* prisoner because of his 
rebellious activities against the Dutch Company, was forced 
under threat of arms and a blockade of the coast to leave 
Tartas.* It is significant to note that if the Dragon had 
arrived earlier, a shameful retreat by the English could 
possibly have been averted as the armed ship \/ould have 
served as a useful means of defence against the Dutch.
By expelling the English and blockading the coast,
the Dutch had broken the first article of the Anglo-Dutch
Marine Treaty of 1674 which was signed in Europe at the
end of the third Anglo-Dutch war. This stipulated that
neither side should exclude the other from commerce and free
navigation in a territory which was at peace with the Dutch
or the English. A strong protest from the Directors of the
English Company about the domineering behaviour of Van Imhoff
2
in 1749 was waived aside by the Dutch Company. Subsequently, 
the Directors did not broach the question again until 1762 
when discussions were held between the English representatives 
and the Dutch commissioners, Van Schoonhoven and Van der Hoop,
2 * Dutch records (A) Vol. 17, 15 December 1762.
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over the exclusive right of the English to salpetrc in India
The English based their claims on the fact that the 
Dutch Company held a pepper monopoly in Banjarmasin which 
was prejudicial to English interests* Notwithstanding the 
existence of Anglo-Ba.njarese trade and relations as stipulated 
in an unofficial agreement between 1741 and 1747, the Dutch 
had evicted the English factors, and thereby had perpetrated 
a breach of the treaty of 1674. The Dutch commissioners in 
reply justified Van Imhof^s actions on the ground of former 
contracts concluded between the Dutch Company . aiid the 
Banjarese, the existence of which the English had strongly 
denied* It was apparent that the English had invalidated 
the Dutch-Banjarese treaty of 1733. They argued that if a 
treaty did exist, the Dutch should have adhered to it by 
despatching vessels to trade and to protect the Panambahan. 
Instead, there was neither evidence of Dutch commercial 
operations nor a guard ship in Banjarmasin, hence proving 
that the Dutch Company had already renounced all previous
4
contracts. Except for an unsuccessful attempt by the 
Bencoolen factors to procure a cargo of pepper at Banjar for 
the Canton market in 1766, no positive action was taken by; 
the English against the Dutch claims to Banjarmasin until 
the early nineteenth century with the advent of Stamford
3* Dutch records (A) Vql. 17, 11 December 1762.
4. Ibid.
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Raffles and Alexander Hare.
In the event, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century the Dutch Company ensured its sovereignty over 
Banjarmasin by the ratification of a new treaty in 1747.
In this, the Panambahan, in effect, signed away his freedom. 
Henceforth, though Banjarmasin was freed from fears of 
external threats, the establishment of Butch control 
signified the beginning of the end of the Banjarese political 
and commercial independence. Surprisingly, the Banjarese 
submitted themselves to Dutch suzerainty although they had 
fiercely resisted all previous attempts at domination, 
probably because they welcomed Dutch protection during these 
insecure periods, as had previously been manifested in the 
ruler’s request for a Dutch fortified factory.
The main object of this study was to trace the development 
of Banjarmasin as a commercial mart and to analyze the 
activities of the English and Dutch in the region during 
a period which historians hove neglected. It is conceivable 
that Dutch and English authors hove deliberately ignored 
the first half of the eighteenth century of Banjarese history 
not because the records were unavailable but more because 
they chose to write on the pre-1700 and post-1747 periods 
when the ventures of the Dutch and English East Indio 
Companies in south-east Borneo had more permanency and were 
not so temporary and sporadic.
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It has already been observed that the cause and outcome 
of the European ventures were due to certain factors, such 
as Banjarese intransigence and resistance to European 
domination or control, Asian especially Chinese competition, 
and the reluctance of the Dutch and English East India 
Companies to extend their political responsibilities in . 
Banjarmasin* In order to assess the relative importance of 
each factor, one has to examine the underlying motive for' 
European penetration into Banjarmasin5 then only can one 
reach a definite conclusion t?bout the strength or weakness 
of the Banjarese vis-a-vis the Dutch and the English. In 
this context, an important question which arises is whether 
the English and the Dutch could really have been ousted by 
the less technically and militarily advanced Banjarese if 
they had been determined to establish a strong foothold in 
the area.
With regard to the English East India Company, it has 
been stressed that the Directors1 initial objective in 
despatching ships to Banjarmasin was to promote the China 
trade. Interest in Borneo was therefore only incidental —  
to fulfill the need for an intermediate station. The 
Directors definitely had no desire to colonize the area, 
but only to purchase pepper for the China market. In this, 
their express instructions to the employees were clear-cut 
and well defined. In the event, however, when their factors
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in Banjarmasin exceeded their commercial functions and 
became involved in Banjarese internal matters, the Directors, 
who considered that their employees knew best how to advance 
the Company's interest, merely accepted this state of affairs.
Evidently, the men on the spot in Banjarmasin who 
were given powers to establish a factory, felt the urgency 
and expedience of embracing political duties in addition to 
commercial tasks if they intended to trade successfully in 
the area. They were given a free hand to carry out the 
commercial policy of the English Company so long asijhey did 
not commit themselves and pledge military aid to the 
Banjarese. Men like London, Barre and Joyner nevertheless 
felt that it was imperative for the MPax Brittanica11 to 
follow the establishment of trade. The political situation 
in the East served to enhance the personal ambitions of the 
English chiefs in Banjarmasin. Although Holland' and England 
were at peace in Europe, relations between the two peoples 
in the East Indies were not so amicable. The Amboyna massacre 
had demonstrated Dutch hostility towards the English and this 
animosity was also witnessed in Sumatra and the Celebes.
The chiefs in Banjar were therefore determined that their 
Company should entrench itself in the area. If Banjarmasin 
were established as a British base, they felt, it would be 
strategically sited to enable English ships to sail safely 
through the Java sea. Even more important, a base would
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deter the Dutch from setting foot in the area. The actions 
of the English factors in recruiting Bugis soldiers, in 
stationing a guard vessel at the river mouth, and ultimately, 
in fortifying the settlement all indicated their tendency 
to establish a military and strategic station in Banjarmasin.
Nevertheless, the objective of the English factors 
differed from that of their superiors in London. It is 
important to note that the Directors approved the fortification 
plan only because they thought that it would increase the 
Company^ prospects of a better trade in Banjarmasin. The 
Banjar factors, fully realising this, had only put forth 
the economic argument when they were asking for the 
fortification plan to be approved, '^ 'here is no evidence to 
show that they suggested the colonial motive as well for 
fear that their decision to fortify Banjar would be overruled.
This lack of political interest in Banjarmasin on the 
part of the Directors \ias further seen when the fortification 
plan failed and the English were expelled from Banjar.
Despite the factors* pleas for a punitive expedition to be 
sent to Banjarmasin, the English Company did not take any 
positive action until seven years later when it merely ordered 
the new supercargoes to obtain reparation costs from the 
Banjarese — * even then, it did not send any squadron to 
ensure that the Banjarese repaid their debts.
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A slight change occurred in the English Company's 
policy only in the early 1740's when the Directors were 
prepared to grant military assistance to the Banjarese in 
order to ensure that some security was offered to their 
China-bound vessels against Bugis attacks in the Java Sea.
Here again, it must be noted that the Company was not interested 
in Banjarmasin for its own sake but only wanted to make use 
of the place to safeguard the route to China. However, in 
pursuing such an objective, it was nevertheless keen to avoid 
direct conflict with the Dutch, in recognition of the Anglo- 
Dutch Marin* Treaty of 1674. Thus when the Dutch squadron 
sailed into Tartas harbour in 1746 to assume control, the 
English failed to put up any effective resistance. It is 
likely that because of the presence of other alternatives 
whereby English vessels could by-pass Bnnjarmasin and sail 
to China via the Sunda Straits from Boncoolen, the Directors 
did not lodge any vehement protests against the Dutch until 
1762 when they brought up the Banjarnasin incident merely to 
strengthen their claims for saltpetre in India. It was this 
apathy and disinterest in Banjarmnsin of the Directors, more 
than the- Banjarese strength to resist the English traders 
that led to the Banjarese success in dislodging the English 
on several occasions.
Like the English Company, the Dutch Company was unable 
to establish a strong trading position in Banjarmasin in the
326
first half of the eighteenth century simply because it did 
not m^ke any determined efforts towards achieving such an 
end. Though the Batavian Council, the representative of the 
Dutch Company In the East Indies, had attained a very 
ind ependent position with regard to policy-making since the 
issuance of the last "Instructions” by the latter in 1650, 
it preferred to maintain the Company’s mercantile policy In 
which the extension of political responsibilities were to 
be avoided at all costs. This was particularly true of 
Bnnjnrmasin which was regarded as a subordinate pepper port, 
far less important than the more established places such as 
Jambi or Palombang. bndoubtedly, it was this low opinion of 
Banjarnasin, and the- reluctance of the Batavian Council to 
waste its resources of men and money which prevented the 
Dutch from taking positive steps to compel the Banjarese to 
adhere to the pepper treaties in the seventeenth century.
As it was immaterial whether it retained Banjarmnsin or not, 
the Council was therefore unanimously opposed to the idea of 
interfering in Banjarese politics. The numerous missives 
of the Governor-General to his factors, and the Council’s 
dismissal of Banjarese requests for armed aid against Bugis 
infiltration into the region testify to the indifferent 
attitude of the Dutch towards Benjaminsin. Hence, when the 
Banjarese halted their pepper supplies to the Dutch, the 
Council chose to withdraw its ships rather than use force 
to pursue trade.
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The departure of Dutch policy from that of non-involvement 
in indigeneous politics to one of active intervention in 
Banjarraasin in 1746 was the result of a change of personalities 
in the Batavian Council. Unlike his predecessors , Baron van 
Imhoff belonged to the new 1 breed* of Dutchmen who believed 
that commercial power could only be attained by the extension 
of the national frontier, and not by the conclusion of 
ineffective treaties. With the threat of foreign competition 
especially from the English, it was essential for the Dutch 
Company to set up colonies to safeguard the interests of the 
merchants. Although Van Imhoff realised that he was overstepping 
the bounds of his authority by advocating such a radical 
policy, he was nevertheless prepared to face the consequences. 
Imbued with a sense of notional consciousness which was 
simultaneously mixed with personal ambition, the Governor- 
General of Batavia took the initiative to establish political 
control in Banjarmasin. It can also be argued that with the 
decline in importance of the other pepper ports in the East 
Indies, the Governor-General grasped the significance of 
retaining Banjnrmasin for the Dutch Company*s vital pepper 
supplies before the English secured a firm position in the area.
In tracing the development of Banjarmasin as a 
primary pepper port, this study tries to show that without 
the influence of external factors, such as the influx of the 
Chinese, the increase in the demand for pepper on the 
European market, and the patronage of the neighbouring
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Indonesians9 the Banjarese on their own would not have been 
able to elevate their port to such a position of importance. 
The insistence of the Banjarese on subjugating the Biajus 
in order to reap call the profits of the pepper trade, and 
the dishonest practices of the Banjarese nobles in not 
honouring their pepper contracts, certainly did not create 
conditions conducive to economic development. Fortunately 
for the Banjarese, the settlement of the Chinese and their 
subsequent establishment of a sound trading system whereby 
many commercial functions which had been previously handled 
by the Banjarese were transferred to the Chinese, helped to 
attract foreign merchants to Tartas and K-ayu Tinggi. As far 
as day-to-day commercial transactions in Banjarmasin were 
concerned, this study tends to provide supplementary and 
confirmatory information on the subject of Asian trading 
methods which have also been discussed in great detail by 
Van Lcur and Meilink-Roel'of sz. Although figures on the 
volume of trade and the tonnage of ships are not readily 
available, it can be said that commercial practices in 
Banjarmasin were, in the main, similar to those which prevailed 
in other pepper ports such as Bantam in the same period. 
Because of the great importance of the south-east Asian 
pepper trade, the Bnnjarose x^ ere not only interested in 
self-rule but also the maintenance of the economic 
autonomy in the early part of the eighteenth century.
APPENDIX I
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SPANISH DOLLAR OR REAL OF EIGHT
Between 1600 and 1760, the Spanish dollar or real of 
eight was the current coin and unit of currency in many 
parts of South East Asia, including Banjarmasin* Also 
known as a piece of eight among the English, it was minted 
in Mexico, Peru or Seville* Linguistically, it was called 
real of eight because there were eight schellinger to a 
coin, and it appeared with subdivisions of 1/8, 1/16
and 1/32* In the 1620*s, the real was equivalent to 48 
stuivers or a rix-dollar. The Peruvian real, also known 
as the pillar dollar because of the presence of two 
pillars on the obverse of the coin, was debased by the 
middle of the seventeenth century. Consequently, the 
Dutch Company prohibited its circulation for some time*
It is conceivable that the Banjarese refused to accept 
pillar dollars after the period because of its debased 
value.
Sources
1* I.C. Scholten, Coins of the Dutch Overseas 
Territories, p. 32.
2. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, pp. 60-51.
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DUTCH-BANJARESE TREATY« 26 SEPTEMBER 1733
Contract, gemaakt en gesloten door den coning Dachmet 
Doula en den pangerang Souria de Laga, regeerders en in 
heerlijkhljd verheven in hot.coningrijk Banjermassing, met 
haare vrunden, de opperhonfden van de Generaale Geoctroyeerde 
Nederlandse Oostindische Comp, den coogman Christoffel de 
Marre en den ondercoopman David Brouwer, sijnde tot het 
sluyten dezer geauthoriseert door den Gouverneur-Generaal en 
de Edele heeren Baden van India tot Batavia.
ART, 1
De coning en pangerang, regeerders van deeze landen, 
beloven altoos met de Comp in vrundschap te leven en hare 
onderdanen de volgende bevelen te doen verstaan en tot de 
gehoorsaamhijd derzelve te constringeeren; ook dat dit 
contract by alle hare nasaten sal werden geobserveerd en tot 
eeuwig geheugen hetselve in coper laten synden, tot een 
eeuwige mernorie van onvergankelijkheid.
2
De Comp sal jaarli jks soo veel jonken hier ter handel 
tot het verkopen van Chineese wharen moeten tollereeren,als 
na dit coningrijk off rivier willen stevenen.
3
Een jonk off wankang sal door de Comp moeten werden 
getollereert, dat dezelve tot sijn voile lading van de 
Banjereesen peper inkoopt, maar geen meer.
4
Wanneer de jonv off \fenkang, die geperrnitterd is peper 
in te copen, binnen deeze rivier niet ^lladen soude kunnen 
werden, uyt vreese van niet sender gevaar buyten deeze river 
te geraken, sal dezelve het resterende syner lading mogen met 
gontings off andere inlandse vaartuygen na buyten orengen, 
om voor de bank hetselve te kunnen inneemen.
5
Tot voorkoming van alle sluykeryen sal aan het opper~ 
hoofd van de Comp, wanneer men peper na buyten sal bregen 
aan de jonk off wankang, eerst kennis moeten worden gegeeven 
(aan het opperhoofd van de Comp) dat die peper voor de 
gepermetteerde wankang is, die dan volgens sijn goedvinden 
een off twee van sijn manschappen daar sal opsetten, om te
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sien, dat die corl aan geen andere vaartuygen werd overgegeeven 
als aan dengeene, die tot den peperhandel is getollereert 
geworden.
6
Ook sal het de Comp vrystaan een vaartuyg tot brandwagt 
te leggen by de jonk, die tot den peperhandel gepermitteert 
werd, om te sien. dat dezelve in off buyten deeze rivier 
geen peper aan sijn medeniackers off andere overgeeft, !tzy 
onder wat pretext het soude mogen sijn, sulks niet te mogen 
geschieden.
7
Wanneer ymand in gontings, wankangs off andere vaartuygen, 
die gesloten sijn en waarmede men peper soude kennen vervoeren, 
buyten en behalven de wankang, die jaarlijks moet gepermitteerd 
werden, eenige peper laad, soo sal het opperhoofd van de Como 
de sabandhaar van Tatas by hem doen roepen en ten overstaan 
van dezelven de peper uyt die vaartuygen halen, confisqueeren, 
wegen, en gedeelt werden, een helft aan den coning voor de 
gecontracteerde prijs te betalon en de andere helft voor de 
Comp •
Wanneer den sabandhaar van Tatas, off dengeene, die uyt 
!sconings naam op Tatas is gestelt, by het opperhoofd van de 
Comp geroepen over sake, die geen uytstel off wagten kenne 
veele, en hy aanstons niet verschijnd, soo sal volgens 
goedvinden van het opperhoofd. Comp dienaren het alleen 
mogen verrigten en het van dieselven effect sijn sal off 
conings volkeren daar waren present geweest, om door uytstelle 
en te moeten wagten voor te comen, dat geen sluyker^e passeeren, 
dat anders ligtelijk soude gebeuren.
9
Voorts sal de Comp alle de peper werden gebragt, die 
in dit coningrijk werde bevonden, het picol off 12.5 ponden 
tegen 4i Spaanse reaal, soo voor den peper als conings tol, 
en geene meerder nog minder prijs te sullen mogen bedingen 
dan boven gesteld,
10
De Comp sal verpligt sijn ook alle de peper, die deese 
landen voortbregen, tot de gestelde prijs van 4^ - reaal het 
picol off 125 ponden te moeten aannemen, sonder eenigre om 
haar stoffighijd af te wysen.
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11
Men sal aan de Compagnie drooge en goede peper meet 
brengen, en de natte sal mogen werden uytgeligt en eerst 
gedroogt werden, eer men die behoeft in te slaan.
12
Sand, steenen off diergelyke dingen, die buyten de 
stoff van peper sijn, sal de Comp niet behoeven in te slaan, 
voor en aleer den peper is van alle het geene gesuyvert, dat 
hem vervalst heeft, rnaar schil, bast off hetgeene den peper 
selfs van hem gecft, sal men moeten inwegen soo het gebragt 
werd, sonder van eenige suyveringe te spreken.
13
De Comp sal gehouden sijn, wanneer hier een logie off 
pagger heeft gemaakt, off met scheopen off sloepen is leggende, 
dit land en volkeren op versoek van den coning en pangerang 
te assfstecren, wanneer van buyten off in deeze rivier eenige 
vyandelijkheeden werd gepleegt, sonder do ongelden, door de 
Comp gedaanj sal behoeven door den coning te werden gerestitueerd, 
maar sulks voorls Comp reekening te moeten blyven.
14
De Banjareezen, *t sy wie het soude mogen weescn, sullen 
de dienaren van de Comp onverhinder! laten en geen de minste 
molesten aandoen, off sodanige, die eenige fs Comp dienaren 
off onderhorige aandoen, besteelen of eenige andere 
oncrdentelijkheden tegen dezelve ploegen, sullen mogen 
werden opgepakt en by de Comp soo lang bewaart, tot den 
sabandhaar off dengeene, die in deese nogerye daartoe is 
gestelt, is geroepen, wanneer dien kwaaddoender daaraan sal 
werden overgegeven om volgens de wetten dezes lands door don 
coning gestrafft te werden over syne begane forten*
15
De dienaren en onderhorige van de Comp sullen de 
Banjareesen en al de onderhorige van den Sulthan geen de 
minste molesten, nog haar met drygingen goederen affdwingen 
off moeyelijkheden aandoen; den overtreder, die sulks 
aanvangt, sal door fs conings volkeren mogen werden opgepakt 
en aan het opperhoofd ten eerst en overgegeven, die desulke 
over sijn begane quaad na merite sal straffen.
16
Wanneer eenig Banjarees off andere onderhorige van den 
coning op de plaatsen kwam, daar *s Comp dienaren logeeren, 
en wilde amok speelen, sal men de sodanige daarvan affhouden 
en sien sulks te beletten, des mogelijk sijnde; maar anders 
sal het de dienaren, en wel voornamentlijk de schildwagten.
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die op haar posten staan, (gepermitterd zijn) de sodanige 
met goweld tegen te gaan met het gebruyk van zijn geweer^ 
en den geweldpleger daardoor dood off gequest werdende, 
sal men daar den sabandhaar kennis van geven, sonder 
verdere verantwoordinge te doen, sodanig ook behandelt sal 
werden de Hollanders, wanneer die by de Banjareese ook 
sodanig kwaad-plegen; en gequest rokende, sal daar ook geen 
navragen over sijn.
17
Wanneer eenige Engclsen, Franse, Portugeese off andere 
Europeese natie hier ten handel comen, soo dal den coning en 
pangerang haar moeten afwysen en segpen, sy geen goederen 
hier kenne bemagtigen, met die expressie, dezelven aanstons 
moeten vertrekken, sonder hier iets te mogen verkopeii off 
kopen.
18
Den coning en prngerang geven aan de Comp tot voortsetting 
van den handel de keur, wat grond sy het bequaamste oordeelen, 
om op te woonen, sijnde twee plaatsen hier in dese negery 
daartoe aangeweesen, het eene waarop men sedert het jaar 1727 
al heeft gewoont, en het andere, geleegen een wynig lager op 
de boncedenhoek van de eerste dwarsspruyt, daar men meede 
door de negery Oud-Banjer na de groote spruyt vaart, welke 
een van byde door de Comp can genomen en gebruykt werden.
19
De Comp sal op de grond, die het beste geoordeelt werd 
tot gebruyk, een logie off pagger mogen maken, na sulks goed 
gevonden werd, dan wel met scheepen fs jaarlijks een besending 
cloen, sooals men sedert het jaar 1727 gedaan heeft, sonder 
dat men genoodsaakt sal sijn een pagger off vastighijd te 
bouwen, 11 geen in het geheel aan het goodvinden van den 
Gouveneur-Generaal en de Raden van India blijft gcrefereert.
Ondcr stond: Aldus gecontracteert in de negary
Cayutange, gelegen in !t coningrik Banjermassen, dan 26 
September 1733.
Lager stond 1 s conings en pangerangs segul, gedrukt 
in roode lacque, met die van den pangerant in Tt swart.
Onder stonds Accordeert « was geteekend - D. Brouwer,
Source;
F.W. Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticunn Vol V, pp. 165-70,
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DUTCH-BANJARESE TREATY, 18 MAY 1747
Vernieuwt contract van handel, vrient- en bondgenootschap 
tusschen den sulthan Taradji Dulla, den pangerang Ratoe Anun 
benevens de verdere grooten van Banjermassing, en de magtige 
Hollandsche Oost-indische Maatschappyc, op speciale gegevene 
macht en order van den HoogEdclen Heere Gustaaf Willem,
Baron van Imhoff, Gouverneur-Generaal, en de WelEdele Heeren 
Raaden van Nederlands-India, gemaakt en geslooten door 
derzelver daartoe expresselijk afgesondene, den opperkoopman 
Steven Marcus van der Heyden, benevens de cooplieden Jan 
van Suchtelen en Daniel van den Burch,
Nademaal de voorige contracted tusschen de Nederlandsche 
Compagnie en de sulthans van Banjermassing niet zodanig als 
men wel gewenscht had, gestrekt hebben tot welzijn der 
wederzijdse onderdanen, en de volkeren van Banjer in het 
onderhouden derselver, inzonaerheyt in opzichte van het 
laatste, met den sulthan Chamidulla geslooten, geheel nalaatig 
zijn geweest, waardoor het contract genoegsaam aangcmerkt 
is geworden alsof het niet meer in wesen was, overzulx heeft 
den Gouveneur-Generaal en de Raden van India goedgevondcn 
gehad den oppercooprnan en president Steven Marcus van der 
Heyden, benevens de cooplieden Jan van Suchtelen cn Daniel 
van den Burgh expresselijk in commissie na Banjer te senden, 
met speciale magt cn last omme nader met den sulthan Tamdji 
Dulla en grooten derselver landen te confereeren en zodanig 
nieuw contract van handel en bondgenootschap te sluyten, als 
beter zoude kunnen voldoen aan de intentie van wcrderzeydse 
contracteerende partyen, *t welk in deser voege thans ten 
effecten gebragt en vastgestelt is,
Articul 1
Eerstelijk zal tusschen den sulthan, Ratoe Anum, 
benevens de verdere grooten en volkeren van Banjer en 
tusschen de Hollandsche Compagnie zijn en blyven een vaste 
vriendt- en bondgenootschap, zoodanig dat men elkanders 
welvaren van wederzyden zal trachten te bevorderen zonder 
daarvan af te wyken ofte veranderen.
Articul 2
Byaldien eenige vyand dit land van Banjer mogt komen 
aan te tasten, hetzy te waater of te land, belooft de 
Comp dat haar scbip, scheepen of volkeren, zich alhier 
bevindend, die van Bandjer na vermogen zullen bystaan, ten 
eynde zoodanig een vyand te helpen afweiren en te verdryven, 
zonder eenige onkosten voor kruyt of loot te rekenen.
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Articul 3
Maar wanneer onder de koninglyke Banjareesche familie,
11 zy tusschen twee brooders of twee zoonen, twecdragt off 
oorlog mogt ontstaan, zal de Comp niet behoeven of vermogen 
een der par thyen te helpen, maar by !t sneuvelen van een 
dier beyde zal den overwinnaar of die het rijk behout, aan 
de articulen van dit contract moeten voldoen*
Articul 4
Daarentegen belooft den sulthan het opperhooft, 
dienaren en onderdanen van de Comp, die zich alhier zullen 
bevinden, te neemen in zijn bescherming en te bezorgen dat 
sezelve geen leet of overlast komen te lyden, ft zy van de 
volkeren van Banjer, !t zy van andere; en by aldien zulx 
mogte geschieden, dat de Comp daarin behoorlyke satisfactie 
gegeven en de schuldige op het strengste gestraft worden, 
zullende de Comp van hare kant besorgen, dat haar volk den 
Banjaresen meede geen geweld of overlast arndoen, of die 
daaraan schuldig mogt bevonden werden, maar billikheyt straffe 
doen erlangen*
Articul 5
Voorts belooft den sulthan en Ratoe Anum alle de peper, 
die haar landt voorbrengt, geene uytgesondert, aan de Comp 
te leveren en te verkoopen, zonder aan eenige anderen, wie 
het ook zy, daarvan iets te moogen verkoopen of permitteeren 
uyt te voeren, ook te zullen beletten dat door hunnc 
onderdanen off inwoonders aan imant anders dan aan de Comp 
alleen eenige peper verkogt of gelevert word, ook niet uyt 
het landt vervoert•
Articul 6
Ingevolge van dien beloven den sulthan en Ratoe Anum 
ook alle Europesche natien, die alhier ten handel mogten 
willen koomcn ofte die door haar mogten werden i,y tgesonden, 
alle, geene uytgesondert, te sullen afwysen en niet te 
permitteeren dat deselve alhier eenige goederen aanbrengen, 
inkoopen, verkoopen of verhandelen, mitsgaders ook beletten 
dat eenige van hare onderdanen met deselve eenige de 
minste handel dryven. En zullen de schuldige, die daerop 
geattrappeert werden, als overtrecders van die contract 
gestraft werden*
Articul 7
Doch zal de Comp op des sulthans speciaal versoek 
permitteeren dat jaarlijx alhier eene Chinese wankang 
aankomt, en geen mecr, met zoodanige goederen als China 
uytlevert en alhier vertiert werden,.egter onder dese 
voorwaarde - die den sulthan en Ratoe opregtelijk belooven
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naar tc komen - dat door hi.n nog door hunne onderdanen 
gene peper aan deselve zal mogen verkogt, verruylt of in 
eenige maniere gelevert werden; maar aan de Comp alleen 2a 1 
het vrystaan van bar re alhier opgoslagene voorraat aan die 
wankang peper tc verkopen tegens 8 rijxdaaldcrs Spaans het 
picol.
Articul 8
Daarentogcn belooft de Comp alle be peper, die *t 
land van Bandjer voortbrengt, te zullen a a m e e m c n  en betalen 
tegens 6 rijxdaaldcrs Spaans de picol van 125 pond, nits 
deselve gelevert werd good en droog, zonder verxenging van 
sant of steentjes, en gesuyvert van alle vuyligheyd. Ook 
zal die peper met Comp gewigt cn schalen gowoopen werden van 
wedcrzeyde, des begerende, ten overstaan van twee 
gecomnitteerdens, ten eynde dese do ontstane disputcn 
zouden kunnen beslissen; en byaldien zulx ondooniijli is, 
zal die bcslissing moeten geschieden door den sulthan cn het 
opperhooft, dat hier Comp wegen zal wesen.
Articul 9
En gelijk den sulthan genegen is alle sluykclryen c-11 
vervoer van peper, zooveel in zijn vcrmoogen is, te woeren 
cn tcgen te gaan, geeft Zijn Iioogheyu tot betcre bereyking 
van dat oogmerk aan de Comp oppe-r hoof den, die alhier zullen 
zijn, vrye magt, om alle uytgaande vaartuygen te laaten 
visitoeren, zonder egter de daarop varende persoonen eenig 
Iced te doen; maar by ontdekking van peper zal men denzelven 
mogen aanslaan cn verdec-lcn, dc ecno helft voor de Comp 
en de andere ten voordeele van des sulthans schryvers.
Articul 10
Wydcrs belooft do Comp voor nu on altoos, zoo la.ngo 
dit contract ten vollen naargekomen werdt, te zullen toclaten 
de vrye vaart der Banjaresen op natavia en gohc.el Java, 
tot Orisse en Sourabaja toe, dog niet vender om de Oost,
' t zy naar Baly, Lombok , Sumbawa en de verdere eylanden tot 
Timor toe, of na de Baviaan; ook niet naar dc West of Noords 
als na Biliton, Palembang, uoliore, Malacca cn andere custen 
en landen, daar omhor gelcgen, tot al hetwelkc den sulthan 
de nodige orders zal gevcn, opdat zyne onderdanen door 
het niet naarkomen van dien geene schacle of ongcluk komen 
te ontmoeten.
Articul 11
Ook zal dc Comp magt hebbon alle inkomende vaartuygen, 
waarop suspicie valt, cxactelijk te visitoeren, ter ontdekking 
en agterhsling van desulken, die vreemde amphioen of Comp 
specerycn tragten in te voercn. En zullen Comp opperhoofden 
alle vaertuygen, waarin speceryen oi amphioen - niet by de
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Comp gekogt - bevonden worden, met derzelver ophebbende 
tnanschnppen naar Batavia mogen versenden, om aldaar naar 
maate van haar delict straffe te crlangen.
Articul 12
Eyndelijk belooft den sulthan aan de Comp ten 
genoegen een bekwame plaats en huys tot logemcnt der 
dienaren en berging van goederen en handelwaren te bezorgen, 
mits daarvoor betalend een billyke prijs5 insgelijks geven 
de sulthan en Ratoe Anum volkooraene vryheyd om een logie 
te vinden, in gelyker voegen als zulx door den voorigen 
sulthan Chamidulla is toegestaan geworden.
Aldus gedaan en gecontracteerd in *t hoff des sulthans 
tot Cajoetangi, den 18 Mey 1747* En zijn hiervan gemaakt 
twee eonsluydendc afschriften, op gelyke wyse g-etekent cn 
gesegeld, waarvan een onder Zijn Hoogheyd en een onder de 
commissianten verblevon is*
Onder het Maleyts stond en tvjec zeegels, een van den 
sulthan Tamdjidulla en een van Ratoe Anum, mitsgaders onder 
ft Hollands drie zegels van de commissianten, en daarbezyden 
getekents S.M. van der Heyden, Jan van Suchtelen en D* van 
der Burgh.
Daaronder: Accordoert - getekent - F* van Ruymbeek,
secretaris.
Ratificatie door Gouveneur-Generaal en Raden van
Indie.
... Zo wierd goedgevonden en verstaan hetselve te 
ratificeeren, behoudens de separate articulen, ter secreete 
resolutie van den 2 beser vermelt, en gemeltcn opperkoopman
Van der Heyden bereeds toegeSonden by missive van den 4 Juny
deses faars, mitsgaders de acte van ratificatie diendwegen 
te laten expedieeren na vorige exempclen, ook speciaal 
ten opsigte van Banjer te vinden bij resolutie van den 15 
Maart 1734,
Batavia in 11 casteel, dato voorschrcven - was 
getekend - G.W. van Imhoff, J. Hossel, D. Nolthenius,
J.H. Cluysenaer, J. van den Bosch, H. Verysel, A. van Broyel,
J.H. Thelingen, P.A* van de Parra, secretaris.
Separate artikelen, door Gouverneur-Generaal en 
Rade aan het voorgaande contract toegevoegd.
I
Aangesien in het jongst gerenoveerde contract van 
vriendschap tussen den sulthan Tamdji Dulla, den pangerang 
Ratoe Anum en de verdere groten van Banjermassing aan de 
eene, en de Nederlandsche Oostindische Comp aan de andere
338
zyde, onder den 17 May deses jaars 1747 eenige notabele 
veranderingen zijn gemaakt, soowel ten opsigte van de prijs 
van de peper als andersints, dewelke hetselve souden kunnen 
doen aanmerken als een nieuw contract, tegens de intentie 
der contracteerende parthyen, soo is nodig g 'oordeelt hy 
dit separate articul daaraf de nodige verklaring te doen 
en dienvolgende wel uytdrukkelijk te inhaereeren de vorige 
contracten, tussen de Nederlandse Comp en het rijk van 
Banjer, al van hondert jaren herwaards, gemaakt, als de 
grond en het fundament van de tegenwoordige, spccianl die 
van den jare 1664 en 1733, waaraff het presente alleen een 
nadere vcrnieuwinge en verklaringe is, en de pointen, daarby 
verraelt, allesins te doen standgrypen voor en soo vcrre in 
het laatste contract niet zijn verandort ofte geheel en al 
vernietigt•
II
Ook is tot nader verstand van het eerste articul der 
voormelde renovatie, spredende van de vernieuwing der 
vriendschap en bondgenootschap, zodanig dat men elkanders 
welvaren te wederzyden sal trachten te bevorderen, item van 
het tweede articul, houdende belofte aan de zyde van de Comp, 
om het land van Banjer, invoegen als daarby vermelt is, te 
beschermen, nodig g 1 oordeelt in desen te verklarcn, dat 
aan de zyde van den sulthan en pangerang, item de ' 
groten op Banjer, speciaal ook onder de voorschrcven vernieu- 
winge der bondgenootschap sal gehor,,n, dat aan niemand, die 
mctdc Comp in oorlog is, eenige schuylplaatse aldaar of in 
het geheele gebied van Banjer sal mogen gegeven werden, veel 
min eenige bescxerming, maar dat degeene, die fs Comp vyanden 
off rebellen sijn, aanstonds sullen moeten werden afgowecsen 
en, hetzy goedwillig off quaadwillig, van daar verdreven, 
sonder onderscheyt wie het ook zy.
Dese separate articulen sullen werden gehouden van 
voile kragt en waarde, even off deselve by het contract 
van den 18 Mey laastlcden van woorde tot woorde waren 
g 1insereert.
Source:
F.W* Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum. Vol. V, pp. 448-54.
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